Common use of Protection and Control Clause in Contracts

Protection and Control. 1.3.1. The protection systems, which protects transmission system elements, shall be capable of minimizing the severity and extent of disturbances to the transmission system while themselves experiencing a first-order single contingency such as the failure of a relay protection system to operate or the failure of a breaker to trip. In particular: 1.3.1.1. the elements designated by the Transmitter as essential to system reliability and security shall be protected by two protection systems. Each system shall be independently capable of detecting and isolating all faults on those elements. These elements shall have breaker failure protection, but breaker failure protection need not be duplicated. Both protection systems shall initiate breaker failure protection; 1.3.1.2. to reduce the risk of both systems being disabled simultaneously by a single contingency, the protection system designs shall not use components common to the two systems; 1.3.1.3. the use of two identical protection systems is not generally, recommended, because it increases the risk of simultaneous failure of both systems due to design deficiencies or equipment problems; 1.3.1.4. the protection systems shall be designed to isolate only the faulted element. For faults outside the protected zone, each protection system shall be designed either not to operate or to operate selectively in coordination with other protection systems; 1.3.1.5. Customer protection settings for protections affected by conditions on the transmission system shall be coordinated with those of the transmission system; 1.3.1.6. protection systems shall not operate to trip for stable power swings following contingencies that are judged by protection system designers as not harmful to the transmission system or its Customers; 1.3.1.7. the components and software used in all protection systems shall be of proven quality for effective utility application and following good utility practice; 1.3.1.8. critical features associated with the operability of protection systems and the high voltage interrupting device (HVI) shall be annunciated or monitored; 1.3.1.9. the design of protection systems shall facilitate periodic testing and maintenance. Test facilities and procedures shall not compromise the independence of the redundant protection systems. Test switches shall be used to eliminate the need to disconnect wires during testing; 1.3.1.10. the two protection systems shall be supplied from separate secondary windings on one voltage transformer or potential device and from separate current transformer secondary windings, i.e., from two separate current transformers; 1.3.1.11. separately fused and monitored DC sources shall be used with the two protection systems. For all generating Facilities connected to the transmission system, two separate DC station battery banks shall be required to provide the required degree of reliability; and 1.3.1.12. protection system circuitry and physical arrangements shall be designed to minimize the possibility of incorrect operations from personnel error. 1.3.2. Specific protection and control practices and equipment requirements are set out in Schedule G of this Agreement. 1.3.3. Transmitters and Customers should apply protection systems, using the typical tripping matrix for transmission system protection shown in Exhibit E.2, of this Schedule E.

Protection and Control. 1.3.1. The protection systems, which protects transmission system elements, shall be capable of minimizing the severity and extent of disturbances to the transmission system while themselves experiencing a first-order single contingency such as the failure of a relay protection system to operate or the failure of a breaker to trip. In particular: 1.3.1.1. the elements designated by the Transmitter or the IESO as essential to system reliability and security shall be protected by two protection systems. Each system shall be independently capable of detecting and isolating all faults on those elements. These elements shall have breaker failure protection, but breaker failure protection need not be duplicated. Both protection systems shall initiate breaker failure protection; 1.3.1.2. to reduce the risk of both systems being disabled simultaneously by a single contingency, the protection system designs shall not use components common to the two systems; 1.3.1.3. the use of two identical protection systems is not generally, recommended, should be avoided because it increases the risk of simultaneous failure of both systems due to design deficiencies or equipment problems; 1.3.1.4. the protection systems shall be designed to isolate only the faulted element. For faults outside the protected zone, each protection system shall be designed either not to operate or to operate selectively in coordination with other protection systems; 1.3.1.5. Customer protection settings for protections affected by conditions on the transmission system shall be coordinated with those of the transmission system; 1.3.1.6. protection systems shall not operate to trip for stable power swings following contingencies that are judged by protection system designers as not harmful to the transmission system or its Customers; 1.3.1.7. the components and software used in all protection systems shall be of proven quality for effective utility application and following good utility practice; 1.3.1.8. critical features associated with the operability of protection systems and the high voltage interrupting device (HVI) shall be annunciated or monitored; 1.3.1.9. the design of protection systems shall facilitate periodic testing and maintenance. Test facilities and procedures shall not compromise the independence of the redundant protection systems. Test switches shall be used to eliminate the need to disconnect wires during testing; 1.3.1.10. the two protection systems shall be supplied from separate secondary windings on one of a voltage and current transformer or potential device and from separate current transformer secondary windings, i.e., from two separate voltage and current transformers; 1.3.1.11. separately fused and monitored DC sources shall be used with the two protection systems. For all generating Facilities connected to the transmission system, two separate DC station battery banks shall be required to provide the required degree of reliability; and 1.3.1.12. protection system circuitry and physical arrangements shall be designed to minimize the possibility of incorrect operations from personnel error. 1.3.2. Specific protection and control practices and equipment requirements are set out in Schedule G of this Agreement. 1.3.3. Transmitters and Customers should apply protection systems, using the typical tripping matrix for transmission system protection shown in Exhibit E.2, of this Schedule E.

Protection and Control. 1.3.1. The protection systems, which protects transmission system elements, shall be capable of minimizing the severity and extent of disturbances to the transmission system while themselves experiencing a first-order single contingency such as the failure of a relay protection system to operate or the failure of a breaker to trip. In particular: 1.3.1.1. the elements designated by the Transmitter or the IESO as essential to system reliability and security shall be protected by two protection systems. Each system shall be independently capable of detecting and isolating all faults on those elements. These elements shall have breaker failure protection, but breaker failure protection need not be duplicated. Both protection systems shall initiate breaker failure protection; 1.3.1.2. to reduce the risk of both systems being disabled simultaneously by a single contingency, the protection system designs shall not use components common to the two systems; 1.3.1.3. the use of two identical protection systems is not generally, recommendedshould be avoided, because it increases the risk of simultaneous failure of both systems due to design deficiencies or equipment problems; 1.3.1.4. the protection systems shall be designed to isolate only the faulted element. For faults outside the protected zone, each protection system shall be designed either not to operate or to operate selectively in coordination with other protection systems; 1.3.1.5. Customer protection settings for protections affected by conditions on the transmission system shall be coordinated with those of the transmission system; 1.3.1.6. protection systems shall not operate to trip for stable power swings following contingencies that are judged by protection system designers as not harmful to the transmission system or its Customers; 1.3.1.7. the components and software used in all protection systems shall be of proven quality for effective utility application and following good utility practice; 1.3.1.8. critical features associated with the operability of protection systems and the high voltage interrupting device (HVI) shall be annunciated or monitored; 1.3.1.9. the design of protection systems shall facilitate periodic testing and maintenance. Test facilities and procedures shall not compromise the independence of the redundant protection systems. Test switches shall be used to eliminate the need to disconnect wires during testing; 1.3.1.10. the two protection systems shall be supplied either from separate secondary windings on one of a voltage and current transformer or potential device and from separate current transformer secondary windings, i.e., from two separate voltage and current transformers; 1.3.1.11. separately fused and monitored DC sources shall be used with the two protection systems. For all generating Facilities connected to the transmission system, two separate DC station battery banks shall be required to provide the required degree of reliability; and 1.3.1.12. protection system circuitry and physical arrangements shall be designed to minimize the possibility of incorrect operations from personnel error. 1.3.2. Specific protection and control practices and equipment requirements are set out in Schedule G of this Agreement. 1.3.3. Transmitters and Customers should apply protection systems, using the typical tripping matrix for transmission system protection shown in Exhibit E.2, of this Schedule E.