Shared Data Structure Causes Synchronization Overhead Sample Clauses

Shared Data Structure Causes Synchronization Overhead. ‌ The second obstacle for parallelizing MCTS is a shared search tree. A parallel al- gorithm with a shared data structure suffers from synchronization overhead when it utilizes locks for data protection. Locks are notoriously bad for parallel performance because other threads have to wait until the lock is released. Moreover, locks are often a bottleneck when many threads try to acquire the same lock. The MCTS algorithm uses a tree data structure for storing the states of the domain and guiding the search process. The basic premise of a search tree in MCTS is relatively simple: (A) nodes are added to the tree in the order in which they were expanded. (B) nodes are updated in the tree along with the order in which they were selected. In parallel MCTS, parallel threads are manipulating a shared search tree concurrently, and locks are required for data protection. It seems that we should have synchronization without using locks to avoid synchronization overhead. In Chapter 5, we show how we deal with this obstacle.
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