The Collapse of Russellian Monism Sample Clauses

The Collapse of Russellian Monism. The third and final objection was raised by Xxx Xxxx (2015) who claims that Russellian monism is not a better alternative to either physicalism or dualism, but it is actually in danger of collapsing into one or the other, depending on whether consciousness is a fundamental component of the universe or not. Kind (2015) does not necessarily claim that Russellian monism is false but expresses pessimism about whether it can transcend the divide between dualism and physicalism. The dualist will insist that consciousness is inscrutable – a fundamental aspect of reality, while the physicalist will insist that inscrutables are non- phenomenal (Kind 2015). Depending on whether the Russellian monist endorses panpsychism or panprotopsychism, the view will collapse into dualism or idealism in the case of the former, and physicalism in the case of the latter. So, according to Kind (2015), while Russellian monism might sound as an alternative to the two traditional views, it is merely a reconceptualization or reinterpretation of the same age-old problems. It is unclear then why Xxxxxxxxxx monism should be considered as progressing the debate with regard to the mind- body problem. Xxxxx and Xxxxxxx (2020) have argued that Kind’s (2015) argument misconstrues Russellian monism since the theory does not purport to settle if consciousness is fundamental or not, but just to provide a framework to discuss that question – a framework different from the ones provided by physicalism or dualism. With regard to traditional dualism and traditional materialism, Xxxxx and Xxxxxxx claim that the following is how Russellian monism can make a different contribution and what sets the view apart: “By construing (proto)phenomenal properties as categorical grounds of physical dispositional properties, Russellian monism provides a framework for developing a view that has neither of those shortcomings: a view that adequately integrates consciousness into nature without denying or distorting consciousness’s distinctive features.” (2020: 239) I also think that the danger that Russellian monism faces is not actually between dualism and physicalism, but between idealism and physicalism. That is, if all concrete reality is mental, it could be said that reality simply is mental. If all dispositions are grounded in an underlying categorical nature which is purely phenomenal, then reality at the fundamental level is wholly mental, which could be construed as a version of idealism. (Though, it is quest...