Xxxxxxx on intention. XX Xxxxxxx’x subtle criticism of DER, and specifically the way intention might be morally significant, has been an important contribution to the contemporary literature on double effect92. The main thrust of his criticism is that the permissibility of an action does not depend on the agent’s intentions in the way that the DER maintains, and that we are led to view what is really just an ‘illusory’ appeal of DER, because of a difference between two closely related forms of moral judgment, which can be based on the same moral principles. The deliberative use of moral principles answer the question of permissibility, whereas the critical use of moral principles answers questions about the agent’s blameworthiness. Xxxxxxx argues that intention does not and should not feature in our deliberative use of moral principles, and therefore it is not non-derivatively relevant to permissibility.93 "It remains true that a person who intends to kill noncombatants in order to shorten the war by undermining morale (and has no further justification for her action) acts wrongly - she has an intention that she should abandon. But this truth should not be taken to suggest that intention has a fundamental role in determining the impermissibility of this action, in the way claimed by double 92 Xxxxxxx, Moral Dimensions: Permissibility, Meaning, Blame. effect. The intention is wrongful because the act intended is wrongful, and the act is wrongful because of its likely consequences, not (fundamentally) because of the intention."94 Before approaching Xxxxxxx’x position in more detail, and offering some objections, I consider a line of thinking that is also critical of DER and close to Xxxxxxx’x view. Xxxxxx Xxxxxx Xxxxxxx’x approach to DER rests on a distinction between evaluating acts and evaluating agents. Xxxxxxx’x view is distinctive and more subtle than Xxxxxxx’x argument.
