Empirical setting Clausole campione

Empirical setting. The data we use come from the 2003 NSSBF (National Survey of Small Businesses Finances) conducted by the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System. Detailed information of this dataset are given in section 2.7.3. In the survey there is also a section regarding the use of trade credit by firms. We use this information together with the information on bank financing to study the relationship between trade credit and bank credit. In particular we use the information whether the firm used trade credit or not during the last year and the information whether the firm has been financed by the bank in the last three years, and if yes, what was the interest rate charged by the bank. As explained in the previous section we want to test whether the use of trade credit has an effect on the contractual terms between bank and firm and on credit rationing. According to the theoretical model of ▇▇▇▇▇ and ▇▇▇▇▇▇▇ (1997) our hypothesis is that firms that use trade credit are those that suffer from relevant information asymmetries and thus they may experience credit rationing. These firms might use trade credit in order to access financing. On the other hand, firms whose characteristics are fully observed do not need to use trade credit to obtain financing. All firms, regardless of whether they use trade credit or not, apply for bank financing and some of them obtain credit at a given interest rate. Our empirical analysis aims to test whether there exists a relationship between the decision to use trade credit, the probability to obtain financing and the interest rate charged by the bank (cost of credit). We argue that the decision on the use ▇▇▇▇▇▇▇▇▇▇ ▇▇▇▇, Access to credit for SMEs: theories and evidence 77 Tesi di Dottorato in Diritto ed economia dei sistemi produttivi Universit`a di Sassari of trade credit may affect the other results, i.e. the probability to obtain financing and the cost of credit, in a different way depending on whether the firm uses trade credit or not. At the same time firms decide whether to use trade credit comparing their expected outcomes in terms of cost of credit and probability to obtain credit in the two choices. As already discussed, according to ▇▇▇▇▇ and ▇▇▇▇▇▇▇ (1997), the decision to use trade credit will be undertaken by firms in order to signal themselves as of good quality, to be financed at an affordable interest rate. We define these firms as opaque firms. Indeed, if they do not signal themselves, they will be charged a high...