REPUBLIEK VAN SUID-AFRIKA
REPUBLIEK VAN SUID-AFRIKA
Rapporteerbaar Van belang vir ander regters
DIE ARBEIDSHOF VAN SUID-AFRIKA, KAAPSTAD UITSPRAAK
SAAKNOMMER: C 881/2014
In die xxxx tussen:
Xxxxxxx XXXXX Xxxxxx XXXXX | Eerste applikant Tweede applikant |
en | |
ESKOM HOLDINGS BPK | Eerste Respondent |
KVBA | Tweede Respondent |
XXXXXX XX XXXXXXX | Derde Respondent |
Verhoor: 13 Augustus 2015
Uitspraak: 7 Desember 2015
Opsomming: Hersiening op grond van ongeldigheid i.p.v. onbillikheid.
Aansoek van die hand gewys op grond van Xxxxx v Steenkamp 2015 (4) SA 247 (A).
UITSPRAAK
STEENKAMP R
[1] Die applikante, Mnre Xxxxx en Xxxxx, is ontslaan deur die eerste respondent, Eskom. ‘n Kommissaris van die KVBA1, Mnr Xxxxxx Xxxxxxxxx0, het bevind dat die ontslag vir ‘n billike rede geskied het, maar nie kragtens ‘n billike proses nie. Vir die prosedurele onbillikheid het hy aan die twee applikante vergoeding van R20 000 elk toegeken.
[2] Die applikante wil die beslissing laat hersien kragtens artikel 145 van die Wet op Arbeidsverhoudinge3. Hulle voer aan dat hul ontslag ongeldig is, en nie bloot onbillik nie; dat dit van geen regskrag is nie; en dat Eskom gelas moet word om hulle terugwerkend in hul poste te herstel.
[3] Ek het hierdie xxxx op 13 Xxxxxxxx 2015 aangehoor. Uitspraak word gelewer op 7 Desember 2015. Die rede vir die geruime tydsverloop tussen verhoor en uitspraak is dat die eerste respondent xxxxx steun op die uitspraak van die Arbeidsappèlhof in Edcon v Steenkamp.4 Daardie uitspraak is op xxxxxxx xxxxx geneem na die Konstitusionele Hof. Ek het aangedui dat ek op die bindende gesag van die Konstitusionele Hof sou wag voordat ek uitspraak gee in hierdie xxxx. Daardie hof het die xxxxx aangehoor op 8 September 2015. Op hierdie stadium, drie maande later en op die vooraand van die jaarlikse reses, het daardie hof nog nie uitspraak gegee nie. Ten einde die partye nie xxxxxx xx laat wag en hierdie uitspraak te laat oorstaan tot na die reses nie, het ek dus besluit om uitspraak xx xxx met verwysing na die gesag van die Arbeidsappèlhof en sonder die xxxxxxx van die hoogste hof.
[4] Eskom is ‘n openbare maatskappy in staatsbesit, geskep volgens Wet 13 van 2001, en die nasionale elektrisiteitsverskaffer. Die applikante, Mnre Xxxxxxx Xxxxx en Xxxxxx Xxxxx, het by Eskom se depot op Worcester gewerk. Hulle was lede van die National Union of Mineworkers (NUM).
1 Kommissie vir Versoening, Bemiddeling en Arbitrasie (die tweede respondent).
2 Die derde respondent.
3 Wet 66 van 1995.
4 2015 (4) SA 247 (LAC).
[5] Die applikante is ontslaan nadat hulle waatlemoene gesteel het. Hulle was aan diens as tegnici. Hulle het in ‘n Eskom-bakkie na ene Xxxx xx plaas buite Rawsonville xxxx, die waatlemoene gesteel, en Xxxx het hulle betrap.
[6] Eskom het ‘n dissiplinêre verhoor gehou. Die voorsitter het bevind dat hulle summier ontslaan moet word. Hulle het geappelleer. Die appèlvoorsitter het die sanksie van ontslag vervang met onbetaalde skorsing vir twee weke. Die applikante het diens xxxxxx, maar twee weke later het die algemene bestuurder van Eskom Xxx-Kaap op sy beurt die sanksie van die appèlvoorsitter tersyde gestel. Hy het die applikante meegedeel dat die sanksie van ontslag steeds xxx xxxx is.
[7] NUM het ‘n geskil van onbillike ontslag na die KVBA xxxxxx. By die arbitrasie is die applikante verteenwoordig deur Me Tapiwa Ralehoko xxx Xxxxxxx Xxxxxxxx & Xxxxxx. Eskom is verteenwoordig deur die huidige prokureur wat hierdie aansoek teengestaan het, Mnr Xxxx Xxxxx xxx Xxxxxx Xxxx Xxxxxxxxx. Die arbiter, Mnr Xxxxxx xx Xxxxxxx (die derde respondent), het bevind dat die ontslag vir ‘n billike rede geskied het, maar nie volgens ‘n billike proses nie. Die rede daarvoor was dat Eskom nie die dissiplinêre kode gevolg het nie. Vir die prosedurele onbillikheid het hy aan elk vandie twee appliaknte vergoeding van R20 000 toegestaan.
[8] Die applikante voer aan dat hul ontslag ongeldig was en van geen regskrag nie. Die rede daarvoor, sê hulle, is dat die dissiplinêre kode ‘n kollektiewe ooreenkoms tussen Eskom en NUM is; dat dit dus xxxx vorm van die dienskontrakte van werknemers xxxx Xxxxx en Xxxxx; dat hulle nie regsgeldiglik ontslaan is nie; en dat die arbiter nie die regsbevoegdheid gehad het om die arbitrasie aan te hoor nie en dus ultra xxxxx opgetree het.
[9] Ter opsomming, dus, voer die applikante aan dat die arbitrasietoekenning hersien moet word in terme van a 145(2)(iii) van die Wet.
[10] Die applikante xx xxxx xxxxx op twee gronde:
10.1 Xxx ontslag was nie regsgeldig nie.
10.2 Die arbiter het nie jurisdiksie gehad nie en het buite sy magte opgetree.
[11] Eskom doen aan die hand dat:
11.1 die arbiter jurisdiksie gehad het om die geskil voor hom aan te hoor, synde ‘n geskil oor ‘n beweerde onbillike ontslag;
11.2 hierdie Hof nie jurisdiksie het om oor die toepassing van die kollektiewe ooreenkoms te beslis nie; en
11.3 dat die Hof in elk geval nie spesifieke nakoming kan beveel nie aangesien die applikante oneerlik was en nie op hul dienskontrak – wat hulle verbreek het – kan staatmaak nie.
[12] Ten einde te beslis of die ontslag regsgeldig was – en dus of die KVBA jurisdiksie gehad het oor die vraag of daar ‘n billike ontslag was – is die toets wat hierdie Hof moet toepas nie of die beslissing van die arbiter redelik was nie5, maar of dit korrek was.6
[13] Die applikante voer aan dat die dissiplinêre kode (DP) van Eskom xxxx is van die kollektiewe ooreenkoms met NUM; daarom xxxx van hul dienskontrakte; end at hul ontslag strydig was met die DP, daarom ongeldig en nietig. Hulle betoog verder dat Eskom ‘n stislwyende ooreenkoms met hulle bereik het tot die effek dat hulle, na hul suksesvolle xxxxx, net twee weke se skorsing sonder betaling opgelê is.
[14] Mnr Rautenbach het ter ondersteuning van sy betoog xxxxxx xx
Xxxxxxxxx v CPUT7 waarin die Hof beslis het dat, waar ‘n dissiplinêre kode
5 Xxxx uiteengesit in Sidumo v Rustenburg Platinum Mines Ltd (2007) 28 ILJ 2405 (CC).
6 SARPA v SA Rugby (Pty) Ltd [2008] 9 BLLR 845 (LAC); Sanlam Life Insurance Ltd v CCMA
(2009) 30 ILJ 2903 (LAC) te 2908.
7 (2009) 30 ILJ 1229 (C).
xxxx is van ‘n dienskontrak en die werkgewer nie daarvolgens optree nie, die versuim tot nietigheid van ‘n ontslag in terme van so ‘n prosedure lei.
[15] In hierdie geval wys Mnr Rautenbach daarop dat die DP verskeie gebiedende klousules bevat, bv:
15.1 “This procedure shall apply throughout Eskom Holdings Ltd…”
15.2 “Parties using this procedure shall apply…
15.3 “An employee shall, during all disciplinary proceedings, be entitled to be assisted or advised by a representative.”
15.4 “A written notice advising the employee of the alleged misconduct …, process to be followed (enquiry, hearing or pre-dismissal arbitration), the particulars relating thereto … shall be furnished to the employee…”
15.5 “….the manager shall prepare for an adversarial approach.”
15.6 “The parties must exchange all relevant documents…”
[16] Die XX xxxx dit duidelik dat werknemers die reg op xxxxx het – ‘n reg wat die applikante uitgeoefen het. Daar is egter geen melding daarvan dat die appèlvoorsitter slegs ‘n aanbeveling kan maak wat deur Eskom se topbestuur ongedaan gemaak mag word nie. Die applikante voer aan dat die algemene bestuurder ultra xxxxx opgetree het deur die appèlbesluit omver xx xxxx en dat sy besluit xx Xxxxx en Xxxxx xx ontslaan, ongeldig is.
Het die arbiter jurisdiksie gehad?
[17] Die vraag of die arbiter jurisdiksie gehad het, is nou verweef met die vraag of Xxxxx en Xxxxx xx ontslag regsgeldiglik plaasgevind het. As dit nie gebeur het nie, het Mnr Xxxxxxxxxx betoog, was daar geen ontslag nie en die KVBA het geen regsbevoegdheid gehad om ‘n onbillike ontslagsaak aan te hoor nie.
[18] In hierdie verband het hy gesteun op NEHAWU v University of Transkei8
waar die hof hom xxxx volg uitgelaat het:
8 [1999] 3 BLLR 244 (LC).
“At the outset of the hearing it was agreed that the application would be argued in two stages as the first stage might dispose of the matter. The first stage relates to the validity of the dismissal or, more accurately, whether in law there has been a dismissal. The second relates to the fairness of the dismissal, if there has been one.”
[19] Daardie xxxx is met goedkeuring aangehaal deur die Arbeidsappèlhof in Revan Civils v NUM9 in die konteks van die vraag of die werknemers in daardie xxxx regsgeldig ontslaan is in terme van die bepalings van a 189A van die WAV. Die hof steun op sy beurt op die vroeëre beslissing in De Beers Group Services (Pty) Ltd v NUM10 om te bevestig dat voortydige kennisgewings onder a 189A(8) en die daaropvolgende ontslag ongeldig en sonder regskrag is.
[20] Mnr Rautenbach se steun op die De Beers-beginsel is egter ongedaan gemaak deur die ongewone stap van die Arbeidsappèlhof om sy eie bevindings in Revan en De Beers omver xx xxxx in die onlangse uitspraak in Edcon v Steenkamp.11 Xxxx xx in die inleiding uitgewys het, is daardie xxxx op xxxxxxx xxxxx xxxx die Konstitusionele Hof aangehoor op 8 September 2015; maar tot op hede, drie maande later en op die vooraand xxx xxxxx, het die hoogste hof nog nie uitspraak gegee nie, en hierdie Hof is gebonde aan die nuutste regspraak van die Arbeidsappèlhof in Steenkamp.
[21] Gegewe die xxxx dat die applikante in hierdie xxxx op die vorige regspraak van die Arbeidsappèlhof in Revan en De Beers gesteun het, is dit ongelukkig nodig om ‘n aansienlike gedeelte van daardie hof se latere uitspraak in Xxxxxxxxx aan te haal ten einde die ratio van daardie beslissing toe te pas op die feite van hierdie xxxx:
“[37] … The Labour Appeal Court in De Beers, without any elaboration of reasoning, assumed that because the notices of termination did not comply with the statutory requirements, it axiomatically followed that the dismissals were invalid and of no force and effect. The proposition is debatable and possibly wrong.
9 (2012) 33 ILJ 1846 (LAC).
10 (2011) 32 ILJ 1293 (LAC).
11 Hierbo voetnoot 4.
…
[38] The failure by an employer to give proper or valid notice of termination to an employee can be construed as a breach of contract and if material may result in a wrongful or unfair termination of employment, entitling the employee to invoke the remedies either of specific performance or damages for wrongful termination; or reinstatement, re-employment or compensation (in terms of section 193 of the LRA) for unfair dismissal. Where the failure to give valid notice is in breach of a statutory provision as well, the breach will be a violation of the principle of legality, perhaps allowing the employee to challenge the lawfulness of the action by means of review proceedings. A review of a decision to terminate employment leading to a declaration of invalidity is not unknown in our law and is predicated upon the general principle that acts carried out in the performance of a statutory duty or obligation must be performed in accordance with the requirements of the statute, failing which they are liable to be set aside by the courts because acts performed contrary to law are ordinarily void.
[38] Early in the last century, our courts followed the thinking of English law to hold that the remedy of specific performance was not available to aggrieved employees suing for wrongful dismissal. The consequence of this view was that any termination of an employee’s contract of employment by his employer, no matter how wrongful or unfair, had the practical effect of putting an end to the employment relationship (a concept broader than and different to a contract of employment) as the employee was restricted to seeking damages. It followed that a dismissal of an employee did not need to be lawful or valid to terminate the employment relationship or to constitute a dismissal. Hence, in the employment context, somewhat abnormally, a contract of employment could be regarded as at an end by the employer rejecting the continued use of the services of the employee and refusing to pay remuneration, even though lawful cancellation had not occurred.
[39] The remedies for unfair dismissal introduced in our labour legislation during the 1980’s, now contained in Chapter 8 of the LRA, altered the range of remedies available to employees, by including most notably the right to seek reinstatement.
[40] The implicit acceptance by the Appellate Division in Schierhout v Minister of Justice12 that a wrongful or “invalid” termination can in effect bring a contract of employment to an end has however persisted in our labour law. The notion is comprehended in the definition of “dismissal” in section 186 of the LRA which defines a dismissal to mean inter alia “an employer has terminated a contract of employment with or without notice”. The statutory concept of a “dismissal” is not the equivalent of a lawful cancellation of a contract of employment. It encompasses much more. Besides the termination of a contract of employment with or without notice, it includes the failure to renew a fixed term contract in certain circumstances, the refusal to allow an employee to resume work after taking maternity leave, selective non re-employment and a resignation by an employee where the continuation of the relationship has been rendered intolerable by the employer. The statutory concept of dismissal is therefore not restricted to the contractual notion of lawful cancellation and recognises that contract law is an insufficient instrument to regulate the modern employment relationship. The purpose of the wide definition of “dismissal” is to extend the LRA’s scope to cover the effective dismissal of employees, whether or not by due termination of their contracts of employment. A wrongful termination without notice which does not constitute a lawful cancellation or rescission of the contract may therefore still constitute a dismissal in terms of the LRA.
[41] The definition of dismissal is thus wide enough to include a wrongful or “invalid” termination in violation of contractual or statutory notice periods within its ambit. The word “terminated” in section 186(1)(a) of the LRA should be given its ordinary meaning of “bringing to an end”. The ordinary meaning is not coloured by the lawfulness, fairness or otherwise of the action. The fact that a remedy may exist to redress any wrongfulness or unfairness does not per se alter the consequence of an ending brought about by the employer’s action. As a rule, a wrongful or unfair termination will only be reversed (and the contractual rights and obligations restored) by the grant of the remedy of specific performance or an award of retrospective reinstatement at the discretion of the court. The resultant legal position is not unlike that prevailing in administrative law where a declaration of illegality will not have the inevitable consequence that wrongful action will be declared invalid and set aside.
12 1926 AD 99 at 110.
[42] Despite the approach taken by the Appellate Division in Schierhout to the contractual remedy of specific performance, it went on to hold that a distinction needed to be drawn in cases of employment in the public service which although primarily contractual were subject to statutory regulation. The effect of this, as we have mentioned, was “to bring into play a fundamental principle of our law namely that a thing done contrary to a statutory prohibition is void and of no effect”. The dismissal of a public servant in contravention of the statute governing his employment could be declared invalid and set aside. The same would apply by extension to any employee whose employment is regulated in part by statutory provisions like those in this case. The De Beers principle is predicated upon this notion. A declaration of invalidity however only entitled an employee to claim payment of his salary but did not constitute an order of specific performance ad faciendum. The character of a dismissal in contravention of statutory provisions, as a consequence, was more voidable than void by reason of the discretionary nature of the remedies available.
[43] This case, as already explained, is concerned with whether non- compliance with the notice and procedural provisions of section 189A of the LRA should result in a declaration of invalidity and an entitlement to reinstatement on that ground.
…
Where one is concerned with the enforcement or breach of statutory duties, as opposed to mere contractual terms, the question must be resolved with reference to the provisions of the applicable statute, its purpose and any remedies which the statute has appointed to redress breach of the statutory obligations it has imposed. The general principle of our law, applied in the employment context by Xxxxx XX in Schierhout, that a thing done contrary to the direct prohibition of the law is void and of no effect, no longer applies in all cases. More recent cases have ruled that whether that is so will depend upon the proper construction of the particular legislation. In addition, our law now seeks to maintain a clearer divide between the law regulating administrative action and that applicable to unfair labour practices, as mandated by the discrete constitutional provisions and statutes applicable to such action.
…
[49] … A termination by an employer without giving proper or valid notice is still a dismissal. It may prove to be a wrongful or unfair dismissal, but it is a dismissal nonetheless. As explained earlier, wrongful or unfair dismissals will have the consequence of bringing a contract of employment to an end unless and until a court orders specific performance or retrospective reinstatement. The LRA thus clearly recognises what has been termed “a premature termination” to constitute a dismissal. The ideas of nullity, voidness and invalidity are inconsistent with that scheme.
[50] The De Beers principle introduces the anomaly that a conventional dismissal will be removed from the scope of Chapter 8 of the LRA altogether and will not be assessed on the basis of fairness, merely because it was procedurally premature and branded as invalid. The categorisation of the dismissal as invalid leads automatically to reinstatement, a sanction not in keeping with the purpose of the LRA. Section 193(2)(d) of the LRA for instance makes it clear that reinstatement is not a competent remedy for procedural unfairness. A declaration of invalidity and consequential relief in the form of automatic reinstatement on the grounds of procedural non-compliance is therefore inconsistent with the intention of the legislature to generally limit relief for procedural lapses. Other remedies exist to deal with the problem of prematurity which in their application will lead to more proportionate and less capricious consequences in keeping with the aim of the LRA to promote orderly collective bargaining and the effective resolution of labour disputes.
…
[56] In the premises, we are persuaded that non-compliance with section 189A(8) of the LRA was not intended by the legislature to result in the invalidity or nullity of any ensuing dismissals. Consequently, we are of the opinion that the decisions in De Beers Group Services (Pty) Ltd v NUM and Revan Civil Engineering Contractors and Others v NUM were wrongly decided.”
[22] Dit blyk dat die Arbeidsappèlhof dit nou onomwonde gestel het dat die nie- nakoming van statutêre verpligtinge – wat normaalweg ‘n onregmatige ontslag sou daarstel – nie sonder meer lei tot nietigheid en outomatiese herindiensstelling nie.
[23] Dit is presies die omstandighede, feite- en regsgrondslag van hierdie xxxx. Xxxxx en Xxxxx xx dat hul ontslag onregsgeldig en daarom nietig is. Maar die WAV skryf ander remedies voor vir wat dit beskryf as ‘n prosedureel onbillike ontslag, xxxx die geval in Steenkamp.
[24] In hierdie geval het die NUM, namens Xxxxx en Xxxxx, ‘n geskil oor ‘n beweerde onbillike ontslag na die KVBA xxxxxx. Dit is inderdaad die raamwerk wat die Wet voorskryf vir geskilbeslegting in die arbeidsfeer. Daar kan geen twyfel wees dat die KVBA en die arbiter jurisdiksie gehad het om die geskil voor xxx xx besleg nie, d.i. die geskil oor ‘n beweerde onbillike ontslag wat die applikante xxxxxx het. Die arbiter het bevind dat die ontslag vir ‘n billike rede geskied het, maar nie ooreenkomstig ‘n billike proses nie. Dit is waarom hy aan Xxxxx en Xxxxx vergoeding van R20 000 elk toegestaan het.
[25] Op grond van die huidige regspraak in Steenkamp waaraan hierdie Hof gebonde is, het die arbiter jurisdiksie gehad om die xxxx voor xxx aan te hoor. Dit was ‘n geskil oor ‘n beweerde onbillike ontslag. Die xxxx dat die ontslag moontlik onregmatig of onregsgeldig was, het nie tot die nietigheid daaarvan gelei nie; die werknemers het die voorgeskrewe prosedure gevolg om dit na die KVBA xx xxxxxx om te besluit of dit onbillik was. Die KVBA het dus jurisiksie gehad vir die arbitrasie.
[26] Die arbiter het bevind die ontslag was wel prosedureel onbillik. Hy het sy diskresie uitegeoefen om gepaste vergoeding toe te staan. Hy het ook bevind dat die ontslag substantief xxxxxx was. Gegewe die werknemers se oneerlikheid, was dit ‘n redelike gevolgtrekking. Dit is nie hersienbaar nie.
[27] Gegewe die xxxx dat die werknemers ontslaan is, en dat die arbiter besluit het daardie ontslag is onbillik, kan hulle ook nie op ‘n sg stilswyende ooreenkoms steun nie. Die besluit van die appèlvoorsitter is ongedaan gemaak deur dié van die algemene bestuurder waarvolgens Xxxxx en Xxxxx xxxxxxxxx ontslaan is. Hul ontslag is ‘n xxxx. Of daardie ontslag xxxxxx was, is ‘n vraag wat deur die arbiter beantwoord is. Dit was substantief xxxxxx maar prosedureel onbillik. Daardie beslissing van die arbiter is myns
insiens nie hersienbaar nie. Die werknemers is steeds ontslaan, maar Eskom moet aan hulle vergoeding betaal vir die prosedurele onbillikheid van die ontslag.
[28] In die lig van my gevolgtrekking hierbo vind ek dit nie nodig om te beslis of die applikante se eisoorsaak in der waarheid voortspruit uit die interpretasie en toepassing van ‘n kollektiewe ooreenkoms waaroor die KVBA, en nie hierdie Hof nie, jurisdiksie sou hê. Dieselfde oorweging geld die vraag of die Hof daadwerklike vervulling van die dienskontrakte xxx xxxx of kon bevel.
Die aansoek om hersiening word van die hand gewys met koste.
Xxxxx Xxxxxxxxx Regter van die Arbeidshof van Suid-Afrika
13 WAV a 162.
VERSKYNINGS | |
APPLIKANTE: | Xxxxx Xxxxxxxxxx In opdrag van Xxxxxx Xxxxxx & Xx Xxxx Ing. |
EERSTE RESPONDENT: | Xxxx Xxxxx xxx Xxxxxx Xxxx Xxxxxxxxx (betoogshoofde opgestel xxxx Xxxxx Xxxx). |