Clarifying Consciousness. So, consciousness* is fundamental, irreducible, sharp, determinate, as well as non- representational and non-phenomenal. At this point, one might wonder whether this concept corresponds to any regular, pre-theoretical view of consciousness that we have. It might be tempting to think of it as protoconsciousness, a property which is not consciousness itself but is somehow responsible for the coming about of consciousness in complex systems. Indeed, Xxx seems to suggest something along these lines in the following: “[W]hat underwrites the transfer of consciousness* from fundamental entities to certain complexes is their being organized functionally in the right way. It is because the fundamental parts are conscious* and arranged in this way that the complex states so formed are conscious*; further, in being conscious* and playing the right role, these states are conscious.” (Tye 2021b: 88–9) However, I believe that there is an alternative. After all, Xxx named his view representational panpsychism rather than panprotopsychism. The better way to think about consciousness*, in my opinion, is in terms of it being the condition for experience as such; the field of consciousness; minimal subjectivity; the conduit for experiences; an abstracted viewpoint. Notably, these options are all sharp. They do not have to be something representational, as Tye says, but they can be that in which experiences happen. Admittedly, this is fairly abstract, though it better corresponds to Xxx’x aims. Similar views have been discussed in contemporary literature on phenomenology14. They would allow for consciousness to be both something sharp, that either is or is not present, and for it to be something that has vague representational content. In contrast, if consciousness* is actually protoconsciousness, then Xxx would inherit the problems of panprotopsychism, most significantly the question of how something non- conscious can lead to consciousness as we know it, which is the same explanatory gap that panpsychists accuse physicalists of having. The simpler solution is that quarks ‘provide’ us with consciousness*, while the complex, such as the brain, provides us with consciousness as representational content. This is a crucial idea, which will be relevant to my proposal in Chapter IV.
