De nition Sample Clauses

De nition. 9 Protocol is a secure authenticated key exchange with a LW-key generator W() if the following statements are true:

De nition. We map a de nition to a Reo module. The rule in Listing 5.4 carries out this mapping. Similar to all of our mapping rules, it respects the nesting of elements, meaning that the result of mapping an enclosed element is assigned to the mapped parent element. The rule creates a Reo module for the BPMN 2 de nition and triggers rules matching the nested processes. The result of the triggered rules will be assigned to connectors inside the created module. Figure 5.3.1: The FlowNode and its related entities in BPMN 2 EMF meta-model The select command in the rule collects the processes from the list of elements nested within the rootElements attribute of the de nition. RootElement is an abstract type with Process as one of its subtypes. The select command applied on rootElement guarantees that not any other subtype but process will go through this assignment. The function oclIsKindOf returns true, if it is invoked from either an instance of the passed type or an instance of one of its subtypes. Similarly, the function oclIsTypeOf returns true, if the element to which it is applied is an instance of the passed type.

De nition. 2 An n-player SR protocol hSh; Reci is (1 )-correct, t-resilient AVSS if the following requirements hold, for every t-adversary. Let the dealer's input for Sh is a value s 2 S for some nite globally known set S. Then:

De nition. 2 does not require a player to recognize a situation where the sharing of a secret has failed. In other words, an uncorrupted player is in one of two \states": either it knows that the sharing has succeeded, or it does not yet know. This characteristic of the de nition, although seemingly unnatural, appears to be essential for our needs. A de nition that requires uncorrupted players to always complete protocol Sh with a success/failure decision is a considerably stronger one. In fact, this stronger de nition trivially implies Byzantine agreement, thus it seems un t for primitives used to construct a Byzantine agreement protocol.

De nition. 1 A leveled commitment contract is a tuple hC; i, where C is the underlying full commitment contract and is the set of decommitment penalties. Let AC be the set of agents involved in the contract C. Then will consist of one decommitment penalty for each