Man-in-the-middle-attack Sample Clauses

Man-in-the-middle-attack. This kind of attack can be foiled if the origin authenti- cation of values exchanged can be provided. Although, origin authentication is not provided, the way the final session key is computed prevents this kind of attack. If an attacker intercepts the two messages and sends the following to A: T (1) = cP(1),W (2) = cP2 , the computed partial key will be as follows: K(1) = e(1)(aS(1), T (1))= e(1)(Q(1), P(1))acs(1) , K(2) = e(2)(aQ(2),W (2))= e(2)(Q(2), P(2))acs(2) . Although, the attacker can compute K(1), it is infeasible for the attacker to compute K(2) without acquiring ephemeral key a of A, or the master key s2 of PKG2.

Man-in-the-middle-attack. In this section, we compare and analyze the schemes proposed by Xxxxx et al. [27], Xxxxx et al. [28], Li et al. [29] against our proposed scheme from the perspectives of computational cost and communication cost. We select a bilinear mapping e : G1 G1 G2 for the aforementioned existing three schemes. G1 is the additive cyclic group of prime order q, which is generated by an elliptic curve E(Fp). G2 is the multiplicative group of prime order q, which is generated by an elliptic curve E(Fp).

Man-in-the-middle-attack. The man in the middle attack is where an intruder intercepts the message and tampers with a vulnerable message. This kind of attack happens between the source node and the destination node. During this type of attack, both the source node and the destination node are not aware of this attack. In TLPKA, the vulnerable message can not affect the procedure because the source node derives a unique pairwise key which is shared with the correct destination node. Therefore, even if the adversary intercepts the message, he or she can not reveal the information used for authentication. Only the correct destination node having the correct pairwise key can reply to the message correctly. Consequently, the Man in the middle Attack is prevented successfully.

Man-in-the-middle-attack. In this attack, assume that the adversary can intercept the transmitted messages during the authentication and key agreement phases. attempts to modify the arbitrary messages to deceive the Vi, Dj, and CC. For this purpose, needs to get the secret attributes IDi, si, ri, and TSi to generate a legitimate request message M1. Identically, also cannot modify other messages X0, X0, and M4 due to the same reason. Therefore, our scheme can prevent the man-in-the-middle attack.