Xxxxx et al Sample Clauses

Xxxxx et al. 1:20-cv- 2530. Plaintiffs shall be barred from reinstituting those lawsuits except pursuant to the terms and on the conditions specified in Paragraphs VI.C and D, below.
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Xxxxx et al. 1:20-cv-2530 and/or bring any claims, causes of action, suits or demands of any kind whatsoever in law or in equity against the United States based upon matters which could have been asserted by Plaintiffs against the United States based upon EPA’s evaluation of Pennsylvania’s July 18, 2022 amended Phase III WIP. EPA does not waive or limit any defense relating to such litigation. The Parties agree that contempt of court is not an available remedy under this Agreement.
Xxxxx et al. A de novo heterodimeric Due Xxxxx protein minimizes the release of reactive intermediates in dioxygen-dependent oxidation. Angew. Chem. Int. Ed. Engl. 56, 15580–15583 (2017). 35. X. Xxxxx, X. Xxxxx, X. Xxxxxx, X. Xxxxxxxx, Designing covalently linked hetero- dimeric four-helix bundles. Methods Enzymol. 580, 471–499 (2016).
Xxxxx et al. De novo design of a non-natural fold for an iron-sulfur protein: Alpha- helical coiled-coil with a four-iron four-sulfur cluster binding site in its central core. Biochim. Biophys. Acta 1797, 406–413 (2010). CHEMISTRY
Xxxxx et al partial settlement agreements; and (B) may include consideration of other relevant factors, such as the criteria described below.
Xxxxx et al. C. A. No. 10136-VCL, filed September 16, 2014; and Xxxxxxxx x. 1 All terms with initial capitalization not otherwise defined herein shall have the meanings ascribed to them in ¶ 1 herein. B. On October 6, 2014, the Court entered a stipulated Order Re Consolidation and Leadership, consolidating the foregoing actions into the Action and appointing Xxxxxxxxx Xxxxxxxx Xxxxxx & Xxxxxxxxx LLP, Xxxxx & Xxxxxxxxxx P.A., and Xxxxxxx Topaz Xxxxxxx & Check, LLP as Co-Lead Counsel (“Lead Counsel”). The Complaint filed in City of Lakeland Employees’ Pension Plan x. Xxxxx, et al., C.A. No. 10136-VCL, was deemed the operative complaint in the consolidated action (hereafter the “Verified Class Action Complaint”). C. On January 13, 2015, Plaintiffs filed a Motion for Leave to File a Supplement to Verified Class Action Complaint, which proposed supplement included allegations that disclosures to GFI stockholders in the Proxy were misleading or omitted material information and allegations that the Management Defendants had further breached their fiduciary duties by threatening to modify certain employment agreements in order to make the possibility of a transaction with BGCP less attractive to BGCP. D. On January 28, 2015, Plaintiffs filed a Motion for Leave to File a Second Supplement to the Verified Class Action Complaint, which included additional facts and allegations about events that had occurred since the filing of the Verified Class Action Complaint. E. On February 7, 2015, pursuant to the Court’s oral ruling on February 6, 2015, Plaintiffs filed the Third Supplement to the Verified Class Action Complaint, which included additional facts and allegations about events that had occurred since the filing of the Second Supplement. F. On February 27, 2015, BGCP announced that it completed its tender offer for GFI shares. G. On May 20, 2015, the Court entered the Third Scheduling Order, which provided that trial would commence on November 9, 2015. H. On July 13, 2015, Plaintiffs filed the Amended Verified Class Action Complaint (together with the Verified Class Action Complaint and the Supplement, Second Supplement, and Third Supplement to the Verified Class Action Complaint, the “Pleadings”), superseding the Complaint filed on September 11, 2014 and the subsequent Supplements to the Complaint. I. On July 29, 2015, after arm’s length negotiations, including a one-day mediation on July 1, 2015, counsel to the Parties reached an agreement-in-principle to settle the Action tha...
Xxxxx et al. (Medicaid HMOs only); and
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Xxxxx et al. 2018). In November 2016, Texas State University, under contract with CPA, began the development of a habitat suitability model (Hardy et al. 2018) and survey protocols for conservation planning of the CPA’s proposed CCAA. Texas State University used data of recent and historical occurrences of the DSL, remote sensing, Geographic Information Systems, image classification methods and ground-truthed data (where access could be obtained) to develop the model (Xxxxx et al. 2018). They generated a detailed base map of land covers and classified these covers into eight map units: developed, sand, mesquite, shinnery oak, other vegetation, cultivated, barren/gravel, and water. They then used these maps units to define the boundaries of suitable habitat.
Xxxxx et al. (2015) Just like the Ship of Theseus remains functionally the same boat through it having all its planks replaced, my brain has remained functionally the same as its neurons have been progressively replaced. Yet something is different here. Though the cognitive functioning that Xxxxxx and I would suppose is essential to my identity has been preserved, the brain has ceased to be an organic thing, and it is now a synthetic thing. In order for some- thing to be organic, certain biological chemistry behaviours need to occur to sustain homeostatic balance for the cells involved in it. Our synthetic neurons will have done away with those organic behaviours: they have no need for glucose or oxygen to sustain any internal metabolism like biological neurons do. If it is the case that a brain is essentially a biological thing in virtue of being an organ, then the transition of the cognitive apparatus to a medium made of synthetic neurons will have affected the identity of the brain. But even if that were the case, has the transition of the cognitive functioning from its original biological medium to a synthetic medium also affected my identity? This is a question of whether the function we have said is essential to my identity is also sufficient for my identity or not. If the function alone is also sufficient, then I have survived despite the fact that the underlying medium which sustains the function has changed from being a biological organ to being a synthetic thing. If function alone is not sufficient, then I will have ceased to exist at some point during the transition to the synthetic medium. But now if an Animalist wishes to argue that I have not survived, on what grounds would that be the case? If the preservation of the cognitive functioning is not the sufficient condition for my persistence, then what is? The identity of partic- ular atoms has already been ruled out. And the loss of lower level cellular function is metaphysically the same as the loss of other organic and metabolic function I suffered when my brain was moved from its initial body: it is the same kind of low level animal biological function which Xxxxxx argued was not essential in the brain transplant scenario. If I survive and go with the brain in the transplant scenario, I should, for the very same reasons, survive the transition to a synthetic brain. I do not think that this retort is available to an Animalist, and certainly not to one who is also a single-substance materialist like Xxxxx...
Xxxxx et al. (U.S.A.) v. United Mexican States, Award of 16 November 1925, 4 UNRIAA 82, para. 19, speaks of ‘serious lack of diligence in apprehending and/or punishing culprits’ (emphasis added). 26 See e.g. Xxxxxxxxxx and Xxxxxx (Great Britain) v. Colombia, Award of 5 November 1875, in: X.X. Xxxxx, History and Digest of the International Arbitrations to which the United States has been Party (6 vols., Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1898), vol. II, 2050, at 2082.
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