Privacy Amplification Clause Samples

Privacy Amplification. Comparing the security condition given in Definition 1.8 with ▇▇▇▇▇▇▇’▇ criterion of secu- rity (perfect security) given in Definition 1.6 implies that a secure communication is the sense of Definition 1.8 is not necessarily a secure communication in the sense of Defini- tion 1.
Privacy Amplification. [9] The transmitter and the legiti- mate receiver publicly agree on a deterministic function they apply to their common sequence to generate a secret key. In this work, we focus primarily on the first phase of the key- distillation process and we investigate the optimal transmission strategy to adopt when the terminals in the network deploy multiple antennas. of messages over the public channel. A secret-key rate is defined as the ratio between the number of key bits k obtained at the end of a key-distillation strategy and the number of noisy channel uses n required to obtain it. A secret-key rate R = k/n is achievable if there exists a secret-key distillation strategy such that, • on denoting the secret key distilled at the transmitter and that at the legitimate receiver by K and Kˆ, the error probability is zero asymptotically, that is: public communication channel W nR R + YnR B lim P hK =/ Kˆi = 0; (3) A XnT HE HR + ZnE E W • the mutual information between the secret key and the eavesdropper observations is arbitrarily low (strong se- crecy constraint [11]); that is, if we denote the messages sent on the public two-way channel by the the random variable F and we collect the outputs of the eavesdropper nE E Fig. 1. Secret-key agreement over quasi-static MIMO fading channels.
Privacy Amplification. After information reconciliation, ▇▇▇▇▇ and ▇▇▇ both know x0 but cannot use it as key, since ▇▇▇ has some information about it (in fact, ▇▇▇ knows some positions of x0 with certainty in our setting). ▇▇▇▇▇ and ▇▇▇ rectify this situation in the next step, called privacy amplification. The simple idea is that ▇▇▇▇▇ and ▇▇▇ can apply a strong extractor: ▇▇▇▇▇ chooses a seed uniformly at random and sends it to Bob. Then, they both apply the extractor to x0. Since for Eve x0 has large min-entropy, this gives a bit string which is close to uniform with respect to ▇▇▇’s information.
Privacy Amplification. The Alices apply a privacy amplification protocol to generate the final key systems ▇▇▇ ▇▇▇ · · · ▇▇▇ . The winning condition for the M -partite parity-CHSH game is [RMW18] a1,j ⊕ a2,j = x1,j ∧ x2,j ⊕ Mi=3 ai,j ! 4 where a1,j, . . . , ▇▇,▇, ▇▇,▇, and x2,j are realizations of the random variables specified in round j of the RMW18 Protocol. The winning probability for an arbitrary classical strategy is PCHSH = 3 . The ▇▇▇▇ inequality corresponding to the classical–quantum threshold in the tripartite case is [HKB20] ν = O1O+O3 − O0O− ≤ 1, (3) where O± = (O0 ± O1)/2, i refers to the ith party, and O0 and O1 are observables corresponding to the inputs 0 and 1, respectively, and are defined in [HKB20].

Related to Privacy Amplification

  • Privacy Statement The Parties agree to keep all information related to the signing and fulfillment of this Agreement confidential, and not to disclose it to any third parties, except for subcontractors involved in this agreement, unless prior written consent is obtained from the other Party. Should subcontractors be engaged under this agreement, they are required to adhere to its terms and conditions.

  • Information Technology Accessibility Standards Any information technology related products or services purchased, used or maintained through this Grant must be compatible with the principles and goals contained in the Electronic and Information Technology Accessibility Standards adopted by the Architectural and Transportation Barriers Compliance Board under Section 508 of the federal Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (29 U.S.C. §794d), as amended. The federal Electronic and Information Technology Accessibility Standards can be found at: ▇▇▇▇://▇▇▇.▇▇▇▇▇▇-▇▇▇▇▇.▇▇▇/508.htm.

  • Privacy Act If performance involves design, development or operation of a system of records on individuals, this Agreement incorporates by reference FAR 52.224-1 Privacy Act Notification (Apr 1984) and FAR 52.224-2 Privacy Act (Apr 1984).

  • Privacy Compliance The Provider shall comply with all applicable federal, state, and local laws, rules, and regulations pertaining to Student Data privacy and security, all as may be amended from time to time.

  • HIPAA To the extent (if any) that DXC discloses “Protected Health Information” or “PHI” as defined in the HIPAA Privacy and Security Rules (45 CFR, Part 160-164) issued pursuant to the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (“HIPAA”) to Supplier or Supplier accesses, maintains, uses, or discloses PHI in connection with the performance of Services or functions under this Agreement, Supplier will: (a) not use or further disclose PHI other than as permitted or required by this Agreement or as required by law; (b) use appropriate safeguards to prevent use or disclosure of PHI other than as provided for by this Agreement, including implementing requirements of the HIPAA Security Rule with regard to electronic PHI; (c) report to DXC any use or disclosure of PHI not provided for under this Agreement of which Supplier becomes aware, including breaches of unsecured protected health information as required by 45 CFR §164.410, (d) in accordance with 45 CFR §164.502(e)(1)(ii), ensure that any subcontractors or agents of Supplier that create, receive, maintain, or transmit PHI created, received, maintained or transmitted by Supplier on DXC’s behalf, agree to the same restrictions and conditions that apply to Supplier with respect of such PHI; (e) make available PHI in a Designated Record Set (if any is maintained by Supplier) in accordance with 45 CFR section 164.524;