The Standard Russellian Argument. The main motivation behind Xxxxxxxxxx monism is the idea that physical theory only reveals the behaviour of matter without telling us anything about what matter is intrinsically. Xxxx (2017: 17) calls this the positive component of Russellian monism: physics only describes the relational, dispositional, extrinsic, or structural properties of matter, without saying anything about the underlying non-relational, categorical, intrinsic, or non-structural properties of matter – its ‘deep nature’. For example, physics tells us how an electron behaves, but not how it is in and of itself (Xxxx, Xxxxxx & Xxxxx-Xxxxxxxxx 2017). Earlier formulations of this line of thought stem from Xxxxxxxx Xxxxxxx (1927/1992), who argued that observational science reveals the mathematical structure of the reality but not what reality is intrinsically, and Xxxxxx Xxxxxxxxx (1928: 259), who claimed that physical theory cannot reveal the nature of the atom because it only attempts to describe it through ‘pointer readings on instrument dials’. This is the first step of the Russellian argument. The second step involves the notion that this categorical nature either is consciousness or is somehow related to consciousness. The reasoning behind this is that consciousness, or something closely related to it, is the best candidate to play the categorical role since it is the only positive conception of a ‘deep nature’ we have available. Consciousness, as Xxxxxx (2006: 137) argues, is something we have ‘ready to hand’ to play the categorical role, and positing something else is unjustified and based solely on the demand that it has to be non-mental. In Mortal Questions, Xxxxx (1979) similarly argued that either consciousness is a fundamental and ubiquitous property of reality, or it emerges from non-conscious properties, which would lead us back to the same starting position and problems with regard to explaining consciousness. Xxxx calls this the negative component of Russellian monism: “[T]he deep nature of matter transparently explains consciousness, in the sense that there is an a priori entailment from facts about the deep nature of matter to facts about consciousness. If you were able to access the deep nature of my brain, you would in principle be able to deduce the nature of my consciousness. The mystery of consciousness, then, results from our scientific ignorance concerning the deep nature of matter.” (2017: 17–18) This was also expressed in the work of Xxxxxxxxx (1928), who appeale...
