Vagueness and Consciousness Sample Clauses

Vagueness and Consciousness. Xxxxxxx X. Xxxxxx discussed the vagueness argument in an influential paper, stating that “[i]f our concept conscious state is sharp rather than vague, then common versions of the identity theory, functionalism, and dualism are false” (2006a: 515; emphasis added). Those theories tie conscious states to neurophysiological states. The former concept is sharp: conscious experience either is present, or it is not, and “we can make no clear sense of the idea of a borderline phenomenally conscious state” (Tye 1996: 681). The latter concept is vague: if conscious states are tied to neurons, for example, then it is possible to imagine a borderline case of the ‘neuron’ concept, perhaps by removing atoms (or other sufficiently small parts) from neuronal components, arriving at structures that are neither clearly neurons nor clearly not neurons (Xxxxxx 2006a: 522). As Xxxxxx argues, for any neurophysiological state N, it is “a near certainty that, regardless of what N is, a borderline N will eventually be reached” (2006a: 522). That is, there is no determinate point at which the brain switches from being in N to not being in N. In contrast, any given conscious state C either is or is not present. Xxxxxx’s (2006a: 527) argument can then be outlined as follows: