Game G0 definition

Game G0. In G0, a real attack against our proposed scheme from A is simulated. Firstly, the value of b is selected randomly. According to the above definitions, we obtain: AdvInd = 2 · Pr[Succ0] − 1 (27) Game G1: To increase the probability that A wins game, the query Execute is used to model the eavesdropping attacks. Since its goal is to get some information about SK, A has to compute skU or skS according to the definition of the proposed scheme; however, skU = rS(rU + N(x))P, where rU, rS are unknown. Without corrupting the gateway node GWN to get dGWN, the probability of success would not be increased just by eavesdropping the transmitted messages, which implies that Pr[Succ1] = Pr[Succ0] (28)
Sample 1Sample 2
Game G0. The starting game G0 is the real attack experi- ment by the adversary against the proposed AKA scheme in the random oracle model. The value of c is selected randomly by at the beginning of the experiment. According to the definition of semantic security [46], [47], it follows that,
Sample 1
Game G0. This game G0 is the real game as defined earlier. ∆ initializes the game by generating public-private key pairs for all the participants as specified by the protocol and choosing a random bit b, which is used by him to answer the Test query. Then it answers all queries of the adversary in accordance with the protocol P . Game G1: The game G1 is identical to G0 except that ∆ aborts if a signature forgery occurs for some player U before any Corrupt(U) query was made. We denote such an event by E1. Using a well-know lemma we get: | Pr[W in0] | ≤ - Pr[W in1] Pr[E1]. Note that ∆ can detect a signature forgery for some player U when he finds a valid message, not generated by him (all messages generated by ∆ are stored in the Sessions table), in some session before the Corrupt query was made to U . |P|∗ Calculation of Pr[E1]: The event E1 occurs when the adversary makes an existential signature forgery for any one of the protocol participants. The probability of this happening is bounded by SuccF,Σ(k) where SuccF,Σ(k) is the success probability of an existential signature forgery against a signature scheme Σ, given some public key PK.
Sample 1

Examples of Game G0 in a sentence

  • Game G0 describes the real protocol, as run bySendn(π, y) sends an incoming message y to the in-Prasad and Saxena [9], using our formalism (see Fig-stance π.

  • Let Game G0 be the standard uf-cma1 game with the algorithms of Fig.

  • While this authority understands the changes that have taken place, it will continue to specify a minimum sovereign rating of AAA.

  • G1: This game differs from Game G0 in that now the key K0 is chosen at random from G.

  • Game G0: This is the real game.Game G1: In this game, the simulator generates correctly every flow from the honest players, as they would do themselves, knowing the inputs (n1, .

  • G1 Game G1 is very similar to the Game G0 except that we use the TLPuz challenger to answer the CreatePuzSoln queries from and we insert a TLPuz challenge into the response to the Test query.

  • Obviously, if Z = gab, the game simulated by A1 is Game G0, and A outputs a valid forgery with probability Pr[X0].

  • By definition, we have thatPr[X0] = s (1) G1: This game differs from Game G0 in that when handling the adversary’s queries, the key for thepseudorandom function is chosen as a random element of G, i.e. K ←$ G.

  • Game G0: The game G'0 G'0 = G0.is defined as being the real attack against our protocol: Game G1.

  • This game is identical to Game G0 with the only exception that the simulation aborts if asks a Send query on a message Ui σ such that σ is a valid signature that has not been previously output by an oracle Πs before querying Corrupt(Ui), i.e., the simulation fails if outputs a successful forgery (event Forge occurs).


More Definitions of Game G0

Game G0. This game corresponds with the real attack against the defined scheme. From the definition, it holds that Adv(A) = 2Pr[succ0(A) − 1] (3) • Game G1: This game corresponds with a passive attack in which the adversaries can intercept the messages and thus Execute queries are performed, followed by a Test query. However, from the intercepted messages M1, M2, the attacker is not able to derive additional information and thus, it follows that Pr[succ1(A)] = Pr[succ0(A)] (4)
Sample 1
Game G0. This game simulates an ordinary attack by an
Sample 1
Game G0. This is the real attack. The X generates a pair of signing/verification key and the U0 is given a pair of public-private key. It answers all queries of the adversary in accordance of the protocol. Game G1: Let Forge be an event that A asks for a send query to the U0 such that the verification of the signature is correct and m′ was not previously out- put by a client as an answer to another send query. It means that A is sending a message that it has pro- duced itself. Such an event can be detected by X as it Protocol User U0 round Message Dyn Auth Verif PS
Sample 1
Game G0. This is the real protocol in the random oracle model. The oracles including five random oracles (H0, h1, h2, h3, and h4) and all instances (Ci and Sj) are thus available to the adversary. By definition, tp Advake−fs(A) = 2Pr[Succ0] − 1. Then we furthermore assume that we choose a random bit b' if the game aborts or stops with no answer b' from the adversary, or the adversary has not finished the game with more than qse queries or lasts for more than time t where qse and t are predetermined upper-bounds.
Sample 1
Game G0. The real protocol execution. This is the real execution where the environment Z runs the EKE2 protocol (see Figure 26) with parties P0 Receiver R
Sample 1

Related to Game G0

  • Game has the meaning ascribed to that term in the Control Act;

  • phonogram means the fixation of the sounds of a performance or of other sounds, or of a representation of sounds, other than in the form of a fixation incorporated in a cinematographic or other audiovisual work;

  • Reseller is a category of CLECs who purchase the use of Finished Services for the purpose of reselling those Telecommunications Services to their End User Customers.

  • Digital Cross Connect System or "DCS" is a function which provides automated Cross Connection of Digital Signal Level 0 (DS0) or higher transmission bit rate digital channels within physical interface facilities. Types of DCS include but are not limited to DCS 1/0s, DCS 3/1s, and DCS 3/3s, where the nomenclature 1/0 denotes interfaces typically at the DS1 rate or greater with Cross Connection typically at the DS0 rate. This same nomenclature, at the appropriate rate substitution, extends to the other types of DCS specifically cited as 3/1 and 3/3. Types of DCS that cross connect Synchronous Transport Signal level 1 (STS-1 s) or other Synchronous Optical Network (SONET) signals (e.g., STS-3) are also DCS, although not denoted by this same type of nomenclature. DCS may provide the functionality of more than one of the aforementioned DCS types (e.g., DCS 3/3/1 which combines functionality of DCS 3/3 and DCS 3/1). For such DCS, the requirements will be, at least, the aggregation of requirements on the "component" DCS. In locations where automated Cross Connection capability does not exist, DCS will be defined as the combination of the functionality provided by a Digital Signal Cross Connect (DSX) or Light Guide Cross Connect (LGX) patch panels and D4 channel banks or other DS0 and above multiplexing equipment used to provide the function of a manual Cross Connection. Interconnection is between a DSX or LGX to a Switch, another Cross Connection, or other service platform device.

  • End User means, in the event that the Services or Deliverables involve the use of any information systems, any and all UNICEF employees, consultants and other personnel and any other external users collaborating with UNICEF, in each case, authorized by UNICEF to access and use the Services and/or Deliverables.

  • Common Channel Signaling (CCS) means an out-of-band, packet-switched, signaling network used to transport supervision signals, control signals, and data messages. It is a special network, fully separate from the transmission path of the public switched network. Unless otherwise agreed by the Parties, the CCS protocol used by the Parties shall be SS7.

  • Common Channel Signaling (CCS means an out-of-band, packet-switched, signaling network used to transport supervision signals, control signals, and data messages. It is a special network, fully separate from the transmission path of the public switched network. Unless otherwise agreed by the Parties, the CCS protocol used by the Parties shall be SS7.

  • PSP or “PSPs” means the State’s IT Policies, Standards and Procedures. “SSAE” means Statement on Standards for Attestation Engagements.

  • Token means the security device which allows an individual user to access IRIS.