Common use of Analysis part 3 Clause in Contracts

Analysis part 3. God and creation are not one According to Xxxxx, atomist philosophy failed to provide an explanation for the order visible in the material world. But Xxxxx was also aware of philosophers who did provide an explanation for the order visible in the material world, but at the same time, in his opinion, assigned too much splendour to it. Xxxxx used the name ‘Chaldeans’ to identify these philosophers. According to Xxxxx, they claimed the heavenly bodies, the sun, the moon and the stars to be the ultimate powers which provide order and control events in the material world.189 As Xxxxx saw it, these philosophers presented the world itself as divine instead of distinguishing between creation and God.190 The identification of God with the world itself resembles a form of materialism present in Stoic philosophy.191 In general, the Stoics held that the material world was one whole and that nothing existed outside it. They held that God must be part of the material world as well.192 Xxxxx opposed this view of reality, although 188 See also Runia, Creation, pp. 117–118, where he additionally presents the example of Xxxxxxx (2nd century CE), who brought forward an argument in favour of divine providence similar to that of Xxxxx. 189 Migr. 179, 192–194; Her. 99, 301; Mut. 16; Spec. I, 13–14; Virt. 212. Xxxxx almost always combines his description of what he calls the ‘Chaldean creed’ with an exhortation to leave their opinion behind. 190 As Philo put it with a Greek wordplay in Congr. 49: μãλλον δὲ τὸν κόσμον αὐτὸν θεὸν αὐτοκράτορα νομίζων, οὐκ αὐτοκράτορος ἔργον θεοῦ. 191 Xxxxxxx describes the similarities between what Xxxxx presents as the ‘Chaldean creed’ and Stoic materialism in Niehoff, Biography, pp. 226–228. 192 Xxxxxx, ND I.15.37; XXX XX, 000, 000. Xxxxx philosophy in general is described as pantheistic (see note 171 and also, for instance, Long, Hellenistic Philosophy, p. 152 and Hornblower/Spawforth, Classical Dictionary, p. 1446). In the latter (p. 195) it is additionally claimed that Stoic philosophers, especially Xxxxxxxxxx, legitimised astrology, which is contested by Xxxx in Long, Xxxxxxxx to — Xxxxx’x doctrine of God — we should note that he describes this view as ‘Chaldean’ and not Stoic.193 In Opif. 6b–12, Xxxxx offers two arguments for why he maintains that God transcends his creation. These arguments bring two aspects to light of how Xxxxx considered God and creation to be fundamentally different from each other. Xxxxx’x first argument is that regarding everything in existence, one must distinguish between the active cause and its passive object.194 The active cause forms the passive object into separate, distinct objects, thereby bringing the material world into existence. According to Xxxxx, the active cause that brought the material world into existence cannot be part of that world itself. He identifies the active cause with ‘the mind of the universe’ (Opif. 8). Moreover, to avoid seeing that mind as in anyway a part of that universe, Xxxxx adds that it transcends even immaterial concepts, such as virtue and beauty.195 Why did Xxxxx believe that the ultimate active cause could not be part of the material universe? He did not explain his view in De Opificio Mundi, but in other places Xxxxx elaborated on what he saw as the fallacy of the Chaldeans. According to Xxxxx, the Chaldeans, the astrologers, thought that instead of a transcendent God, the stars controlled the events in the world. Philo countered Xxxxxxxxx, p. 133. The doctrines of Xxxxxxxxx xx Xxxxxxx (approximately 130–68 BCE), as described by Xxxxxx, provide an example of the kind of doctrines that Philo refuted. Xxxxxxxxx often took his starting point from the writings of Xxxxx and in his philosophy merged Platonic, Xxxxxxxxxxxx and Stoic ideas. Enlightening for our discussion is Xxxxxxxxx’ agreement with Xxxx that there is nothing that is ‘immaterial, transcendent or external to the material universe.’ In addition, Xxxxxxxxx merged Xxxxx’x Demiurge and World Soul into ‘one positive force immanent in the world, the Logos’ (Xxxxxx, Middle Platonists, pp. 83–84). 193 For this reason, Xxx avoids identifying the Chaldeans with the Stoics and only uses the label ‘Chaldean’ in his article discussing Xxxxx’x argument in Opif. 6b–12, see Bos, ‘Philo’. 194 As Xxxxx writes in Opif. 8: ‘Xxxxx … realised that it is completely inevitable that in everything that exists there is an active cause and a passive part’ (Μωυςῆς δέ ... ἔγνω δὴ ὅτι ἀναγκαιότατόν ἐστιν ἐν τοῖς οὖσι τὸ μὲν εἶναι δραστήριον αἴτιον, τὸ δὲ παθητόν). In Xxxxxxxx Xxxxxxxx’ summary of the Stoic view on the relation between God and the material world, a distinction is made between the active cause and the passive object similar to Xxxxx (as Xxx explains before the Stoics, Xxxxxxxxx already distinguished between the active and the passive, see ibid., p. 71). In contrast to Xxxxx, however, Xxxx identified the substance of God with the whole of the world and heaven (see DL VII, 134 and 148). Xxxxxxxx presents an overview of various aspects of the philosophical debate in antiquity over ‘cause’ in Sterling, ‘Day One’, pp. 126–129. 195 Philo continues in Opif. 8 that the active cause is ‘the most pure and fully unmixed mind of the universe … greater than virtue, and greater than knowledge, greater than the good itself and the beautiful itself.’ Xxx suggests that Xxxxx was inspired by Xxxxxxxxxxxx arguments in this section. Xxxxxxxxx argued that the active and the passive principle are both immaterial (cf. An. I, 407b 17–18). He further claimed in Met. XII, 1075b 34–37 that Xxxxx did not clearly identify the cause of everything that exists (although Xxxxx did connect νοῦς and αἴτιος in Phil. 30A–E, as Xxxxxx points out in Dillon, Middle Platonists, p. 157). Xxx argues that Aristotle’s solution to Xxxxx’x perceived omission was to identify that cause as the intellect and the prime mover. According to Xxxxxxxxx, God is the intellect transcending virtue in the sense of human practice (Eth. Nic. X, 1177b 25–30) (see Bos, ‘Philo’, pp. 71–73). — Xxxxx’x doctrine of God — that if the heavenly bodies of the material world were the ultimate cause for everything in existence, then they would need to be constantly active and never be passive or at rest. This is not so, according to Xxxxx. The sun, the moon and the stars can be seen to change their course with the seasons. Change implies being acted upon, ‘suffering’ in a sense.196 Thus, if the heavenly bodies are acted upon, they are also passive in some way and cannot be the ultimate cause for creation. According to Xxxxx, only a transcendent God can be said to be active only and never be acted upon.197 As Xxxxx saw it, to believe that the cause for the material world lies inside that world itself is a grave mistake. Its consequence is that one honours creation over its creator.198 According to Xxxxx, there can be no greater impiety than to ascribe attributes of the truly active to what is essentially passive.199 Philo reasoned that ‘Chaldeans’ believed something created (i.e., the stars) was greater than their creator (God). Xxxxx held that the order is exactly the other way around, namely that the creator is always superior to that which he has created.200 Xxxxx maintained that the ultimate cause for creation must exist apart from the material world, because everything existing in the material world, including the 196 Cher. 88.

Analysis part 3. God and creation are not one According to Xxxxx, atomist philosophy failed to provide an explanation for the order visible in the material world. But Xxxxx was also aware of philosophers who did provide an explanation for the order visible in the material world, but at the same time, in his opinion, assigned too much splendour to it. Xxxxx used the name ‘Chaldeans’ to identify these philosophers. According to Xxxxx, they claimed the heavenly bodies, the sun, the moon and the stars to be the ultimate powers which provide order and control events in the material world.189 As Xxxxx saw it, these philosophers presented the world itself as divine instead of distinguishing between creation and God.190 The identification of God with the world itself resembles a form of materialism present in Stoic philosophy.191 In general, the Stoics held that the material world was one whole and that nothing existed outside it. They held that God must be part of the material world as well.192 Xxxxx opposed this view of reality, although 188 See also Runia, Creation, pp. 117–118, where he additionally presents the example of Xxxxxxx (2nd century CE), who brought forward an argument in favour of divine providence similar to that of Xxxxx. 189 Migr. 179, 192–194; Her. 99, 301; Mut. 16; Spec. I, 13–14; Virt. 212. Xxxxx almost always combines his description of what he calls the ‘Chaldean creed’ with an exhortation to leave their opinion behind. 190 As Philo put it with a Greek wordplay in Congr. 49: μãλλον δὲ τὸν κόσμον αὐτὸν θεὸν αὐτοκράτορα νομίζων, οὐκ αὐτοκράτορος ἔργον θεοῦ. 191 Xxxxxxx describes the similarities between what Xxxxx presents as the ‘Chaldean creed’ and Stoic materialism in Niehoff, Biography, pp. 226–228. 192 Xxxxxx, ND I.15.37; XXX XX, 000, 000. Xxxxx philosophy in general is described as pantheistic (see note 171 and also, for instance, Long, Hellenistic Philosophy, p. 152 and Hornblower/Spawforth, Classical Dictionary, p. 1446). In the latter (p. 195) it is additionally claimed that Stoic philosophers, especially Xxxxxxxxxx, legitimised astrology, which is contested by Xxxx in Long, Xxxxxxxx to — Xxxxx’x doctrine of God — we should note that he describes this view as ‘Chaldean’ and not Stoic.193 In Opif. 6b–12, Xxxxx offers two arguments for why he maintains that God transcends his creation. These arguments bring two aspects to light of how Xxxxx considered God and creation to be fundamentally different from each other. Xxxxx’x first argument is that regarding everything in existence, one must distinguish between the active cause and its passive object.194 The active cause forms the passive object into separate, distinct objects, thereby bringing the material world into existence. According to Xxxxx, the active cause that brought the material world into existence cannot be part of that world itself. He identifies the active cause with ‘the mind of the universe’ (Opif. 8). Moreover, to avoid seeing that mind as in anyway a part of that universe, Xxxxx adds that it transcends even immaterial concepts, such as virtue and beauty.195 Why did Xxxxx believe that the ultimate active cause could not be part of the material universe? He did not explain his view in De Opificio Mundi, but in other places Xxxxx elaborated on what he saw as the fallacy of the Chaldeans. According to Xxxxx, the Chaldeans, the astrologers, thought that instead of a transcendent God, the stars controlled the events in the world. Philo countered Xxxxxxxxx, p. 133. The doctrines of Xxxxxxxxx xx Xxxxxxx (approximately 130–68 BCE), as described by Xxxxxx, provide an example of the kind of doctrines that Philo refuted. Xxxxxxxxx often took his starting point from the writings of Xxxxx and in his philosophy merged Platonic, Xxxxxxxxxxxx and Stoic ideas. Enlightening for our discussion is Xxxxxxxxx’ agreement with Xxxx that there is nothing that is ‘immaterial, transcendent or external to the material universe.’ In addition, Xxxxxxxxx merged Xxxxx’x Demiurge and World Soul into ‘one positive force immanent in the world, the Logos’ (Xxxxxx, Middle Platonists, pp. 83–84). 193 For this reason, Xxx avoids identifying the Chaldeans with the Stoics and only uses the label ‘Chaldean’ in his article discussing Xxxxx’x argument in Opif. 6b–12, see Bos, ‘Philo’. 194 As Xxxxx writes in Opif. 8: ‘Xxxxx … realised that it is completely inevitable that in everything that exists there is an active cause and a passive part’ (Μωυςῆς δέ ... ἔγνω δὴ ὅτι ἀναγκαιότατόν ἐστιν ἐν τοῖς οὖσι τὸ μὲν εἶναι δραστήριον αἴτιον, τὸ δὲ παθητόν). In Xxxxxxxx Xxxxxxxx’ summary of the Stoic view on the relation between God and the material world, a distinction is made between the active cause and the passive object similar to Xxxxx (as Xxx explains before the Stoics, Xxxxxxxxx already distinguished between the active and the passive, see ibid., p. 71). In contrast to Xxxxx, however, Xxxx identified the substance of God with the whole of the world and heaven (see DL VII, 134 and 148). Xxxxxxxx presents an overview of various aspects of the philosophical debate in antiquity over ‘cause’ in Sterling, ‘Day One’, pp. 126–129. 195 Philo continues in Opif. 8 that the active cause is ‘the most pure and fully unmixed mind of the universe … greater than virtue, and greater than knowledge, greater than the good itself and the beautiful itself.’ Xxx suggests that Xxxxx was inspired by Xxxxxxxxxxxx arguments in this section. Xxxxxxxxx argued that the active and the passive principle are both immaterial (cf. An. I, 407b 17–18). He further claimed in Met. XII, 1075b 34–37 that Xxxxx did not clearly identify the cause of everything that exists (although Xxxxx did connect νοῦς and αἴτιος in Phil. 30A–E, as Xxxxxx points out in Dillon, Middle Platonists, p. 157). Xxx argues that Aristotle’s Xxxxxxxxx’x solution to Xxxxx’x perceived omission was to identify that cause as the intellect and the prime mover. According to Xxxxxxxxx, God is the intellect transcending virtue in the sense of human practice (Eth. Nic. X, 1177b 25–30) (see Bos, ‘Philo’, pp. 71–73). — Xxxxx’x doctrine of God — that if the heavenly bodies of the material world were the ultimate cause for everything in existence, then they would need to be constantly active and never be passive or at rest. This is not so, according to Xxxxx. The sun, the moon and the stars can be seen to change their course with the seasons. Change implies being acted upon, ‘suffering’ in a sense.196 Thus, if the heavenly bodies are acted upon, they are also passive in some way and cannot be the ultimate cause for creation. According to Xxxxx, only a transcendent God can be said to be active only and never be acted upon.197 As Xxxxx saw it, to believe that the cause for the material world lies inside that world itself is a grave mistake. Its consequence is that one honours creation over its creator.198 According to Xxxxx, there can be no greater impiety than to ascribe attributes of the truly active to what is essentially passive.199 Philo reasoned that ‘Chaldeans’ believed something created (i.e., the stars) was greater than their creator (God). Xxxxx held that the order is exactly the other way around, namely that the creator is always superior to that which he has created.200 Xxxxx maintained that the ultimate cause for creation must exist apart from the material world, because everything existing in the material world, including the 196 Cher. 88.