Compl. A. no. 1, sch 1, s. 1
Compl. A. no. 1, sch. 1, s. 3 15.8.2 The Naskapis of Québec shall have the exclusive right to xxxx and fish within Category IN lands and Category IIN lands and, under reserve of the rights specified in paragraph 15.8.4, persons other than Naskapis shall not have the right to xxxx and fish therein. These persons other than Naskapis may xxxx and fish with the express authorization of, and upon the terms and conditions established by, the Naskapi local authority. The exclusive rights provided for in this paragraph shall be strictly respected and enforced by the responsible governments in the Territory. The Naskapi local authority may permit residents of Québec of Naskapi of Québec ancestry who are not eligible under the present Agreement, but who traditionally xxxx, fish and trap in the Naskapi Sector, to exercise the right to harvest solely for personal purposes in Category IN lands and Category IIN lands. Persons so authorized shall in no event be counted for purposes of allocating quotas to the Naskapis of Québec. 15.8.3 Persons other than Naskapis authorized to xxxx and fish pursuant to paragraph 15.8.2 shall be subject to all applicable laws and regulations of Québec and Canada and all applicable local and regional government by-laws and regulations.
Compl. A. no. 2, s. 1
Compl. Ex. 8 at ATT00181; Answer Ex. 4 at DEF000269.
Compl. ECF No. 20 at 6 (¶ 20); Release Agreement – ECF No. 20 at 26–36. 13 Compl. – ECF No. 20 at 6 (¶ 21); Release Agreement ¶ 1 – ECF No. 20 at 26 (¶ 1).
Compl. Lead Plaintiff alleges in the Complaint that the Ordinance is invalid under Chapters 316 and 318 of the Florida Statutes and Article V and Article VIII, Section 2(b), of the Florida Constitution and incorporates these allegations by reference into each Count of the Complaint. In particular, Lead Plaintiff alleges that the Ordinance is invalid because (1) Chapters 316 and 318 of the Florida Statutes preempt all regulation and enforcement of red light violations to the State of Florida and (2) the Ordinance violates provisions relating to the establishment of a court system in Article V of the Florida constitution. ATS and the City filed motions to dismiss the Complaint, and those motions are currently pending before the Court.]
Compl. 53.) It is undisputed that MassMutual has for many decades interpreted “members” to be the life-insureds, and (where there is a difference) not the policy owners. It is also undisputed that MassMutual’s policies have always provided clear notice of this allocation of voting rights. The complaint offers no allegation of any deception or ambiguity about the company’s longstanding practice. The policy endorsement states: “The Insured/Annuitant is hereby notified that by virtue of this policy/contract he or she is a member of Massachusetts Mutual Life Insurance Company and is entitled to vote in person or by proxy at any and all meetings of said Company.” (Dkt. No. 25, Xxxxx Decl. Exs. B & X.) In the policies, the “insured” is listed as the person whose life is insured by the policy (the life- insured) and the policyholder is referred to as the “owner.” As noted, usually these two positions are occupied by the same flesh-and-blood person. Plaintiffs as policyholders, but not life-insureds, allege that they each have been denied at least 19 votes annually based on MassMutual’s grant of voting rights to the life-insured. They contend that, as a result of MassMutual’s allocation of voting rights, they have not been able to hold the Board of Directors accountable.1 Plaintiffs argue, in essence, that as policyholders they have suffered losses as equity owners but have been unable to hold MassMutual’s Board accountable because of the allegedly improper allocation of voting rights. The verified class action complaint offers only one cause of action, breach of fiduciary duty, against all Defendants. Plaintiffs allege that the individual Defendants breached their fiduciary duty to the Company and policyholders by precluding policyholders who hold policies insuring the lives of others from voting in the election of MassMutual’s Board of Directors. Plaintiffs ask the court for orders granting: (1) declaratory relief holding that Defendants violated Massachusetts law in denying policyholders voting rights for MassMutual’s Board of Directors; (2) declaratory relief holding that Defendants violated Massachusetts law in giving only individuals who are life-insureds voting rights for MassMutual’s Board of Directors; (3) preliminary and permanent injunctions prohibiting MassMutual from denying policy owners the right to vote; (4) preliminary and permanent injunctions prohibiting MassMutual from allowing life-insureds the right to vote; (5) preliminary and permanent injunctions...
Compl. A. no. 18, sch. 1, s. 21 Compl. A. no. 18, sch. 1, s. 21
Compl. A. no. 3, ss. 1 and 2 Compl. A. no. 22, sch. 1, s. 2
Compl. C.S.D. Other
