Compl. A. no. 1, sch 1, s. 1
Compl. A. no. 1, sch. 1, s. 3 15.8.2 The Naskapis of Québec shall have the exclusive right to xxxx and fish within Category IN lands and Category IIN lands and, under reserve of the rights specified in paragraph 15.8.4, persons other than Naskapis shall not have the right to xxxx and fish therein. These persons other than Naskapis may xxxx and fish with the express authorization of, and upon the terms and conditions established by, the Naskapi local authority. The exclusive rights provided for in this paragraph shall be strictly respected and enforced by the responsible governments in the Territory. The Naskapi local authority may permit residents of Québec of Naskapi of Québec ancestry who are not eligible under the present Agreement, but who traditionally xxxx, fish and trap in the Naskapi Sector, to exercise the right to harvest solely for personal purposes in Category IN lands and Category IIN lands. Persons so authorized shall in no event be counted for purposes of allocating quotas to the Naskapis of Québec. 15.8.3 Persons other than Naskapis authorized to xxxx and fish pursuant to paragraph 15.8.2 shall be subject to all applicable laws and regulations of Québec and Canada and all applicable local and regional government by-laws and regulations.
Compl. A. no. 2, s. 1
Compl. ECF No. 20 at 9 (¶ 25); Release Agreement ¶ 2(c) – ECF No. 20 at 29.
Compl. Ex. 1 at ATT00109; Answer Ex. 3 at DEF000266.
Compl at 26 (NSA ¶ 3b). Plaintiff contends that the Army breached paragraph 3b of the NSA by failing to make a good faith attempt to transfer plaintiff to an equivalent position for which he could be deemed qualified. See id. ¶¶ 15, 28–29.
Compl. 2. On December 21, 1987, while employed at the Federal Correctional Institution (“FCI”) in El Reno, Oklahoma, plaintiff filed a formal discrimination complaint with the BOP, alleging that he was not assigned to a riot control squad on the basis of his race. Id.; Pl.’s Ex. 3.
Compl. 53.) It is undisputed that MassMutual has for many decades interpreted “members” to be the life-insureds, and (where there is a difference) not the policy owners. It is also undisputed that MassMutual’s policies have always provided clear notice of this allocation of voting rights. The complaint offers no allegation of any deception or ambiguity about the company’s longstanding practice. The policy endorsement states: “The Insured/Annuitant is hereby notified that by virtue of this policy/contract he or she is a member of Massachusetts Mutual Life Insurance Company and is entitled to vote in person or by proxy at any and all meetings of said Company.” (Dkt. No. 25, Xxxxx Decl. Exs. B & X.) In the policies, the “insured” is listed as the person whose life is insured by the policy (the life- insured) and the policyholder is referred to as the “owner.” As noted, usually these two positions are occupied by the same flesh-and-blood person. Plaintiffs as policyholders, but not life-insureds, allege that they each have been denied at least 19 votes annually based on MassMutual’s grant of voting rights to the life-insured. They contend that, as a result of MassMutual’s allocation of voting rights, they have not been able to hold the Board of Directors accountable.1 Plaintiffs argue, in essence, that as policyholders they have suffered losses as equity owners but have been unable to hold MassMutual’s Board accountable because of the allegedly improper allocation of voting rights. The verified class action complaint offers only one cause of action, breach of fiduciary duty, against all Defendants. Plaintiffs allege that the individual Defendants breached their fiduciary duty to the Company and policyholders by precluding policyholders who hold policies insuring the lives of others from voting in the election of MassMutual’s Board of Directors. Plaintiffs ask the court for orders granting: (1) declaratory relief holding that Defendants violated Massachusetts law in denying policyholders voting rights for MassMutual’s Board of Directors; (2) declaratory relief holding that Defendants 1 Plaintiffs allege that this deprivation is material given that MassMutual allegedly agreed to pay $1 billion to settle claims arising from its participation in the Ponzi scheme orchestrated by Xxxxxxx X. Xxxxxx Investment Securities, LLC. Defendants appear to contest Plaintiffs’ claim about this supposed payment. For a description of the Ponzi scheme, see In re Xxxxxxx X. Xxxxxx Inv. Se...
Compl. Lead Plaintiff alleges in the Complaint that the Ordinance is invalid under Chapters 316 and 318 of the Florida Statutes and Article V and Article VIII, Section 2(b), of the Florida Constitution and incorporates these allegations by reference into each Count of the Complaint. In particular, Lead Plaintiff alleges that the Ordinance is invalid because (1) Chapters 316 and 318 of the Florida Statutes preempt all regulation and enforcement of red light violations to the State of Florida and (2) the Ordinance violates provisions relating to the establishment of a court system in Article V of the Florida constitution. ATS and the City filed motions to dismiss the Complaint, and those motions are currently pending before the Court.] Beginning in early 2011, Lead Counsel and Counsel for ATS began having discussions about a possible settlement of the Litigation between ATS and Lead Plaintiff. On February 16 and 17, 2011, Lead Plaintiff and ATS engaged in two days of mediation before the Xxxxxxxxx Xxxxxxx Xxxxxxx, a former state court judge and highly-respected mediator. Ultimately, after two days of adversarial and arms-length negotiations, Lead Plaintiff and ATS reached an agreement-in-principle to settle as to ATS. As part of that agreement, Lead Plaintiff also agreed to extend the same settlement terms to the City. As a result, the City and ATS have reached an agreement-in-principle with the Lead Plaintiff to settle the Litigation by making a total sum of $375,566.00 available for payment to Class Members with valid claims as detailed herein. The settlement provided for in this Stipulation will finally and forever terminate the Litigation as against all of the Settling Defendants.
Compl. C.S.D. Other
