Formal Security Analysis Using RoR Model Sample Clauses

Formal Security Analysis Using RoR Model tion, the USP computes Ci+1 = h(Ci ||Rx ), Rx = h(IDu ||Rx ) ⊕ Rx∗ , and R = h(IDu ||R ) ⊕ R . According to the RoR model, an attacker A interacts Finally, the USP replaces {PIDu, (Ci , Ri , Ri )} with with the t-th participant instance Πt. Following the proposed h i scenario (as shown in Table II). In our proof, we use a scheme, we define the UAV’s and the USP’s instances by U and S, receptively. The RoR model uses Execute, Send, Reveal, CorruptDevice, and Test queries to simulate an attack guesses the random bit c in game i . The advantage of the adversary to win the game can then be represented as Adv AKE = Pr SuccGi . The proof, following the model in collision resistant one-way hash function h( ) (a pseudo- random function), and a secure ideal PUF function P as random oracles.

Formal Security Analysis Using RoR Model tion, the USP computes Ci+1 = h(Ci ||Rx ), Rx = h(IDu ||Rx ) ⊕ Rx∗ , and R = h(IDu ||R ) ⊕ R . According to the RoR model, an attacker A interacts Finally, the USP replaces {PIDu, (Ci , Ri , Ri )} with with the t-th participant instance Πt. Following the proposed scheme, we define the UAV’s and the USP’s instances by U and S, receptively. The RoR model uses Execute, Send, Adv AKE = Pr ΣSuccGi Σ. The proof, following the model in Reveal, CorruptDevice, and Test queries to simulate an attack scenario (as shown in Table II). In our proof, we use a collision resistant one-way hash function h( ) (a pseudo- random function), and a secure ideal PUF function P as random oracles.