The Model Sample Clauses

The Model. 7.1.1 RCC and the MOD will operate within a Public / Public partnership. The overriding objective is to ensure that the site is developed in such a way as to deliver the agreed vision for the site. Hence whatever vehicle is adopted it must ensure that RCC and MOD retain control over exactly what gets delivered. 7.1.2 The MOD will procure a Land Sale Delivery Partner (LSDP) to deliver the project and the development along the same lines as LSDP models used elsewhere for Defence sales

The Model. As mentioned in the Introduction, we follow Brulhart and Xxxxxx (2000) and estimate the following two specifications of an equation designed to account for changes in employment in 3-digit ISIC (Rev.

The Model. While the historical record shows that the Federal Reserve attempted to use the nonrate terms of access to control discount window borrowing in the 1920s and early 1930s it is not clear the attempts were successful. Assessing whether changes in credit policy had a material effect on bank borrowing requires empirical tests using a model that can measure the administrative pressure applied at the discount window. A useful starting point in developing such a model is in specifying the costs to banks in meeting a reserve need. Cost-minimizing banks would weigh the cost of borrowing from the discount window against the cost of liquidating assets or borrowing from an alternative source. The cost of borrowing from the Federal Reserve is the interest paid at the discount rate, Rd, plus the implicit costs of supervisory surveillance. These costs are those resulting from the administrative pressure supervisors apply to discourage banks from engaging in arbitrage when discount rates were below market rates of interest, as they were for most of the 1920s and many months in the early 1930s. In this model the implicit costs are represented by a borrowing function in which the marginal surveillance cost of access to the discount window, c(B/K), rises with the amount borrowed, B, relative to bank capital, K. Capital is the appropriate scale variable given that Federal Reserve banks had from the start focused on borrowing relative to capital when seeking to restrain bank borrowing (Xxxxxxxxxxx, 1932, p. 44). The implicit costs may be thought of as the opportunity costs of providing the collateral for the borrowings or the capital adjustments required by supervisors whose attention is drawn to the bank by the borrowing. The cost of liquidating the assets is the foregone interest on the assets, RA, plus the transactions costs incurred in selling the assets, tc, measured as a portion of the value of the assets. Although a small market for federal funds developed in several cities in the 1920s in which banks could borrow or lend reserves, most banks met reserve drains by liquidating assets — particularly their holdings of call loans and short- term marketable securities (Xxxxxx, 1938, 93-97 and Xxxxxx, 1964) 3-13). The total cost, C, to banks of meeting their reserve need, RN, can be expressed as: where (1) C = RdB + c(B/K) + RaA + tcA Rd is the discount rate, c(B/K) is the implicit or surveillance costs involved in borrowing, Ra is the interest rate on the alternative source ...

The Model. We consider a team with n members who take part in a joint production repeat- edly. At the beginning of each period, each team member i simultaneously decide whether or not to participate in the production process. Let dt ∈ {0, 1} denote the participation decision for each team member i at each period t. For an individual i who is willing to take part in the production at t, we have dt = 1 and dt = 0

The Model. In this section we refine the formal security model which has been widely used in the litera- ture [12, 8–10, 23, 6] to analyze group key agreement protocols. In particular, we incorporate strong corruption [4] into the security model in a different way than the previous approaches by allowing an adversary to ask one additional query, Dump, and we modify the definition of freshness according to the refined model. Section 5 shows that our approach leads to much simpler security proof of the compiler presented by Xxxx and Yung [23]. U { } Participants. Let = U1, . . . , Un be a set of n users who wish to participate in a group key agreement protocol P . The number of users, n, is polynomially bounded in the security parameter k. Users may execute the protocol multiple times concurrently and thus each user can have many instances called oracles. We use Πs to denote instance s of user Ui. In initialization phase, each user Ui ∈ U obtains a long-term public/private key pair (PKi, SKi) by running a key generation algorithm G(1k). The set of public keys of all users is assumed to be known a priori to all parties including the adversary A.

The Model. We assume that there are N nodes in the entire network, with ISPi controlling αi fraction of nodes. In other words, we assume that αi is ISPi’s market share. We also assume that the amount of traffic sent from an ISP to another ISP is proportional to the product of the number of nodes controlled by each. Thus, the amount of traffic from ISPi to ISPj and to the rest of the network, which is assumed to be reachable only through the transit ISP, is given by fj = βjαiαjN 2 fr = βrαi(1 − αi − αj)N 2, respectively, where βj and βr are arbitrary constants. Similarly, the amount of traffic from ISPj to ISPi and to the rest of the Internet are given by fi = βiαiαjN 2 fr = βrαj(1 − αi − αj)N 2, respectively, where βi and βr are arbitrary constants. Finally, the amount of traffic from the rest of the network to ISPi and ISPj are given by fi = βiαi(1 − αi − αj)N 2 fj = βjαj(1 − αi − αj)N 2, respectively, where where βi and βj are arbitrary constants.

The Model. Consider a population of size one of patients with a specific disease. Patients are indexed with a parameter θ that represents their personal characteristics such as age, co-morbidities, or even some analytical parameter (cholesterol level, blood pressure, biomarker, etc.). We assume that θ is distributed uni- formly within the interval [0, 1]. A pharmaceutical firm has developed a new drug whose therapeutic value has been previously proved in a clinical trial. A clinical trial is defined by {θt , q(θt )} where θt ∈(0,1) represents the characteristics of the patients above which the new drug is tested and q(θ t )∈ (0,1] is the probability that the drug is effective (that is to say, the drug cures, meaning in this setting that it restores completely the quality of life pre- vious to the disease). In other words, patients with θ ≥ θt participate in the clinical trial, and they are cured with probability q(θt ). For the sake of simplicity, we will assume that the probability that the drug cures in the clinical trial is one: q(θt ) = 1. For patients with θ < θt , the clinical trial does not provide any information about the drug efficacy. In real clinical practice, the drug can be administered to patients with θ < θt but its effectiveness is uncertain. We assume that Pr (cure θ < θ ) = θ . Thus, the drug cures with a low probability if it is ad-

The Model. 2.1. The basic game (1) This hypothesis may be seen as representing synergistic e↵ects in the target implemen- tation and/or convexity of individual costs. As for the second interpretation, think of m firms that have to share equally an aggregate abatement level. If their individual xxxxx- ment costs are increasing in individual abatement, then clearly individual participation costs c(m) are decreasing. If, in addition, individual abatement costs are convex, it is easily shown that total abatement costs mc(m) are decreasing6. Moreover, the regulator may consider the achievement of a given target by too few agents is cost-inefficient or not feasible. It is thus assumed that if some participation threshold w > 1 is not reached, the VA fails and a mandatory regulation is enforced instead. As a collective threat, the mandatory regulation typically applies to each of the n firms, whatever their individual willingness to undertake voluntary action may be. Conversely, if the threshold is reached, the VA succeeds and only the m w participating firms implement the global target, each of them bearing the cost c(m). It follows firm i’s payo↵s are defined by: > u(si, m)= 8>< —c(m) if si = 1, m ≤ w 0 if si = 0, m ≤ w —t if m< w, (2) where t is the cost to comply to the mandatory regulation. I also assume that a VA is cost-e↵ective, meaning that if at least w firms participate, they prefer, as a whole, the VA to the mandatory regulation: t> c(w). This condition is one of profitability in the sense 5Such a cap may be for instance to conform some given share of a sector output with an efficiency standard (e.g. the ACEA agreement), or to reduce targeted agents’ toxically releases to some limit value (e.g. the EPA’s 33/50 Program).‌ 6If the aggregate abatement level is A, and individual abatement cost function is d(.), then total costs are md (A/m), and this function is decreasing when d(.) is convex. of self-enforcing equilibrium,7 and it has for direct consequence that the Xxxx solution is non trivial. Aside from profitability, the participation threshold and the threat parameter are exogenous in this model, so as to keep the analysis as general as possible. However, their setting may be constrained if considered within some given institutional context8, as illustrated in section 6. I now turn to the presentation of the correlating device.

The Model. The model presented in this section is a global emission game defined by a triple G = {I, A, Πi}. The set I = {1, 2, , n} is the set of the n players, each of them representing a country. This set I is split into two subset, denoted by I1 and I2, that contain the developed countries and the developing countries, respectively. Even if more asymmetry would be more realistic, the division in two homogeneous groups is suitable to take differences into account and largely used in literature (see e.g., Xxxxxxx and de Zeeuw, 2013). An environmental coalition is then a subset C = (C1 ∪ C2) ⊆ I, where C1 ⊆ I1 is the set of developed countries in coalition and C2 ⊆ I2 is the set of developing countries in coalition. The second element of the triple G is the set of strategies A. Also this set can be written by the union of two disjoint sets A = A1 ∪ A2, where A1 and A2 contain the strategies of developed and developing countries, respectively. The strategies contained in each set Ai are given by the emissions functions of player i, that are the functions of time ei(t) such that ei(t) ≥ 0 ∀t ∈ [0, +∞). The third element of the triple G is the payoff (or welfare) function Πi, i = {1, 2}, that is a map that, for every possible strategies profile, determines the gain of each player. The production of goods and services generates benefits to the citizens of a country and, as by-product, emissions of pollution too. Calling by xx(t) the total production of goods and services for country i at time t, is it possible to write the emission of the country i as function of its own production: ei(t) = 6 Altruistic behavior and International Environmental Agreements h(yi(t)), where h is an increasing function that satisfy h(0) = 0. If the function h is also smooth, than it is possible to express the relation between production and benefit in terms of emissions directly. A very well known form for this benefit in literature (see e.g., xx Xxxxxx and Xxxxxx-Xxxxxx, 2018), expressed by Xx(ei(t)) for player i, is the quadratic and concave function Bi(ei(t)) = αiei(t) − 2 ei (t), where αi is a strictly positive parameter. The assumption of two homoge- neous kinds of players means that there are only two different values for the parameter α; α1 for each i ∈ I1 and α2 for each i ∈ I2. Moreover, the usual presumption on these parameters is that α1 > α2. The simple idea is that developed countries are able to produce more good and services for unity of pollution respect to developing countri...

The Model. The Model combines four basic elements together in an integrated agreement: basic procedural and other standard provisions needed for an agreement of limited partnership formed under the Revised Uniform Limited Partnership Act; basic business, tax and regulatory provisions commonly used in privately held limited partnerships which make long term debt and equity investments; the specific provisions that SBA requires be included in limited partnership agreements for SBICs; and the suggested wording for additional provisions that are often incorporated into a limited partnership agreement. The specific features of the Model are described briefly below: Bold and Regular Type. The Model uses two different typefaces, brackets and underscoring to assist readers in identifying (i) required provisions, (ii) suggested possible provisions if the terms are used, (iii) the general formatting of the agreement, and (iv) places where additional provisions can or may be added by a user: Bold, Arial type indicates provisions that are required. Times New Roman type indicates where optional provisions are expected to appear in the agreement, if used, and the suggested language of a particular provision. Applicants may determine the specific wording of these provisions, but SBA will not accept language that conflicts with the Small Business Investment Act of 1958, as amended, and the rules and regulations thereunder and interpretations thereof promulgated by SBA.