RECTIFYING DEFICIENCIES OF REJECTED OFFERS. As observed previously, PG&E communicated early to several Participants about basic deficiencies in their Offer packages and provided them with an opportunity to correct these deficiencies by completing or correcting their original submissions. None of these original shortfalls in the packages resulted directly in rejection from the short list, as far as can be discerned. Most of the individual rejections of Offers were based on low valuations, low viability, and avoidance of excess supplier concentration. In general deficiencies preventing Offers from being selected do not appear to be caused by errors or misjudgments by the Participants in drafting the Offer package, but rather by the poor economics of projects or technologies at the MW scale chosen by developers, by insufficient progress by the developer at this point in time in areas such as site control, permitting, demonstration of resource quality, and interconnection (e.g., a “not fully baked” project, deficient not in its intrinsic merits but in its degree of advancement to date), and by of equipment and of contractors are moving targets. Xxxxxx cannot identify how PG&E could have rectified the deficiencies associated with rejected Offers while maintaining fairness to Participants whose Offers were selected. The only suggestion Xxxxxx can offer would be to edit future solicitation materials and bidders’ workshop presentations to clarify that the RPS solicitation differs completely from any proposed PV Program.
RECTIFYING DEFICIENCIES OF REJECTED OFFERS. PG&E communicated early to several Participants about basic deficiencies in their Offer packages and provided them with an opportunity to correct these deficiencies by completing or correcting their original submissions. None of these original deficiencies caused rejection from the short list, as far as Xxxxxx can discern. Many of the issues related to failure to complete an Attachment D offer form fully, using the final version of that form, or omission of the most recent CAISO or PTO interconnection study. PG&E viability score Given the robustness of the solicitation and the large number of Offer variants, PG&E did not collect every piece of information required by the protocol from every Participant. Some Participants had obtained interconnection studies for their project but did not submit copies with their proposals. Xxxxxx observes that in these cases the missing information would not have made a difference to the selection decision. PG&E made a concerted effort to obtain copies of these studies for most of these projects. By this point it was evident which Offers had proposed uncompetitive, high prices and were unlikely to be short-listed.
RECTIFYING DEFICIENCIES OF REJECTED OFFERS. PG&E communicated early to several Participants about basic deficiencies in their Offer packages and provided them with an opportunity to correct these deficiencies by completing or correcting their original submissions. None of these original deficiencies caused rejection from consideration for the short list once corrected. Most of the deficiencies concerned omissions of required documents from the offer packages, such as interconnection study reports. In a very few cases the deficiencies were clearly beyond remedy, ' In the case of Offers that PG&E rejected for non-compliance with the requirements of the solicitation, Xxxxxx believes that little could have been done by PG&E to help Participants rectify deficiencies in their proposals.
RECTIFYING DEFICIENCIES OF REJECTED OFFERS. As observed previously, PG&E communicated early to several Participants about basic deficiencies in their Offer packages and provided them with an opportunity to correct these deficiencies by completing or correcting their original submissions. None of these original shortfalls in the packages resulted directly in rejection from the short list, as far as can be discerned, except for the two Offers that were rejected for non-conformity with the requirements of the solicitation protocol. Most of the individual rejections of Offers were based on low valuations, low viability, and avoidance of excess supplier concentration. In general, deficiencies preventing Offers from being selected do not appear to be caused by errors or misjudgments by the Participants in drafting the Offer package, but rather by the poor economics of projects or technologies at the MW scale chosen by developers, by insufficient progress by the developer at this point in time in areas such as site control, permitting, demonstration of resource quality, and interconnection (e.g., a “not fully and by the difficulty for some developers in locking down a competitive PPA price when the price of equipment and of contractors are moving targets. Some projects were deeply flawed by site selection at locations where the grid is highly congested, or in foreign control areas where substantial costs would be required to wheel power to the CAISO and to shape and firm it to render it eligible for the RPS program, or in foreign control areas where it is not at all clear that the power can be moved to the CAISO given limited available transmission capability. Other projects were unattractive because of the serious environmental concerns their construction would likely raise. In situations like these, the rejection from the short list would not likely be rectified by any actions PG&E could take to have the developer enhance its Offer package. Some developers seem to have completely mistaken the 2009 RPS RFO for a solicitation for PG&E’s as-yet-unapproved PV Program, and appear to have assumed that PG&E’s proposed tariff price for contracts under that program, $246/MWh, would serve as a winning offer or a “safe harbor” price. In these cases one can imagine how PG&E might have rectified the deficiency of an uncompetitive price by querying the Participants about the basis for their price. However, such a query by PG&E would fall into the category of a request for clarification that could provide one Participa...
