Special Issue. Master Records which portray limited SVK MOD required information on the Standard Services layout (such as substituting SVK MOD weather minimums in place of standard weather minimum), different sequencing/printing configuration of Standard Services, or SVK MOD required update and issue of Standard or Custom Master Records as an exception to Standard Jeppesen criteria.
Special Issue. How Social, Political, and Cultural Information is Collected, Defined, Used and Analyzed, 1993: 45-82. JSTOR. (Accessed March 3, 2017.) Xxxxxxx, Xxxxxxx. “Whatever Happened to Hindustani? Language Politics in Late Colonial India.” M.A. Thesis, University of Hawai'i at Manoa, 2012. Accessed January 17, 2017. xxxxx://xxxxxxxxxxxx.xxxxx.xxxxxx.xxx/bitstream/10125/100891/1/Forste r_Richard_r.pdf Xxxxxx, Xxxxxxx. “Bollywood Forecast to Grow 11% Annually, Report.” Variety. January 6, 2016. Accessed April 10, 2017. xxxx://xxxxxxx.xxx/2016/biz/asia/bollywood-forecast-to-grow-11- annually-report-1201673182/ Xxxxxxxxx, Xxxx. “Language and Politics in India.” Daedalus, 91.3 (Summer 1962): 543-559. JSTOR. (Accessed January 17, 2017.) Gal, Xxxxx and Xxxxxx, Xxxxxx X. “The Boundaries of Languages and Disciplines: How Ideologies Construct Difference.” Social Research, 62, no. 4. (1995): 967- 1001. JSTOR. (Accessed March 6, 2017.)
Special Issue. CROSS-BORDER MATERIAL TRANSFER AGREEMENTS Whenever the delivery of materials involves a cross-border delivery, which happens in most cases, it raises some signifi- cant legal issues, which the respective legal departments will try to resolve. First, there is an issue of the applicable law. For a legal prac- titioner, it is of great importance which law has to be applied to the contract and its interpretation in the event of disagree- ment. This is a big problem for lawyers, who have been trained in the relevant national context, but the legal systems of two countries are like apples and pears. Therefore, it is practically impossible to demand from a lawyer in Germany the “legal release” of a contract concluded under French law. Each lawyer knows only its own law and therefore can ulti- mately be held responsible only for risks from its own legal sphere. The legal practitioner can reduce this problem by resorting to the cross-border standards. At least, if the materials are provided on a fee paid basis, you will fall within the scope of the United Nations Convention on Contracts for the Inter- national Sale of Goods (unless otherwise expressly stated in the text of the contract). In Europe, if you can’t come to an agreement about applicable law because each side insists on its own national law, it makes sense to abandon the relevant rules altogether. Within the EU Regulatory Framework, the provisions of the Rome I-VO / Rome II-VO / Rome IIa-VO Regulation would then apply, whereby the place of perfor- xxxxx will probably be the most important factor. CONCLUSION It should have become clear that even supposedly simple Material Transfer Agreements are not associated with low risk. On the contrary, they are fraught with many legal risks and, above all, an individual development is necessary for each individual case, which depends largely on the respec- tive goals and objectives of the partners. Since the Material Transfer Agreement is a contract, it must be negotiated on an individual basis, even though negotiation time may be cut prohibitively through the use of the standards and clauses that have already been agreed upon for the same circum- stances. We do not understand the demands12from the scientific com- munity that the restriction of liberty to negotiate, to which the parties are entitled, by means of “take it or die” clauses will push things on. This would only be possible, if the provisions used were designed in such a way as to produce a fair bal- ance...
Special Issue. The final phase of polio eradication and endgame strategies for the post-eradication era.). Journal of Infectious Diseases, 2014. 210(Suppl. 1): p. S74-S84.
Special Issue. The Aesthetics of Architecture: Philosophical investigation into the Art of Building (winter 2011):105- 114.
Special Issue. Per- spectives on the Trade–Development Nexus in the European Union, London: Routledge, ISSN: 1356-9775 (print), 1469-3631 (online), 126 pp. Xxxxx Xxxxxxx (2014), Transformations in Trade Politics: Participa- tory Trade Politics in West Africa, London: Routledge, ISBN: 978-0- 000-00000-0, 232 pp. Keywords: European Union, Africa, West Africa, international relations, international trade Xxxx Xxxxxxx is an economist and sociologist and the former deputy director of the Institute of African Affairs at the GIGA German Institute of Global and Area Studies, Hamburg. From 1991 to 2008 he served as the editor of Africa Spectrum. He has many years of professional experience as a senior development expert in several African countries. E-mail: <xxxx.xxxxxxx@xxxx-xxxxxxx.xx> Negotiations on Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs) between the European Union (EU) and African governments have dragged on since 2002. They were confined by the framework of the Cotonou Agreement, which, despite being a cornerstone of ACP–EU development cooperation also serves to limit the rules of the World Trade Organization (WTO).1 The EPAs were meant not just to liberalize trade but also to promote development in Africa. However, high-flying expectations of creating a win-win situation in a partnership of equals were apparently dashed. Agenda-setting by Brussels left it with grandiose declarations about part- nerships between equals, development orientation, and promotion of both inclusive growth and regional integration with due attention to WTO- compatible regulations. According to the EU’s Roadmap 2014 to 2017 (EU 2014), all this should be realized by 2017 by way of exemplary EPAs. The major issues at stake have been especially pronounced in the ongoing negotiations on West African EPAs. Contentious issues were legion. The EU became increasingly impatient with “intransigent” African partners. It finally threatened to cancel the unilateral trade preferences enjoyed by Europe’s former African colonies if the deadline of 1 October 2014 for the ECOWAS EPA was not honoured. Finally, on 10 July 2014 the heads of all ECOWAS member states endorsed the compromise EPA after prolonged negotiations at the organization’s 45th ordinary session in Ac- cra. Shortly afterwards (on 22 July) the Southern African region followed suit, signing the SADC EPA, the second African EPA within one month. Whether the treaties will also be ratified by the parliaments of remaining states – such as Nigeria, by far th...
Special Issue. Cotonou Agreement, Sept. 2000.
