Common use of Tan’itsu minzoku Clause in Contracts

Tan’itsu minzoku. (uni-raciality) As previously stated, attempts to reference ‘race’ in the Nihonjinron literature are evidenced by the use of the phrase ‘tan’itsu minzoku’ (Yoshino, 1992). Tan’itsu literally means ‘one’ but minzoku is more ambiguous it can mean ‘race’, ethnic community and nation, which indicates the uni-raciality of Japanese society without clearly stating whether it refers to racial or cultural features (Xxxxxxx, 1992). According to Xxxxxxxxx (2008), the notion of Japanese (Nihonjin) in vernacular, political and academic contexts generally implies ‘race’ (minzoku) rather than nationality. What is more, ‘[…] “‘race’” has become the standard tag for minzoku in MOFA11’s reports to CERD12 and other UN treaty committees’ (Xxxxxxxxx, 2008, p. 280). This suggests that the word minzoku is a racial concept. Xxxxxxx (1992) tries to defend the use of the word ‘race’ in a Japanese context. He believes that ‘race’ for the Japanese does not mean the same as it does in British ‘race’ relations. This is because ‘race’ in the Japanese context is used to positively identify the Japanese (‘us’) whereas in a British context ‘race’ deals with negatively identifying minority ethnic groups (‘them’). However, as Nihonjinron focuses on positively identifying the Japanese, it has meant that the existence of ethnic minorities, such as the Koreans and the Chinese, has been largely ignored (Xxxxxxx, 1992; Xxxxxxxx, 2010). It would, therefore, seem that it is through the positive identification of the Japanese that other ethnic groups have been negated. Although this is the reverse of the situation in Britain whereby according to Xxxx (1997) the White British majority are invisible and the minority ethnic groups are highly visible, the positive identification of the Japanese remains a highly racial notion (Miles, 1993). There is official validation of the notion of uni-raciality in Japan, because no ‘race’ boxes exist in official documentation as ‘Japan does not compile data on the ethnicity of its nationals’13 (Xxxxxxxxx, 2008; Xxxxx, 0000; Okubo, 2013). The notion of distinct, coexisting ethnic/racial groups does not exist as a statistical correlation as it does in Britain, which has served to reinforce the popular belief that Japan is uni-racial (Lie, 2001). What is more, the notion of uni-raciality in Japan is not weakened by the existence of the largest minority group, the Koreans (Xxxxxxxx, 2010, p. 6) who can remain invisible in Japan because they are racially indistinguishable from the ‘pure’ Japanese (ibid, p. 7; Xxxxxx, 0000x). The ideology of uni-raciality has been critiqued by many theorists including Befu (2001); Xxxxx (2002); and Xxxx (2011) for being mythical and by Xxx (2001, p. 185) for being ‘absurd, banal, fanciful, wrong or mystical’. In spite of such critiques Xxxxxxxxxxx inspired racial messages still openly pervade Japanese society and they remain largely unchallenged as Xxxxxxxxx argues: Japan is unique today in that it maintains racially laden nationalistic views despite their political implications and in the face of historical and genetic analyses that have long made these notions untenable. [..] In Japan the basic principles of race-based stratification remain pertinent and politically influential (Cleveland, 2014, p. 214). 11 Ministry of Foreign Affairs 12 International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination. 13 This means that there is no official category for the A-Js in Japan. Senior Japanese politicians have expressed their ‘racially laden nationalistic views’ both domestically and internationally without harming their political careers (Cleveland, 2014). In the 1980s the then Conservative Prime Minister Xxxxxxxx implied that the Japanese IQ was higher than that of the Americans because the presence of ethnic minorities in America lowered the general IQ level (Xxxxxxxxx, 1997; Sugimoto, 2003). He attributed Japan’s economic success to ethnic purity in contrast to America’s economic failure due to ethnic impurity (Xxxxxxx, 2004). Such was the outcry from the international community that Xxxxxxxx was forced to retract his comments (Xxxxxxx and Xxxxxx, 1986). Such overtly racially laden language is not restricted to the 1980s but it is also evident in the 2000s. Education Minister, Xxxxxx Xxxxx, called Japan an ‘extremely homogenous country’ in February 2007 and eighteen months prior to this, Foreign Minister Xxxx Xxx said that Japan has ‘one nation, one civilization, one language, one culture, and one race’ (Xxxxxxx, 2007)14. The current Prime Minister Xxxxxx Xxx’x seemingly racially laden sentiments can be summarised in his 2006 amendments to the Fundamental Law of Education (see chapter 5). This law would seem to suggest that in Japan only ‘ “us Japanese citizens” (ware ware Nihon kokumin — i.e., excluding foreigners)’ have a right to education in Japan (Arudou, 2013c). Explicit references to educational goals that emphasise ‘ “tradition,” “culture” and “love of nation”’ are made and school teachers and pupils are required to publicly show respect for Japan’s national flag and national anthem (ibid.). Xxx’s Nihonjinron-type beliefs include ‘vague mystical elements of “Japaneseness”, [which] would now appear to be formally enshrined in the Fundamental Law of Education to influence future generations’ (ibid.). Some believe that racial ‘intolerance […] has been emboldened by the conservative politics of Prime Minister Xxxxxx Xxx’ (Xxxxxxxxxx, 2014). The current conservative politics of the Japanese government would seem to support Xxxxxx and Xxxx’s (1992, p. 100) findings that Nihonjinron is ‘the world view and the ideology of the establishment […] those who espouse it are in the majority in a political sense’ (see chapter 4). This could be why Xxxxxxxxx (0000, p. 213) believes that’ [t]he overarching ideology of racial homogeneity […] remains firmly implanted in the national psyche’. 14 No page numbers are given in the introduction. In order to explain such overt racism and ethnocentrism by senior Japanese politicians in the public arena, I will draw upon the Japanese emic binary codes of tatemae (political correctness) and honne (real feelings) (Xxxxxxxx, 2003).

Tan’itsu minzoku. (uni-raciality) As previously stated, attempts to reference ‘race’ in the Nihonjinron literature are evidenced by the use of the phrase ‘tan’itsu minzoku’ (Yoshino, 1992). Tan’itsu literally means ‘one’ but minzoku is more ambiguous it can mean ‘race’, ethnic community and nation, which indicates the uni-raciality of Japanese society without clearly stating whether it refers to racial or cultural features (XxxxxxxYoshino, 1992). According to Xxxxxxxxx (2008), the notion of Japanese (Nihonjin) in vernacular, political and academic contexts generally implies ‘race’ (minzoku) rather than nationality. What is more, ‘[…] “‘race’” has become the standard tag for minzoku in MOFA11’s reports to CERD12 and other UN treaty committees’ (Xxxxxxxxx, 2008, p. 280). This suggests that the word minzoku is a racial concept. Xxxxxxx Yoshino (1992) tries to defend the use of the word ‘race’ in a Japanese context. He believes that ‘race’ for the Japanese does not mean the same as it does in British ‘race’ relations. This is because ‘race’ in the Japanese context is used to positively identify the Japanese (‘us’) whereas in a British context ‘race’ deals with negatively identifying minority ethnic groups (‘them’). However, as Nihonjinron focuses on positively identifying the Japanese, it has meant that the existence of ethnic minorities, such as the Koreans and the Chinese, has been largely ignored (XxxxxxxYoshino, 1992; XxxxxxxxSugimoto, 2010). It would, therefore, seem that it is through the positive identification of the Japanese that other ethnic groups have been negated. Although this is the reverse of the situation in Britain whereby according to Xxxx (1997) the White British majority are invisible and the minority ethnic groups are highly visible, the positive identification of the Japanese remains a highly racial notion (Miles, 1993). There is official validation of the notion of uni-raciality in Japan, because no ‘race’ boxes exist in official documentation as ‘Japan does not compile data on the ethnicity of its nationals’13 (Xxxxxxxxx, 2008; Xxxxx, 0000; Okubo, 2013). The notion of distinct, coexisting ethnic/racial groups does not exist as a statistical correlation as it does in Britain, which has served to reinforce the popular belief that Japan is uni-racial (Lie, 2001). What is more, the notion of uni-raciality in Japan is not weakened by the existence of the largest minority group, the Koreans (XxxxxxxxSugimoto, 2010, p. 6) who can remain invisible in Japan because they are racially indistinguishable from the ‘pure’ Japanese (ibid, p. 7; Xxxxxx, 0000x). The ideology of uni-raciality has been critiqued by many theorists including Befu (2001); Xxxxx Oguma (2002); and Xxxx (2011) for being mythical and by Xxx (2001, p. 185) for being ‘absurd, banal, fanciful, wrong or mystical’. In spite of such critiques Xxxxxxxxxxx Nihonjinron inspired racial messages still openly pervade Japanese society and they remain largely unchallenged as Xxxxxxxxx Cleveland argues: Japan is unique today in that it maintains racially laden nationalistic views despite their political implications and in the face of historical and genetic analyses that have long made these notions untenable. [..] In Japan the basic principles of race-based stratification remain pertinent and politically influential (Cleveland, 2014, p. 214). 11 Ministry of Foreign Affairs 12 International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination. 13 This means that there is no official category for the A-Js in Japan. Senior Japanese politicians have expressed their ‘racially laden nationalistic views’ both domestically and internationally without harming their political careers (Cleveland, 2014). In the 1980s the then Conservative Prime Minister Xxxxxxxx implied that the Japanese IQ was higher than that of the Americans because the presence of ethnic minorities in America lowered the general IQ level (Xxxxxxxxx, 1997; Sugimoto, 2003). He attributed Japan’s economic success to ethnic purity in contrast to America’s economic failure due to ethnic impurity (Xxxxxxx, 2004). Such was the outcry from the international community that Xxxxxxxx was forced to retract his comments (Xxxxxxx Landler and Xxxxxx, 1986). Such overtly racially laden language is not restricted to the 1980s but it is also evident in the 2000s. Education Minister, Xxxxxx Xxxxx, called Japan an ‘extremely homogenous country’ in February 2007 and eighteen months prior to this, Foreign Minister Xxxx Xxx said that Japan has ‘one nation, one civilization, one language, one culture, and one race’ (Xxxxxxx, 2007)14. The current Prime Minister Xxxxxx Xxx’x seemingly racially laden sentiments can be summarised in his 2006 amendments to the Fundamental Law of Education (see chapter 5). This law would seem to suggest that in Japan only ‘ “us Japanese citizens” (ware ware xxxx xxxx Nihon kokumin — i.e., excluding foreigners)’ have a right to education in Japan (Arudou, 2013c). Explicit references to educational goals that emphasise ‘ “tradition,” “culture” and “love of nation”’ are made and school teachers and pupils are required to publicly show respect for Japan’s national flag and national anthem (ibid.). XxxAbe’s Nihonjinron-type beliefs include ‘vague mystical elements of “Japaneseness”, [which] would now appear to be formally enshrined in the Fundamental Law of Education to influence future generations’ (ibid.). Some believe that racial ‘intolerance […] has been emboldened by the conservative politics of Prime Minister Xxxxxx Xxx’ (XxxxxxxxxxSlodkowski, 2014). The current conservative politics of the Japanese government would seem to support Xxxxxx Manabe and XxxxBefu’s (1992, p. 100) findings that Nihonjinron is ‘the world view and the ideology of the establishment […] those who espouse it are in the majority in a political sense’ (see chapter 4). This could be why Xxxxxxxxx (0000, p. 213) believes that’ [t]he overarching ideology of racial homogeneity […] remains firmly implanted in the national psyche’. 14 No page numbers are given in the introduction. In order to explain such overt racism and ethnocentrism by senior Japanese politicians in the public arena, I will draw upon the Japanese emic binary codes of tatemae (political correctness) and honne (real feelings) (XxxxxxxxSugimoto, 2003).

Tan’itsu minzoku. (uni-raciality) As previously stated, attempts to reference ‘race’ in the Nihonjinron literature are evidenced by the use of the phrase ‘tan’itsu minzoku’ (Yoshino, 1992). Tan’itsu literally means ‘one’ but minzoku is more ambiguous it can mean ‘race’, ethnic community and nation, which indicates the uni-raciality of Japanese society without clearly stating whether it refers to racial or cultural features (XxxxxxxYoshino, 1992). According to Xxxxxxxxx (2008), the notion of Japanese (Nihonjin) in vernacular, political and academic contexts generally implies ‘race’ (minzoku) rather than nationality. What is more, ‘[…] “‘race’” has become the standard tag for minzoku in MOFA11’s reports to CERD12 and other UN treaty committees’ (Xxxxxxxxx, 2008, p. 280). This suggests that the word minzoku is a racial concept. Xxxxxxx (1992) tries to defend the use of the word ‘race’ in a Japanese context. He believes that ‘race’ for the Japanese does not mean the same as it does in British ‘race’ relations. This is because ‘race’ in the Japanese context is used to positively identify the Japanese (‘us’) whereas in a British context ‘race’ deals with negatively identifying minority ethnic groups (‘them’). However, as Nihonjinron focuses on positively identifying the Japanese, it has meant that the existence of ethnic minorities, such as the Koreans and the Chinese, has been largely ignored (Xxxxxxx, 1992; Xxxxxxxx, 2010). It would, therefore, seem that it is through the positive identification of the Japanese that other ethnic groups have been negated. Although this is the reverse of the situation in Britain whereby according to Xxxx (1997) the White British majority are invisible and the minority ethnic groups are highly visible, the positive identification of the Japanese remains a highly racial notion (Miles, 1993). There is official validation of the notion of uni-raciality in Japan, because no ‘race’ boxes exist in official documentation as ‘Japan does not compile data on the ethnicity of its nationals’13 (Xxxxxxxxx, 2008; XxxxxOkano, 00002012; Okubo, 2013). The notion of distinct, coexisting ethnic/racial groups does not exist as a statistical correlation as it does in Britain, which has served to reinforce the popular belief that Japan is uni-racial (Lie, 2001). What is more, the notion of uni-raciality in Japan is not weakened by the existence of the largest minority group, the Koreans (Xxxxxxxx, 2010, p. 6) who can remain invisible in Japan because they are racially indistinguishable from the ‘pure’ Japanese (ibid, p. 7; XxxxxxArudou, 0000x2013b). The ideology of uni-raciality has been critiqued by many theorists including Befu (2001); Xxxxx (2002); and Xxxx (2011) for being mythical and by Xxx (2001, p. 185) for being ‘absurd, banal, fanciful, wrong or mystical’. In spite of such critiques Xxxxxxxxxxx inspired racial messages still openly pervade Japanese society and they remain largely unchallenged as Xxxxxxxxx Cleveland argues: Japan is unique today in that it maintains racially laden nationalistic views despite their political implications and in the face of historical and genetic analyses that have long made these notions untenable. [..] In Japan the basic principles of race-based stratification remain pertinent and politically influential (Cleveland, 2014, p. 214). 11 Ministry of Foreign Affairs 12 International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination. 13 This means that there is no official category for the A-Js in Japan. Senior Japanese politicians have expressed their ‘racially laden nationalistic views’ both domestically and internationally without harming their political careers (Cleveland, 2014). In the 1980s the then Conservative Prime Minister Xxxxxxxx implied that the Japanese IQ was higher than that of the Americans because the presence of ethnic minorities in America lowered the general IQ level (XxxxxxxxxCreighton, 1997; Sugimoto, 2003). He attributed Japan’s economic success to ethnic purity in contrast to America’s economic failure due to ethnic impurity (Xxxxxxx, 2004). Such was the outcry from the international community that Xxxxxxxx was forced to retract his comments (Xxxxxxx and Xxxxxx, 1986). Such overtly racially laden language is not restricted to the 1980s but it is also evident in the 2000s. Education Minister, Xxxxxx Xxxxx, called Japan an ‘extremely homogenous country’ in February 2007 and eighteen months prior to this, Foreign Minister Xxxx Xxx said that Japan has ‘one nation, one civilization, one language, one culture, and one race’ (Xxxxxxx, 2007)14. The current Prime Minister Xxxxxx Xxx’x seemingly racially laden sentiments can be summarised in his 2006 amendments to the Fundamental Law of Education (see chapter 5). This law would seem to suggest that in Japan only ‘ “us Japanese citizens” (ware ware Nihon kokumin — i.e., excluding foreigners)’ have a right to education in Japan (Arudou, 2013c). Explicit references to educational goals that emphasise ‘ “tradition,” “culture” and “love of nation”’ are made and school teachers and pupils are required to publicly show respect for Japan’s national flag and national anthem (ibid.). Xxx’s Nihonjinron-type beliefs include ‘vague mystical elements of “Japaneseness”, [which] would now appear to be formally enshrined in the Fundamental Law of Education to influence future generations’ (ibid.). Some believe that racial ‘intolerance […] has been emboldened by the conservative politics of Prime Minister Xxxxxx Xxx’ (Xxxxxxxxxx, 2014). The current conservative politics of the Japanese government would seem to support Xxxxxx and Xxxx’s (1992, p. 100) findings that Nihonjinron is ‘the world view and the ideology of the establishment […] those who espouse it are in the majority in a political sense’ (see chapter 4). This could be why Xxxxxxxxx Cleveland (00002014, p. 213) believes that’ [t]he overarching ideology of racial homogeneity […] remains firmly implanted in the national psyche’. 14 No page numbers are given in the introduction. In order to explain such overt racism and ethnocentrism by senior Japanese politicians in the public arena, I will draw upon the Japanese emic binary codes of tatemae (political correctness) and honne (real feelings) (Xxxxxxxx, 2003).

Tan’itsu minzoku. (uni-raciality) As previously stated, attempts to reference ‘race’ in the Nihonjinron literature are evidenced by the use of the phrase ‘tan’itsu minzoku’ (Yoshino, 1992). Tan’itsu literally means ‘one’ but minzoku is more ambiguous it can mean ‘race’, ethnic community and nation, which indicates the uni-raciality of Japanese society without clearly stating whether it refers to racial or cultural features (Xxxxxxx, 1992). According to Xxxxxxxxx (2008), the notion of Japanese (Nihonjin) in vernacular, political and academic contexts generally implies ‘race’ (minzoku) rather than nationality. What is more, ‘[…] “‘race’” has become the standard tag for minzoku in MOFA11’s reports to CERD12 and other UN treaty committees’ (Xxxxxxxxx, 2008, p. 280). This suggests that the word minzoku is a racial concept. Xxxxxxx (1992) tries to defend the use of the word ‘race’ in a Japanese context. He believes that ‘race’ for the Japanese does not mean the same as it does in British ‘race’ relations. This is because ‘race’ in the Japanese context is used to positively identify the Japanese (‘us’) whereas in a British context ‘race’ deals with negatively identifying minority ethnic groups (‘them’). However, as Nihonjinron focuses on positively identifying the Japanese, it has meant that the existence of ethnic minorities, such as the Koreans and the Chinese, has been largely ignored (Xxxxxxx, 1992; Xxxxxxxx, 2010). It would, therefore, seem that it is through the positive identification of the Japanese that other ethnic groups have been negated. Although this is the reverse of the situation in Britain whereby according to Xxxx (1997) the White British majority are invisible and the minority ethnic groups are highly visible, the positive identification of the Japanese remains a highly racial notion (Miles, 1993). There is official validation of the notion of uni-raciality in Japan, because no ‘race’ boxes exist in official documentation as ‘Japan does not compile data on the ethnicity of its nationals’13 (Xxxxxxxxx, 2008; XxxxxOkano, 00002012; Okubo, 2013). The notion of distinct, coexisting ethnic/racial groups does not exist as a statistical correlation as it does in Britain, which has served to reinforce the popular belief that Japan is uni-racial (Lie, 2001). What is more, the notion of uni-raciality in Japan is not weakened by the existence of the largest minority group, the Koreans (XxxxxxxxSugimoto, 2010, p. 6) who can remain invisible in Japan because they are racially indistinguishable from the ‘pure’ Japanese (ibid, p. 7; XxxxxxArudou, 0000x2013b). The ideology of uni-raciality has been critiqued by many theorists including Befu Xxxx (2001); Xxxxx (2002); and Xxxx (2011) for being mythical and by Xxx (2001, p. 185) for being ‘absurd, banal, fanciful, wrong or mystical’. In spite of such critiques Xxxxxxxxxxx inspired racial messages still openly pervade Japanese society and they remain largely unchallenged as Xxxxxxxxx Cleveland argues: Japan is unique today in that it maintains racially laden nationalistic views despite their political implications and in the face of historical and genetic analyses that have long made these notions untenable. [..] In Japan the basic principles of race-based stratification remain pertinent and politically influential (Cleveland, 2014, p. 214). 11 Ministry of Foreign Affairs 12 International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination. 13 This means that there is no official category for the A-Js in Japan. Senior Japanese politicians have expressed their ‘racially laden nationalistic views’ both domestically and internationally without harming their political careers (Cleveland, 2014). In the 1980s the then Conservative Prime Minister Xxxxxxxx implied that the Japanese IQ was higher than that of the Americans because the presence of ethnic minorities in America lowered the general IQ level (Xxxxxxxxx, 1997; Sugimoto, 2003). He attributed Japan’s economic success to ethnic purity in contrast to America’s economic failure due to ethnic impurity (Xxxxxxx, 2004). Such was the outcry from the international community that Xxxxxxxx was forced to retract his comments (Xxxxxxx and Xxxxxx, 1986). Such overtly racially laden language is not restricted to the 1980s but it is also evident in the 2000s. Education Minister, Xxxxxx Xxxxx, called Japan an ‘extremely homogenous country’ in February 2007 and eighteen months prior to this, Foreign Minister Xxxx Xxx said that Japan has ‘one nation, one civilization, one language, one culture, and one race’ (Xxxxxxx, 2007)14. The current Prime Minister Xxxxxx Xxx’x seemingly racially laden sentiments can be summarised in his 2006 amendments to the Fundamental Law of Education (see chapter 5). This law would seem to suggest that in Japan only ‘ “us Japanese citizens” (ware ware Nihon kokumin — i.e., excluding foreigners)’ have a right to education in Japan (Arudou, 2013c). Explicit references to educational goals that emphasise ‘ “tradition,” “culture” and “love of nation”’ are made and school teachers and pupils are required to publicly show respect for Japan’s national flag and national anthem (ibid.). Xxx’s Nihonjinron-type beliefs include ‘vague mystical elements of “Japaneseness”, [which] would now appear to be formally enshrined in the Fundamental Law of Education to influence future generations’ (ibid.). Some believe that racial ‘intolerance […] has been emboldened by the conservative politics of Prime Minister Xxxxxx Xxx’ (Xxxxxxxxxx, 2014). The current conservative politics of the Japanese government would seem to support Xxxxxx and Xxxx’s (1992, p. 100) findings that Nihonjinron is ‘the world view and the ideology of the establishment […] those who espouse it are in the majority in a political sense’ (see chapter 4). This could be why Xxxxxxxxx Cleveland (00002014, p. 213) believes that’ [t]he overarching ideology of racial homogeneity […] remains firmly implanted in the national psyche’. 14 No page numbers are given in the introduction. In order to explain such overt racism and ethnocentrism by senior Japanese politicians in the public arena, I will draw upon the Japanese emic binary codes of tatemae (political correctness) and honne (real feelings) (Xxxxxxxx, 2003).