TFEU. 988 The concept of grandfather rights allows airlines to operate without having to fear losing slots to competitors as long as they meet the 80% usage threshold, see Chapter 2, section 2.2.3, and therefore airlines may argue that they should be the beneficiary of any monetary benefits related to slot value. See European Commission, supra note 54, paragraph 17. 989 ACI, IATA and WWACG, Worldwide Airport Slot Guidelines (WASG) Edition 1 (2020), supra note 8, at 8.6.1. 990 See Case M.8633 – Lufthansa/certain Air Berlin assets, supra note 980, paragraph 13. 991 See Xxxx XxxXxxxxx(II), supra note 113, at 45. The question of slot ownership seems to remain subordinate to the resolution of the legality of slot trading between airlines. However, the issue of slot ownership is a separate policy decision that needs to be distinguished from the objective of maximizing the value and use of slots via market mechanisms. See Xxxxxxxxx, supra note 10. ownership, and, vice versa, also depending on the applicable law, ownership indicates that the holder is free to sell the property at its discretion. As several cases relating to airlines entering administration and the subsequent suboptimal or even non-utilization of slots have shown, some of which are studied in section
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