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TFEU Sample Clauses

TFEUThe Board of Governors shall approve the application for accession of the new ESM Member and the detailed technical terms related thereto, as well as the adaptations to be made to this Treaty as a direct consequence of the accession. Following the approval of the application for membership by the Board of Governors, new ESM Members shall accede upon the deposit of the instruments of accession with the Depositary, who shall notify other ESM Members thereof.
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TFEU. The EEA Agreement does not contain a cul- tural exemption similar to Art. 107(3)(d) TFEU, which allows the Commission
TFEU. 988 The concept of grandfather rights allows airlines to operate without having to fear losing slots to competitors as long as they meet the 80% usage threshold, see Chapter 2, section 2.2.3, and therefore airlines may argue that they should be the beneficiary of any monetary benefits related to slot value. See European Commission, supra note 54, paragraph 17. 989 ACI, IATA and WWACG, Worldwide Airport Slot Guidelines (WASG) Edition 1 (2020), supra note 8, at 8.6.1. 990 See Case M.8633 – Lufthansa/certain Air Berlin assets, supra note 980, paragraph 13. 991 See Xxxx XxxXxxxxx(II), supra note 113, at 45. The question of slot ownership seems to remain subordinate to the resolution of the legality of slot trading between airlines. However, the issue of slot ownership is a separate policy decision that needs to be distinguished from the objective of maximizing the value and use of slots via market mechanisms. See Xxxxxxxxx, supra note 10. ownership, and, vice versa, also depending on the applicable law, ownership indicates that the holder is free to sell the property at its discretion. As several cases relating to airlines entering administration and the subsequent suboptimal or even non-utilization of slots have shown, some of which are studied in section
TFEU. ESA can find aid falling outside the scope of application of the guidelines 65 compatible with the functioning of the EEA Agreement by direct application of Art. 61(3)(c).64 EFTA States remain free to notify aid which does not meet the criteria laid down in the guidelines and ESA may authorise such proposed aid in exceptional circumstances.65
TFEU. 48 Although the provision only refers to products, it is also applied to services.53 49 An interesting element of this provision is that it acknowledges the existence of the concept of so-called indirect aid in that it refers to aid granted to individ- ual consumers. A consumer as such typically does not offer goods or services on a market and therefore cannot be classified as an “undertaking” within the mean- ing of the first paragraph of Art. 61. The provision acknowledges that financial advantages flowing from state resources to consumers can indirectly provide un- dertakings (e.g. those selling the products) with advantages.
TFEU. It allows for aid to make good the damages caused by natural disasters or exceptional circum- stances such as force majeure events. On the basis of this provision, ESA ap- proved aid to the Icelandic and Norwegian aviation sectors in the wake of the terrorist attacks against the United States of America on 11 September 2001.54 50 Case 248/84, 14.10.1987, Germany v Commission, at para. 18. 51 ESA Decision No 459/12/COL, 5.12.2012. See also ESA’s letter to the Norwegian authorities of 10.7.2015, where it took the preliminary view that the financing of a multi-purpose sports hall in Finnmark in northern Norway did not constitute state aid due to the lack of effect on intra-EEA trade. The letter is available on ESA’s website: xxxx://xxx.xxxxxxxx.xxx/state-aid/ state-aid-register/preliminary-assessments/. 52 ESA Decision No 39/07/COL, 27.2.2007. The decision was challenged before the EFTA Court, with its judgment in Case E-5/07, 21.2.2008, Private Barnehagers Landsforening the Court upheld the decision on the grounds that the day-care institutions did not constitute un- dertakings. The Court did not rule on the issue of effect on trade, see para. 84 of the judgment. 53 See ESA’s guidelines on state aid to airports and airlines, para. 156, OJ No L 209, 6.8.2015, p. 17.
TFEU. Actions against enforceable decisions must be brought against the Commission (not against the Agency).
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TFEU. By a detailed analysis of airline alliances, this thesis argues for the wider interpretation of restriction by object and do not identify any contradiction with the more economic approach of EU competition law. This chapter will present the economic and legal context of strategic alliances in general. This reveals the general purpose of alliance agreements and explains whether the economic environment really induces undertakings to cooperate with their competitors. The conclusions of this chapter are relevant both for the analysis under Article 101(1) TFEU and, more importantly, for the scrutiny of efficiency claims under Article 101(3)
TFEU. By relying on the example and analysis of airline alliances and in particular metal-neutral revenue-sharing alliances, the thesis argues that the ‘orthodox’ or wider interpretation of restriction by object is correct and, as such, does not contradict the idea behind the more economic approach of EU competition law. However, the analysis of restriction by object has to take into account the effects of Article 101 TFEU as a whole, including Article 101(3)
TFEU. The research question concentrates on the dichotomy of Article 101 TFEU, and it is concluded that the experience of the aviation industry supports the thesis. Abstract 2 1 Introduction 6
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