The complaint. (19) The complainant essentially argues that the Municipality of Bergen has granted an advantage to BKK by:
(a) overcompensating it for the maintenance and operation of the 18 407 streetlights along municipal roads (14), for which the Municipality is responsible; and (b) financing the 12 000 new LED fixtures on the streetlight infras tructure owned by BKK.
The complaint. (23) The complaint received by the Authority in July 2010 relates to the contract referred to above, concluded on the basis of the tender on 1 February 2010 between the Icelandic Defence Agency and the telecommunication operator Vodafone. The complainant claims that the awarded contract involves State aid in the form of a rent for the use of the optical fibre at a price significantly below what a market investor would have considered to be acceptable.
(24) According to the invitation to tender, leases for the duration of 10 years were to be negotiated, with a minimum consideration of ISK 19 million per year. The price charged for the rental of the fibres was inten ded to cover as a minimum the government's operating costs. The complainant claims that by only charging for the operating costs of the fibres, the lessee was relieved of the financial burden normally incurred by com panies in the same business and incurred by the complainant, in particular an appropriate contribution to fixed costs (i.e. the costs of construction, renewal and depreciation of the cable) and an adequate return on the capi tal investment.
(25) On the amount of the alleged aid the complainant has provided the following details: ‘The amount of the aid constitutes the difference between the rent charged by the state for the use of the cables, i.e. ISK 19 150 000-20 000 000 per year, and what a market investor would [have] deemed an acceptable rent, i.e. over ISK 85 million. The net present value of the total amount of the aid is ISK 464,2 million over the estimated twenty year lifetime of the fiber to each of the two companies, based on the rental price ISK 19 000 000 per year.’ (1).
(26) The complainant has stated that there can be no doubt that a private investor would not accept ISK 19-20 million per year for the use of each of the two fibres, as that amount would fail to cover the costs of operating and renewing the cable, let alone the acceptable return which a market investor would normally expect from his investments.
(27) The complainant maintains that the method of evaluation of the submitted tenders, as set out in Table 1 above, effectively excluded Míla from the tendering process, as it was the only party operating in the market and was therefore by definition unable to acquire 40 % of the points used in the selection evaluation, as these points were awarded for stimulation of competition. For Xxxx'x potential bid to be successful, the rental price it offered would have ...
The complaint. In July 2008, OB complained to the Authority alleging that Oppdal municipality was going to sell property 271/8, which served as a parking area for customers of a nearby ski resort, without notifying the sale. OB owns and operates a number of ski resorts in the Norwegian municipality Oppdal. The buyer of the plot in question, SDO, is a competitor who had previously leased an area from OB for use in its business related to ski equipment and ski instructor services. After OB increased the lease, SDO was looking for new premises.
(1) Minutes from meeting 30 June 2008 in Oppdal Municipality (Formannskapet). In its complaint, OB alleged that the property would be sold without conducting an unconditional bidding procedure, as described in the Authority’s guidelines for sales of land and public buildings, paragraph 2.1 (1). XX also argued that the municipality had not acted in accordance with the alternative procedure described in paragraph 2.2 in the Authority’s guidelines, since it had started sale negotiations with the potential buyer prior to obtaining an independent evaluation of the property. Moreover, OB maintained that it was unclear on which principles the evaluation reports are based. OB alleged that its own NOK 3,1 million offer, based on the same exploitation of the property as the buyer, showed that the market price was not reflected in the sales price, and that OB could not be considered to be a buyer with a particular interest in the property.
The complaint. The complainant alleges that several transactions between the Port of Reykjavík (4), Dráttarbrautir Reykjavíkur ehf. and Stáltak hf. (5) (later Stálsmiðjan ehf.) involve State aid to Stáltak. The complainant considers that ever since December 1999, when Dráttarbrautir Reykjavíkur was founded as a private limited liability company established by the Port and Stáltak, the Port has directly and indirectly supported the operations of Stáltak and, on more than one occasion, unduly saved the company from financial difficulties or imminent bankruptcy. The complainant believes the aid granted amounted to several million ISK. In this manner, the complainant considers that the Port has disrupted the competitive position of enterprises that operate in the area, in particular ports that offer slipway services; dry-docking and ship repairs. The complainant has explained that only three companies, which are situated in the three largest harbours in Iceland, can offer dry-docking and ship repair slipway services. These companies are Stáltak, which operated in the Reykjavík Harbour, and two companies operating from the Hafnarfjörður Harbour and Akureyri Harbour respectively. The complainant has pointed out that through the Port of Reykjavík’s financial support, Stáltak has been able to offer the slipway services in question at a lower price than its competitors.
The complaint. The complainant has alleged that unlawful State aid is being provided by the Icelandic State and the City to the companies involved in the operation of Harpa. The complainant referred to the State budget for the year 2011 where the Ministry of Finance allocated ISK 419 400 000 to the operation of Harpa and additional ISK 44 200 000 for building costs and maintenance. The Municipality’s budget foresaw a substantial allocation of funds to the Harpa project for the year 2011 amounting to a total of ISK 391 526 000. Furthermore, the Municipality contributed a substantial amount to the project in the years 2009-2010.
The complaint. The complainant states that AS Oslo Sporveier transferred NOK 41 499 000 in new equity to AS Sporveisbussene in 2004, and alleges that this transaction may have involved State aid as no private market investor would inject capital in a loss-making company. The complainant furthermore questions whether capital has been injected in order to fund new activities taking place in a market exposed to competition.
The complaint. (6) The complainant ‘Xxxxxxxxxxxx.xx’ is a privately owned Norwegian bus transport operator. It claims that the award of contracts by Aust-Agder without any form of competition has favoured Nettbus Sør AS and several other the complainant’s competitors during the period 2004-2016, as well as before that period. The complainant takes the view that the compensation paid according to these contracts involves unlawful State aid. It refers in particular to the Authority’s Decision No 254/10/COL of 21 June 2010 (AS Oslo Sporveier and AS Sporveisbussene) submitting that the contracts in this present case also constitute unlawful State aid.
(7) The complainant furthermore submits that Aust-Agder has for many years granted substantial State aid under the contracts. In particular, Nettbuss Sør AS is claimed to have received significant advantages. The complainant argues that in 2009, Aust-Agder increased the compensation to Nettbuss Sør AS by as much as 37 % without any corresponding increase in the production level. According to the complainant, this shows that the compensation that Aust-Agder has been paying out is above the market price.
(8) The complainant alleges that in 2010 Nettbuss Sør AS received more than 70 % of the annual compensation that Aust-Agder paid to the bus transport operators and that this has led to a serious distortion in the local bus transport market, as well as in the express bus market.
(9) The complainant argues that the compensation paid by Aust-Agder represents as much as 68,5 % to 88,4 % of the expected costs of the bus operators for performing local transport services.
(10) Furthermore, the complainant refers to the compensation mechanisms in the contracts between Aust- Agder and the bus operators. These mechanisms set out: (1) that the parties can adjust productions and compensation annually and that the bus operators have a right to propose ‘production changes’;