Common use of Conclusions Clause in Contracts

Conclusions. Does membership of an RTA weaken the interest in multilateral negotiations and liberalization? The background of unilateral reforms and increased membership of the strengthened multilateral system should mean that the recent strong trend towards regionalism is somewhat less dangerous to third countries and to the multilateral system than earlier experiences. This conclusion is re-inforced by the nature of the new agreements, which have wider coverage of product and instruments than earlier agreements, enhancing the degree of integration. On the other hand, we have certainly heard in Geneva comments from negotiators to the effect "If we do not get what we want in the negotiating agenda, why should we worry? We have our own RTA. That is where the action is!" Was this a factor behind the failure of the WTO Ministerial meeting in Seattle in late 1999? On the whole, experience seems to confirm the equivocal view of Xxxxxxx (1998) who says that there is no reason to expect a simple answer to whether regionalism encourages or discourages the evolution towards globally xxxxx trade. Similarly, the jury remains out on whether the emerging mega-blocs of RTAs will facilitate or frustrate the making of multilateral agreements. It should be noted, however, that the emerging mega-blocks ignore, for the most part, the least-developed countries, particularly those in sub-Sahara Africa and South Asia. Are these new blocs then a sign of frustration with the multilateral system? While many countries have embraced trade liberalization as part of a wider package of economic reforms, the pace of change varies widely and has certainly slowed in recent years, even before the Asian financial crisis. For the faster moving countries, finding like-minded countries may well have been a factor behind regional agreements. Moreover, locking in reforms through RTAs has also been a consideration, Mexico in NAFTA is a key example, and this may also be the most important result of the Europe Agreements. Thus, the new regionalism lays down a challenge to be bettered at the multilateral level. Do RTAs harm third countries and weaken the MFN principle? It is hard to find concrete evidence that RTAs have harmed third countries. RTAs are by their nature discriminatory and hence a derogation of the MFN principle. It is, therefore, not surprising that trade within such blocs is generally growing faster than trade from non- members (except in the EC where the numbers are the same in the 1990s). On the other hand, trade with non-members is growing at about the same rate as world trade in general, and in some of the smaller, more dynamic RTAs, trade with non-members is growing faster than world trade. It is argued in the literature that more comprehensive coverage ("going all the way") inclines countries to take a more positive view of general liberalization. Similarly it is argued that deeper integration is beneficial to third countries as domestic regulations allow greater competition even from non-members. These issues obviously need more rigorous research. The maintenance of a dual system (of anti- dumping duties for third parties and competition or anti-trust policy among RTA parties) can create distortions where different criteria and conditions apply to the invocation of such measures and thus have the potential for discrimination against third countries. Differing XXXx among RTAs are likely to have negative effects on trade. Complex and varying methods of calculating regional content impose a significant burden on industry and this problem is magnified by the overlap of RTAs. Likewise, the network of diagonal cumulation schemes of preferential XXXx may have the effect of extending an RTA beyond its own membership, without any legal basis. This is discriminatory, since some of the RTA's trading partners – those participating in the diagonal cumulation scheme – benefit from preferential treatment, while other third parties – those outside the diagonal What about the examination of RTAs in the WTO and the inconclusive debate on systemic issues? Does this matter? This certainly does the system little credit, but it is also a consequence of the fundamental consensus process of the WTO. It is frustrating to all WTO Members, participants or not in an RTA, and has effectively given xxxxx xxxxxxx to participants to operate a range of discriminatory schemes. Given the divergences of view in the CRTA and the strength of entrenched positions, it is difficult to see any major breakthroughs in this area. It may be that the compatibility of individual RTAs with WTO rules is, in future, decided in the DSB of the WTO, in the absence of firm conclusions in the CRTA. WTO (1995) suggests the conversion of the examination process towards a transparency mechanism, which could be welfare-enhancing as suggested by the public choice literature. For example, the present legal examinations might be completed, reflecting the existing divergences of opinion (the current approach in the CRTA), and this might be followed with a periodic examination, looking at the implementation of each agreement and the evolution of trade among partners. A timetable for broad-based, economic review, keeping the RTAs under scrutiny, could go some way to satisfying the concern of third countries about the operation of RTAs. There can be little doubt that the main economic advantages to participants in regional trade agreements would be even greater if the liberalization were carried out on a wider, multilateral scale. RTAs are a second-best solution. Thus, on the basis of theory, Xxxx and Wan (1976) note "...there is a big incentive to form and enlarge a customs union until the world is one big customs union, that is, until free trade prevails."

Conclusions. Does membership The RTAs that have proliferated in Eastern and Southern Africa can, if properly designed and effectively implemented, be an important instrument to assist the member countries in increasing their current low trade links and integrating with global markets. The reality is nonetheless, that these arrangements are characterized by their multiple and overlapping membership, and complex structures - and eventually conflicting and confusing commitments. Past attempts to rationalize and harmonize the current Regional Trade Agreements have failed because ultimately many countries were not committed to regional integration and more generally to trade liberalization, and they did not see clear benefits from the rationalization. However, the Cotonou Agreement provides an excellent and decisive window of an RTA weaken opportunity for the interest in multilateral negotiations and liberalization? The background of unilateral reforms and increased membership of the strengthened multilateral system should mean that the recent strong trend towards regionalism is somewhat less dangerous region to third countries organize itself and to harness the multilateral system benefits stemming from the future Economic Partnership Agreements. EPAs offer all ACP countries the possibility of a complete overhaul of trade relations with the EU in a way that could have serious benefits for them. It has been argued that EPAs may weaken, rather than earlier experiences. This conclusion is re-inforced by the nature of the new agreements, which have wider coverage of product and instruments than earlier agreements, enhancing the degree of integration. On the other hand, we have certainly heard in Geneva comments from negotiators to the effect "If we do not get what we want in the negotiating agenda, why should we worry? We have our own RTA. That is where the action is!" Was this a factor behind the failure of the WTO Ministerial meeting in Seattle in late 1999? On the whole, experience seems to confirm the equivocal view of Xxxxxxx (1998) who says that there is no reason to expect a simple answer to whether regionalism encourages or discourages the evolution towards globally xxxxx trade. Similarlystrengthen, the jury remains out regional integration process in Southern Africa as it will force countries to decide on whether the emerging mega-blocs of RTAs will facilitate or frustrate the making of multilateral agreements. It should be noted, however, that the emerging mega-blocks ignore, for the most part, the least-developed countries, particularly those in sub-Sahara Africa regional configuration and South Asia. Are these new blocs then a sign of frustration with the multilateral system? While many countries have embraced trade liberalization as part of a wider package of economic reforms, the pace of change varies widely and has certainly slowed in recent years, even before the Asian financial crisis. For the faster moving countries, finding like-minded countries may well have been a factor behind regional agreements. Moreover, locking in reforms through RTAs has also been a consideration, Mexico in NAFTA is a key example, and this may also be the most important result of the Europe Agreements. Thus, the new regionalism lays down a challenge to be bettered at the multilateral level. Do RTAs harm third countries and weaken the MFN principle? It is hard to find concrete evidence that RTAs have harmed third countries. RTAs are by their nature discriminatory and hence a derogation of the MFN principle. It is, therefore, not surprising that trade within such blocs is generally growing faster than trade from non- members (except in the EC where the numbers are the same in the 1990s). On the other hand, trade with non-members is growing at about the same rate as world trade in general, and in some of the smaller, more dynamic RTAs, trade with non-members is growing faster than world tradecommon negotiating mandate. It is argued in not EPAs which will force this issue, but the literature that more comprehensive coverage ("going all internal contradictions of the way") inclines countries to take a more positive view of general liberalizationregional trade accords themselves. Similarly it is argued that deeper integration is beneficial to third countries as domestic regulations allow greater competition even from non-members. These issues obviously need more rigorous research. The maintenance of a dual system (of anti- dumping duties for third parties and competition or anti-trust policy among RTA parties) can create distortions where different criteria and conditions apply to the invocation of such measures and thus have the potential for discrimination against third countries. Differing XXXx among RTAs are likely to have negative effects on trade. Complex and varying methods of calculating regional content impose a significant burden on industry and this problem is magnified by the overlap of RTAs. LikewiseIn fact, the network of diagonal cumulation schemes of preferential XXXx may have benefits accruing from the effect of extending an RTA beyond its own membership, without any legal basis. This is discriminatory, since some of the RTA's trading partners – those participating in the diagonal cumulation scheme – benefit from preferential treatment, while other third parties – those outside the diagonal What about the examination of RTAs in the WTO Cotonou Agreement and the inconclusive debate on systemic issues? Does this matter? This certainly does the system little credit, but it is also a consequence of the fundamental consensus process of the WTO. It is frustrating to all WTO Members, participants or not in an RTA, and has effectively given xxxxx xxxxxxx to participants to operate a range of discriminatory schemes. Given the divergences of view in the CRTA and the strength of entrenched positions, it is difficult to see any major breakthroughs in this area. It may be EPA negotiations are so important that the compatibility of individual RTAs with WTO rules is, in future, decided in the DSB of the WTO, in the absence of firm conclusions in the CRTA. WTO (1995) suggests the conversion of the examination process towards a transparency mechanism, which could be welfare-enhancing as suggested by the public choice literature. For example, the present legal examinations might be completed, reflecting the existing divergences of opinion (the current approach in the CRTA), and this might be followed with a periodic examination, looking at the implementation of each agreement and the evolution of trade among partners. A timetable for broad-based, economic review, keeping the RTAs under scrutiny, could go some way to satisfying the concern of third countries about the operation of RTAs. There they can be little doubt the external driving force that will push the main economic advantages regional organizations to participants in rationalize and harmonize their trade regimes. Therefore, unless ESA countries reform and harmonize their regional trade agreements would be even greater if in a way that will permit the liberalization were carried out on negotiation of a widersingle EPA for the whole region, multilateral scale. RTAs are a second-best solution. Thus, on the basis of theory, Xxxx and Wan (1976) note "...there is a big incentive great risk that negotiations will fail or multiple negotiations will take place by subgroups of countries and, as a consequence, they will not produce the results expected Africa will then miss the opportunity to form and enlarge a customs union until improve its integration into the world is one big customs unioneconomy. Governments will have to show political leadership to move this agenda forward and fully harness the potential benefits that EPAs present. ACP Africa, that isCaribbean, until free trade prevailsPacific group BLNS Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia and Swaziland CBI Cross-Border Initiative (See RIFF) CEMAC Communauté Economique et Monétaire de l’Afrique Centrale CET Common External Tariff CMA Common Monetary Area COMESA Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa CU Customs Union DRC Democratic Republic of Congo EAC East African Community ECOWAS Economic Community of West African States EDF European Development Fund EC European Commission EPA Economic Partnership Agreement ESA Eastern and Southern Africa Region EU European Union FDI Foreign Direct Investment FTA Free Trade Area GATT General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs GDP Gross Domestic Product IMF International Monetary Fund IOC Indian Ocean Commission LDC Least Developed Country NTB Non-Tariff Barriers RTA Regional Trade Arrangement RIFF Regional Integration Facilitation Forum RoO Rules of Origin SA South Africa SACU Southern Africa Customs Union SADC Southern African Development Community SGP System of Generalised Preferences SPS Sanitary and Phito-sanitary Measures TS Technical Standards USA United States of America WAEMU West African Economic and Monetary Union WB World Bank WTO World Trade Organization Xxxxxx Xxxx and Xxxxxxx X. Making EU Trade Agreements work: The role of rules of origin. Center for European Policy Studies. Working Paper 183. Brussels, 2002."

Conclusions. Does membership The RTAs that have proliferated in Eastern and Southern Africa can, if properly designed and effectively implemented, be an important instrument to assist the member countries in increasing their current low trade links and integrating with global markets. The reality is nonetheless, that these arrangements are characterized by their multiple and overlapping membership, and complex structures - and eventually conflicting and confusing commitments. Past attempts to rationalize and harmonize the current Regional Trade Agreements have failed because ultimately many countries were not committed to regional integration and more generally to trade liberalization, and they did not see clear benefits from the rationalization. However, the Cotonou Agreement provides an excellent and decisive window of an RTA weaken opportunity for the interest in multilateral negotiations and liberalization? The background of unilateral reforms and increased membership of the strengthened multilateral system should mean that the recent strong trend towards regionalism is somewhat less dangerous region to third countries organize itself and to harness the multilateral system benefits stemming from the future Economic Partnership Agreements. EPAs offer all ACP countries the possibility of a complete overhaul of trade relations with the EU in a way that could have serious benefits for them. It has been argued that EPAs may weaken, rather than earlier experiences. This conclusion is re-inforced by the nature of the new agreements, which have wider coverage of product and instruments than earlier agreements, enhancing the degree of integration. On the other hand, we have certainly heard in Geneva comments from negotiators to the effect "If we do not get what we want in the negotiating agenda, why should we worry? We have our own RTA. That is where the action is!" Was this a factor behind the failure of the WTO Ministerial meeting in Seattle in late 1999? On the whole, experience seems to confirm the equivocal view of Xxxxxxx (1998) who says that there is no reason to expect a simple answer to whether regionalism encourages or discourages the evolution towards globally xxxxx trade. Similarlystrengthen, the jury remains out regional integration process in Southern Africa as it will force countries to decide on whether the emerging mega-blocs of RTAs will facilitate or frustrate the making of multilateral agreements. It should be noted, however, that the emerging mega-blocks ignore, for the most part, the least-developed countries, particularly those in sub-Sahara Africa regional configuration and South Asia. Are these new blocs then a sign of frustration with the multilateral system? While many countries have embraced trade liberalization as part of a wider package of economic reforms, the pace of change varies widely and has certainly slowed in recent years, even before the Asian financial crisis. For the faster moving countries, finding like-minded countries may well have been a factor behind regional agreements. Moreover, locking in reforms through RTAs has also been a consideration, Mexico in NAFTA is a key example, and this may also be the most important result of the Europe Agreements. Thus, the new regionalism lays down a challenge to be bettered at the multilateral level. Do RTAs harm third countries and weaken the MFN principle? It is hard to find concrete evidence that RTAs have harmed third countries. RTAs are by their nature discriminatory and hence a derogation of the MFN principle. It is, therefore, not surprising that trade within such blocs is generally growing faster than trade from non- members (except in the EC where the numbers are the same in the 1990s). On the other hand, trade with non-members is growing at about the same rate as world trade in general, and in some of the smaller, more dynamic RTAs, trade with non-members is growing faster than world tradecommon negotiating mandate. It is argued in not EPAs which will force this issue, but the literature that more comprehensive coverage ("going all internal contradictions of the way") inclines countries to take a more positive view of general liberalizationregional trade accords themselves. Similarly it is argued that deeper integration is beneficial to third countries as domestic regulations allow greater competition even from non-members. These issues obviously need more rigorous research. The maintenance of a dual system (of anti- dumping duties for third parties and competition or anti-trust policy among RTA parties) can create distortions where different criteria and conditions apply to the invocation of such measures and thus have the potential for discrimination against third countries. Differing XXXx among RTAs are likely to have negative effects on trade. Complex and varying methods of calculating regional content impose a significant burden on industry and this problem is magnified by the overlap of RTAs. LikewiseIn fact, the network of diagonal cumulation schemes of preferential XXXx may have benefits accruing from the effect of extending an RTA beyond its own membership, without any legal basis. This is discriminatory, since some of the RTA's trading partners – those participating in the diagonal cumulation scheme – benefit from preferential treatment, while other third parties – those outside the diagonal What about the examination of RTAs in the WTO Cotonou Agreement and the inconclusive debate on systemic issues? Does this matter? This certainly does the system little credit, but it is also a consequence of the fundamental consensus process of the WTO. It is frustrating to all WTO Members, participants or not in an RTA, and has effectively given xxxxx xxxxxxx to participants to operate a range of discriminatory schemes. Given the divergences of view in the CRTA and the strength of entrenched positions, it is difficult to see any major breakthroughs in this area. It may be EPA negotiations are so important that the compatibility of individual RTAs with WTO rules is, in future, decided in the DSB of the WTO, in the absence of firm conclusions in the CRTA. WTO (1995) suggests the conversion of the examination process towards a transparency mechanism, which could be welfare-enhancing as suggested by the public choice literature. For example, the present legal examinations might be completed, reflecting the existing divergences of opinion (the current approach in the CRTA), and this might be followed with a periodic examination, looking at the implementation of each agreement and the evolution of trade among partners. A timetable for broad-based, economic review, keeping the RTAs under scrutiny, could go some way to satisfying the concern of third countries about the operation of RTAs. There they can be little doubt the external driving force that will push the main economic advantages regional organizations to participants in rationalize and harmonize their trade regimes. Therefore, unless ESA countries reform and harmonize their regional trade agreements would be even greater if in a way that will permit the liberalization were carried out on negotiation of a widersingle EPA for the whole region, multilateral scale. RTAs are a second-best solution. Thus, on the basis of theory, Xxxx and Wan (1976) note "...there is a big incentive great risk that negotiations will fail or multiple negotiations will take place by subgroups of countries and, as a consequence, they will not produce the results expected Africa will then miss the opportunity to form and enlarge a customs union until improve its integration into the world is one big customs unioneconomy. Governments will have to show political leadership to move this agenda forward and fully harness the potential benefits that EPAs present. ACP Africa, that isCaribbean, until free trade prevailsPacific group BLNS Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia and Swaziland CBI Cross-Border Initiative (See RIFF) CEMAC Communauté Economique et Monétaire de l’Afrique Centrale CET Common External Tariff CMA Common Monetary Area COMESA Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa CU Customs Union DRC Democratic Republic of Congo EAC East African Community ECOWAS Economic Community of West African States EDF European Development Fund EC European Commission EPA Economic Partnership Agreement ESA Eastern and Southern Africa Region EU European Union FDI Foreign Direct Investment FTA Free Trade Area GATT General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs GDP Gross Domestic Product IMF International Monetary Fund IOC Indian Ocean Commission LDC Least Developed Country NTB Non-Tariff Barriers RTA Regional Trade Arrangement RIFF Regional Integration Facilitation Forum RoO Rules of Origin SA South Africa SACU Southern Africa Customs Union SADC Southern African Development Community SGP System of Generalised Preferences SPS Sanitary and Phito-sanitary Measures TS Technical Standards USA United States of America WAEMU West African Economic and Monetary Union WB World Bank WTO World Trade Organization Xxxxxx Xxxx and Xxxxxxx X. Making EU Trade Agreements work: The role of rules of origin. Center for European Policy Studies. Working Paper 183. Xxxxxxxx, 0000."

Conclusions. Does membership Readers of an RTA weaken this Journal will be well aware that for small island States, rising sea levels, extreme weather events, coral bleaching, loss of fisheries and marine biodiversity, threaten not only their vital interests, but their very existence.28 Several such States have to contend with the interest possibility that their land territory may become fully submerged in multilateral negotiations and liberalization? The background the coming years, requiring the re-settlement of unilateral reforms and increased membership their entire population. Both these initiatives demonstrate the increasing concern felt by the small island States at the ever more serious predictions of the strengthened multilateral system should mean impacts of sea level rise - as well of course as climate change generally - emanating from the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change.29 A vivid demonstration of current impacts was provided by the Tuvalu Minister of Foreign affairs, Xxxxx Xxxx, who delivered his address to the Glasgow UNFCCC COP while standing knee deep in water at a place that had until recently been dry land. He commented that “We are actually looking at legal avenues where we can retain our ownership of our maritime zones [and] retain our recognition as a state under international law.”30 The two processes for requesting advisory opinions discussed above each represent such “legal avenues” and the legal questions that can be posed of course range over a much wider spread of issues than the important issue of maintenance of maritime entitlements threated by sea level rise. 31 The ICJ is the premier legal institution of the UN and has much wider jurisdiction than ITLOS – which was established by the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (LOSC). However, despite widespread concerns initially voiced about the fragmentation of jurisdiction that the recent strong trend towards regionalism is somewhat less dangerous to third countries creation of ITLOS would cause, the two tribunals do largely march in lock step on key legal concepts. So, the two process should be seen as complementary and not as mutually exclusive. There are a large number of major legal questions still at large relating to the multilateral system than earlier experiencesthreats posed by climate change and sea level rise that would definitely benefit from greater clarity. This conclusion is re-inforced Both this new Antigua and Barbuda/Tuvalu initiative and the ongoing campaign by the nature of the new agreements, which have wider coverage of product and instruments than earlier agreements, enhancing the degree of integration. On the other hand, we have certainly heard in Geneva comments from negotiators to the effect "If we do not get what we want in the negotiating agenda, why should we worry? We have our own RTA. That is where the action is!" Was this a factor behind the failure of the WTO Ministerial meeting in Seattle in late 1999? On the whole, experience seems to confirm the equivocal view of Xxxxxxx (1998) who says that there is no reason to expect a simple answer to whether regionalism encourages or discourages the evolution towards globally xxxxx trade. Similarly, the jury remains out Vanuatu could each help shed light on whether the emerging mega-blocs of RTAs will facilitate or frustrate the making of multilateral agreements. It should be noted, however, that the emerging mega-blocks ignore, for the most part, the least-developed countries, particularly those in sub-Sahara Africa and South Asia. Are these new blocs then a sign of frustration with the multilateral system? While many countries have embraced trade liberalization as part of a wider package of economic reforms, the pace of change varies widely and has certainly slowed in recent years, even before the Asian financial crisis. For the faster moving countries, finding like-minded countries may well have been a factor behind regional agreements. Moreover, locking in reforms through RTAs has also been a consideration, Mexico in NAFTA is a key example, and this may also be the most important result of the Europe Agreements. Thus, the new regionalism lays down a challenge to be bettered at the multilateral level. Do RTAs harm third countries and weaken the MFN principle? It is hard to find concrete evidence that RTAs have harmed third countries. RTAs are by their nature discriminatory and hence a derogation of the MFN principle. It is, therefore, not surprising that trade within such blocs is generally growing faster than trade from non- members (except in the EC where the numbers are the same in the 1990s). On the other hand, trade with non-members is growing at about the same rate as world trade in general, and in some of the smaller, more dynamic RTAs, trade with nonwider legal ramifications of what has been called ‘the defining challenge of our generation’32 1 1992 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) 31 International Legal Materials (1992) 851. text at chrome-members is growing faster than world tradeextension://efaidnbmnnnibpcajpcglclefindmkaj/viewer.html?pdfurl=https%3A%2F%0Xxxxxxx.xxx%2Fresource%2Fdocs%2Fconvkp%2Fconveng.pdf&clen=82836 2 Hereinafter SIS Climate Commission Agreement See below pp. It is argued in the literature that more comprehensive coverage ("going all the way"000-000. 3 Art. 4(3) inclines countries to take a more positive view of general liberalization. Similarly it is argued that deeper integration is beneficial to third countries as domestic regulations allow greater competition even from non-members. These issues obviously need more rigorous research. The maintenance of a dual system (of anti- dumping duties for third parties and competition or anti-trust policy among RTA parties4 Art 1(2) can create distortions where different criteria and conditions apply to the invocation of such measures and thus have the potential for discrimination against third countries. Differing XXXx among RTAs are likely to have negative effects on trade. Complex and varying methods of calculating regional content impose a significant burden on industry and this problem is magnified by the overlap of RTAs. Likewise, the network of diagonal cumulation schemes of preferential XXXx may have the effect of extending an RTA beyond its own membership, without any legal basis. This is discriminatory, since some of the RTA's trading partners – those participating in the diagonal cumulation scheme – benefit from preferential treatment, while other third parties – those outside the diagonal What about the examination of RTAs in the WTO and the inconclusive debate on systemic issues? Does this matter? This certainly does the system little credit, but it is also a consequence of the fundamental consensus process of the WTO. It is frustrating to all WTO Members, participants or not in an RTA, and has effectively given xxxxx xxxxxxx to participants to operate a range of discriminatory schemes. Given the divergences of view in the CRTA and the strength of entrenched positions, it is difficult to see any major breakthroughs in this area. It may be that the compatibility of individual RTAs with WTO rules is, in future, decided in the DSB of the WTO, in the absence of firm conclusions in the CRTA. WTO (19955 Art 3(4) suggests the conversion of the examination process towards a transparency mechanism, which could be welfare-enhancing as suggested by the public choice literature. For example, the present legal examinations might be completed, reflecting the existing divergences of opinion (the current approach in the CRTA6 Art 2(4), and this might be followed with a periodic examination, looking at the implementation of each agreement and the evolution of trade among partners. A timetable for broad-based, economic review, keeping the RTAs under scrutiny, could go some way to satisfying the concern of third countries about the operation of RTAs. There can be little doubt that the main economic advantages to participants in regional trade agreements would be even greater if the liberalization were carried out on a wider, multilateral scale. RTAs are a second-best solution. Thus, on the basis of theory, Xxxx and Wan (1976) note "...there is a big incentive to form and enlarge a customs union until the world is one big customs union, that is, until free trade prevails."

Conclusions. Does membership The negotiation of an RTA the Health and Safety agreement is characterized by some interesting, and rather peculiar, aspects. First, GDF Suez is one of the few companies where the workforce was represented by three (now two) European Trade Union Federations. Although EPSU represented the highest number of employees, also the other federations (now merged in IndustriAll-Europe) were relevant in the company. Second, the Special Negotiating Body was not only fully unionized, but it was also mandated by the national trade unions, upon express request of the management. This is in itself a peculiar feature, but it becomes even more interesting in as much as, notwithstanding the acknowledgment and support of the trade unions, the EWC was still in a weak position in relation to the negotiation. The case study has proved useful to investigate the problems that a EWC can encounter if it engages in transnational negotiations at company level on its own. Obviously, the research question cannot be answered in absolute and definitive terms by carrying out a single case study. The research rather aims at adding empirical findings to the wide political and academic debate about which is the best bargaining agent and for what reasons. Let us now assess which problems came out from the case study and how the European Trade Union Federations could, potentially, solve these problems. The first problem the EWC could face is the lack of enough expertise of the EWC members in negotiating EFAs. As far as a unionized EWC is concerned, it could be argued that national trade unions may provide a remedy by specifically training the respective members sitting in the EWC. However, as argued by Waddington (2011) a strong reliance over national trade unions does not help in developing a truly European identity within the EWC and therefore overcoming the tendency of the EWC members to pursue national interests (see Xxxxxxx et al. 2013). In 36 GIULIA FROSECCHI brief, both the lack of expertise and a different understanding over the EWC functions within the same EWC (reflecting different national industrial relations systems) can weaken the interest in multilateral negotiations and liberalization? The background of unilateral reforms and increased membership role of the strengthened multilateral system should mean EWC as negotiator. In order to solve this problem, the EMF procedure wants the affiliates to approve the negotiating team, that has to be always composed by at least one EMF representative. The compulsory presence of the recent strong trend towards regionalism EMF representative is somewhat less dangerous likely to third countries empower the workers’ side and avoid weaknesses due to lack of sufficient competences. Second, the case study showed that in a negotiation started by the management and conducted with the EWC, the management is very likely to end up leading the negotiation and it can be highly complex for the workers’ side to impose its conditions. This may be also due to the multilateral system than earlier experiences. This conclusion is re-inforced by the nature lack of enough expertise and independence of the new agreementsEWC members, which which, on the one hand have wider coverage to rely on national trade unions for any kind of product and instruments than earlier agreementssupport (Waddington 2013) and, enhancing the degree of integration. On on the other hand, we have certainly heard in Geneva comments from negotiators tend to follow the lead of the company, since they are not able to propose a concrete alternative, perhaps also due to the effect "If we lack of enough internal communication (Waddington 2011). The proposal of the European Metalworkers’ Federation overcomes this problem by imposing a clear procedure to both the EWC and the management. It is worthwhile to underline that, before starting the negotiation the EMF representative, as a consolidated practice, explains the procedure to both the above mentioned actors and he clarifies that if the parties do not get what we want accept the procedure the EMF do not engage at all in the negotiating agendanegotiation. Third, why should we worry? We have our own RTAIt can be difficult for the EWC to find a compromise and agree upon common goals. That is where This fact becomes even more relevant since the action is!" Was this EWC, as normally not bound by any procedure, can sign the agreement even if a factor behind the failure member representing a relevant percentage of the WTO Ministerial meeting in Seattle in late 1999? On total workforce is opposing the wholeagreement for protecting his members’ rights. These two interlinked dangers can be due to the lack of enough communication (Waddington 2011) and/or the tendency to pursue national interests (Xxxxxxx et al. 2013), experience seems and/or it can be caused by a will to confirm please the equivocal view management (Ibid). First of Xxxxxxx (1998) who says that there is no reason to expect a simple answer to whether regionalism encourages or discourages the evolution towards globally xxxxx trade. Similarlyall, the jury remains out EMF procedure tries to overcome the lack of communication, among the various players concerned, and the conflicts between national identities by setting up a preliminary meeting where national trade unions, the EMF coordinator, the EWC select committee and even the whole EWC, if feasible, gather together. At this occasion the actors have the opportunity, first, to discuss and share their opinions, second, to agree on whether two core aspects: the emerging mega-blocs composition of RTAs will facilitate or frustrate the making team that should negotiate and the positions to be taken during the negotiation. Also the draft agreement has to be approved by the involved affiliates. In order to avoid the signature of multilateral agreementsan GDF SUEZ TRANSNATIONAL COLLECTIVE AGREEMENT ON HEALTH AND SAFETY: 37 EWC AS NEGOTIATING AGENT AND THE RELEVANCE OF THE ETUF LEADING ROLE agreement not widely accepted, if unanimity cannot be reached, the procedure states that the text can be concluded only upon approval of the national trade unions representing a strong majority of the European workforce concerned. It Indeed, a country can block the signature only if it represents more than 5% of the total European workforce. A lack of unanimous decision over the signature of an agreement can happen mainly because of the substantial differences among industrial relations systems, however the final objective should be notedto overcome the diversities and reach a wide consent. A case where an agreement is signed by the whole negotiating body, howeverbut the representative of the workforce of an entire country (also representing a high percentage of the total workforce) has to be avoided. A situation as such gives, to the management, signals of deep divisions within the workers’ side. For that reason the EMF procedure aims at avoiding the inhomogeneous signature of EFAs and does not envisage the inclusion of opt-out clauses. As a result, the agreements signed by EMF (and now IndustriAll-Europe) demonstrate the ability of the European labour movement to agree on common goals. Furthermore, these texts can be broadly applied at European level (Xxxx et al. 2013). As a consequence, disputes over the companies and countries in which the agreement can be implemented, as it was the case for GDF Suez Health and Safety agreement, are avoided. Overall, the negotiation of the Health and Safety agreement at GDF Suez has shown how complex the relationships and interactions among the players concerned with European collective bargaining can be. This case study illustrates that EWC, national trade unions and ETUFs share the common tendency to undervalue the need to build solid forms of cooperation among themselves, as well as they underestimate the necessity to increase the amount and quality of the communication. In conclusion, the case study adds empirical evidences to the argument that transnational collective bargaining at European level should be led by the ETUFs. However, the research proves that the presence of the ETUF in the negotiation needs to come together with the proactive application of the ETUFs’ policy on the matter, that is a clear mandate procedure, as the emerging mega-blocks ignore, for the most partone of developed by EMF. As stressed by Xxxx et al. (2013), the least-developed countries, particularly those in sub-Sahara Africa and South Asiafaithful application of the procedure is of key importance. Are these new blocs then a sign of frustration with At the multilateral system? While many countries have embraced trade liberalization as part of a wider package of economic reformssame time, the pace of change varies widely and has certainly slowed in recent years, even before the Asian financial crisis. For the faster moving countries, finding like-minded countries may well have been a factor behind regional agreements. Moreover, locking in reforms through RTAs has also been a consideration, Mexico in NAFTA is a key example, and this may also national affiliates should be the most important first ones supporting the application of the above mentioned procedure. As a final remark, it should be kept in mind that the problems here highlighted are problems that could only potentially arise if a EWC decides to negotiate without applying a ETUF procedure. Indeed, as a result of the Europe Agreements. Thus, the new regionalism lays down a challenge to be bettered at the multilateral level. Do RTAs harm third countries and weaken the MFN principle? It is hard to find concrete evidence that RTAs have harmed third countries. RTAs are by their nature discriminatory and hence a derogation analysis of the MFN principle. It is, therefore, not surprising that trade within such blocs is generally growing faster than trade from non- members (except in the EC where the numbers are the same in the 1990s). On the other hand, trade with non-members is growing at about the same rate as world trade in general, GDF Suez Health and in some of the smaller, more dynamic RTAs, trade with non-members is growing faster than world trade. It is argued in the literature that more comprehensive coverage ("going all the way") inclines countries to take a more positive view of general liberalization. Similarly it is argued that deeper integration is beneficial to third countries as domestic regulations allow greater competition even from non-members. These issues obviously need more rigorous research. The maintenance of a dual system (of anti- dumping duties for third parties and competition or anti-trust policy among RTA parties) can create distortions where different criteria and conditions apply to the invocation of such measures and thus have the potential for discrimination against third countries. Differing XXXx among RTAs are likely to have negative effects on trade. Complex and varying methods of calculating regional content impose a significant burden on industry and this problem is magnified by the overlap of RTAs. Likewise, the network of diagonal cumulation schemes of preferential XXXx may have the effect of extending an RTA beyond its own membership, without any legal basis. This is discriminatory, since some of the RTA's trading partners – those participating in the diagonal cumulation scheme – benefit from preferential treatment, while other third parties – those outside the diagonal What about the examination of RTAs in the WTO and the inconclusive debate on systemic issues? Does this matter? This certainly does the system little credit, but it is also a consequence of the fundamental consensus process of the WTO. It is frustrating to all WTO Members, participants or not in an RTA, and has effectively given xxxxx xxxxxxx to participants to operate a range of discriminatory schemes. Given the divergences of view in the CRTA and the strength of entrenched positionsSafety agreement, it is difficult 38 GIULIA FROSECCHI not argued that if the EWC engages independently in a negotiation with the management it will surely encounter the above summarized difficulties. It would be interesting to carry out further case studies applying the same research question, in order to observe how often and to what extent the EWC negotiating EFAs ends up having the same kind of problems. The analytical frameworks applied to the case study turned out to be useful to answer the first part of the research question. Especially, it was interesting to see any major breakthroughs in this area. It may be that how Waddington (2011)’s conclusions about the compatibility of individual RTAs with WTO rules isgeneral problems faced by the EWCs, in future, decided exercising the rights provided for in the DSB European directive, are also encountered in the context of a transnational negotiation. As to the second part of the WTOresearch question, the EMF mandate procedure proved to be able to find a solution to the difficulties the EWC can encounter. Besides the option to analyse other cases of EFAs negotiated by EWCs, by applying the same research question, there is also room to further assess this case, by looking at other viewpoints over the negotiation and at the implementation-related aspects. Indeed, it would be interesting to investigate where the agreement has been implemented and to what extent, in order to understand whether the absence of firm conclusions in management wanted to negotiate the CRTA. WTO (1995) suggests the conversion agreement because of the examination process towards relevance of its content, or just as a transparency mechanismsocial showcase. Furthermore, which could it would be welfare-enhancing as suggested by interesting to assess the public choice literaturenegotiation of the following agreement on equal opportunity. For example, This EFA has involved the present legal examinations might be completed, reflecting the existing divergences of opinion (the current approach in the CRTA), three ETUFs and this might be followed it has been negotiated with a periodic examinationjoint procedure. Therefore, looking at it allows to practically see if and which improvements the implementation of each agreement and the evolution of trade among partners. A timetable for broad-based, economic review, keeping the RTAs under scrutiny, could go some way to satisfying the concern of third countries about the operation of RTAs. There can be little doubt that the main economic advantages to participants in regional trade agreements would be even greater if the liberalization were carried out on a wider, multilateral scale. RTAs are a second-best solution. Thus, on the basis of theory, Xxxx and Wan (1976) note "...there is a big incentive to form and enlarge a customs union until the world is one big customs union, that is, until free trade prevailsnew procedure has brought."

Conclusions. Does membership Readers of an RTA weaken this Journal will be well aware that for small island States, rising sea levels, extreme weather events, coral bleaching, loss of fisheries and marine biodiversity, threaten not only their vital interests, but their very existence.28 Several such States have to contend with the interest possibility that their land territory may become fully submerged in multilateral negotiations and liberalization? The background the coming years, requiring the re-settlement of unilateral reforms and increased membership their entire population. Both these initiatives demonstrate the increasing concern felt by the small island States at the ever more serious predictions of the strengthened multilateral system should mean impacts of sea level rise - as well of course as climate change generally - emanating from the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change.29 A vivid demonstration of current impacts was provided by the Tuvalu Minister of Foreign affairs, Simon Kofe, who delivered his address to the Glasgow UNFCCC COP while standing knee deep in water at a place that had until recently been dry land. He commented that “We are actually looking at legal avenues where we can retain our ownership of our maritime zones [and] retain our recognition as a state under international law.”30 The two processes for requesting advisory opinions discussed above each represent such “legal avenues” and the legal questions that can be posed of course range over a much wider spread of issues than the important issue of maintenance of maritime entitlements threated by sea level rise. 31 The ICJ is the premier legal institution of the UN and has much wider jurisdiction than ITLOS – which was established by the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (LOSC). However, despite widespread concerns initially voiced about the fragmentation of jurisdiction that the recent strong trend towards regionalism is somewhat less dangerous to third countries creation of ITLOS would cause, the two tribunals do largely march in lock step on key legal concepts. So, the two process should be seen as complementary and not as mutually exclusive. There are a large number of major legal questions still at large relating to the multilateral system than earlier experiencesthreats posed by climate change and sea level rise that would definitely benefit from greater clarity. This conclusion is re-inforced Both this new Antigua and Barbuda/Tuvalu initiative and the ongoing campaign by the nature of the new agreements, which have wider coverage of product and instruments than earlier agreements, enhancing the degree of integration. On the other hand, we have certainly heard in Geneva comments from negotiators to the effect "If we do not get what we want in the negotiating agenda, why should we worry? We have our own RTA. That is where the action is!" Was this a factor behind the failure of the WTO Ministerial meeting in Seattle in late 1999? On the whole, experience seems to confirm the equivocal view of Xxxxxxx (1998) who says that there is no reason to expect a simple answer to whether regionalism encourages or discourages the evolution towards globally xxxxx trade. Similarly, the jury remains out Vanuatu could each help shed light on whether the emerging mega-blocs of RTAs will facilitate or frustrate the making of multilateral agreements. It should be noted, however, that the emerging mega-blocks ignore, for the most part, the least-developed countries, particularly those in sub-Sahara Africa and South Asia. Are these new blocs then a sign of frustration with the multilateral system? While many countries have embraced trade liberalization as part of a wider package of economic reforms, the pace of change varies widely and has certainly slowed in recent years, even before the Asian financial crisis. For the faster moving countries, finding like-minded countries may well have been a factor behind regional agreements. Moreover, locking in reforms through RTAs has also been a consideration, Mexico in NAFTA is a key example, and this may also be the most important result of the Europe Agreements. Thus, the new regionalism lays down a challenge to be bettered at the multilateral level. Do RTAs harm third countries and weaken the MFN principle? It is hard to find concrete evidence that RTAs have harmed third countries. RTAs are by their nature discriminatory and hence a derogation of the MFN principle. It is, therefore, not surprising that trade within such blocs is generally growing faster than trade from non- members (except in the EC where the numbers are the same in the 1990s). On the other hand, trade with non-members is growing at about the same rate as world trade in general, and in some of the smaller, more dynamic RTAs, trade with nonwider legal ramifications of what has been called ‘the defining challenge of our generation’32 1 1992 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) 31 International Legal Materials (1992) 851. text at chrome-members is growing faster than world tradeextension://efaidnbmnnnibpcajpcglclefindmkaj/viewer.html?pdfurl=https%3A%2F%0Xxxxxxx.xxx%2Fresource%2Fdocs%2Fconvkp%2Fconveng.pdf&clen=82836 2 Hereinafter SIS Climate Commission Agreement See below pp. It is argued in the literature that more comprehensive coverage ("going all the way"000-000. 3 Art. 4(3) inclines countries to take a more positive view of general liberalization. Similarly it is argued that deeper integration is beneficial to third countries as domestic regulations allow greater competition even from non-members. These issues obviously need more rigorous research. The maintenance of a dual system (of anti- dumping duties for third parties and competition or anti-trust policy among RTA parties4 Art 1(2) can create distortions where different criteria and conditions apply to the invocation of such measures and thus have the potential for discrimination against third countries. Differing XXXx among RTAs are likely to have negative effects on trade. Complex and varying methods of calculating regional content impose a significant burden on industry and this problem is magnified by the overlap of RTAs. Likewise, the network of diagonal cumulation schemes of preferential XXXx may have the effect of extending an RTA beyond its own membership, without any legal basis. This is discriminatory, since some of the RTA's trading partners – those participating in the diagonal cumulation scheme – benefit from preferential treatment, while other third parties – those outside the diagonal What about the examination of RTAs in the WTO and the inconclusive debate on systemic issues? Does this matter? This certainly does the system little credit, but it is also a consequence of the fundamental consensus process of the WTO. It is frustrating to all WTO Members, participants or not in an RTA, and has effectively given xxxxx xxxxxxx to participants to operate a range of discriminatory schemes. Given the divergences of view in the CRTA and the strength of entrenched positions, it is difficult to see any major breakthroughs in this area. It may be that the compatibility of individual RTAs with WTO rules is, in future, decided in the DSB of the WTO, in the absence of firm conclusions in the CRTA. WTO (19955 Art 3(4) suggests the conversion of the examination process towards a transparency mechanism, which could be welfare-enhancing as suggested by the public choice literature. For example, the present legal examinations might be completed, reflecting the existing divergences of opinion (the current approach in the CRTA6 Art 2(4), and this might be followed with a periodic examination, looking at the implementation of each agreement and the evolution of trade among partners. A timetable for broad-based, economic review, keeping the RTAs under scrutiny, could go some way to satisfying the concern of third countries about the operation of RTAs. There can be little doubt that the main economic advantages to participants in regional trade agreements would be even greater if the liberalization were carried out on a wider, multilateral scale. RTAs are a second-best solution. Thus, on the basis of theory, Xxxx and Wan (1976) note "...there is a big incentive to form and enlarge a customs union until the world is one big customs union, that is, until free trade prevails."

Conclusions. Does membership In the following processes and relations between Prishtina and Belgrade the most significant role remains the one of an RTA weaken the interest in multilateral negotiations United States and liberalization? The background Germany, as leaders of unilateral reforms Western Countries, NATO, EU influence, and increased membership future OSCE chairmanship. European perspective and dynamics of the strengthened multilateral system process of integrations will remain on the willing of EU’s institutions of resolving opened questions sooner rather than later. EU cannot afford another frozen conflict like Cyprus/Northern Cyprus or Armenia/ Azerbaijan Nagorno Karabakh situation to be present in volatile Balkans. In case of Nagorno-Karabakh the situation remains explosive. In the summer of 2014, while the international community was focused on the crisis in Ukraine, hostilities escalated in this region yet again. Over the years Azerbaijan has used its energy revenues to improve its military capabilities spending 3 billion USD per year, or 5% of GDP for military purposes. To match Azerbaijani capabilities, Armenia equipped itself with drones.3 So, the seeming comfort of status quo in frozen conflicts should mean not be taken for granted. One often suggested possibility is that the recent strong trend towards regionalism is somewhat less dangerous even Xxxxxxxx Xxxxxxxxx hoped to third countries and partition Kosovo on terms favorable to the multilateral system than earlier experiencesSerb minority, and favorable to the Serb control of historical and religious sites and mineral wealth. This conclusion There is reno evidence, however, that Serb officials suggested this possibility-inforced by not at Rambouillet Talks and not during the nature war of 1998-1999. However, there is evidence that Xxxxxxxxx had pushed the new agreementsplan for the partitioning of Kosovo during negotiations before the war.4 Many observers before and during the war speculated that partitioning might be the “last stand” objective.5 Serbian military employed a greater pattern of physical destruction to Kosovar Albanian property in certain areas in northern part of 1 Xxxxxxx Xxxxxxxxx, which Austrian National Defence Academy Vienna, “Kosovo Agreement-Implementation as Litmus test”, IFK Monitor International July 2013, pg 2 2 Xxxxxx Xxxxxxxxxx, Odnosi izmedju Beograda I Prishtine, Izvorni Naucni Rad Jul 2013, Beograd, BiBlid Vol. LXV, br 3, pg 377 3 Xxxxx Pokalova, “Conflict Resolution in Frozen Conflicts: Timing in Nagorno-Karabakh”, Journal of Balkan and Near Eastern Studies, 20 December 2014, pg 82 4 Xxxxxxxx Xxxx, “Serbs Fear Puts Segregation back on the table in Kosovo”, New York Times, 26th of August 1999, p A1 5 Xxxxxxxx Xxxxxx, “Kosovo Crisis: Province at Stake as Xxxxxxxxx considers spoils of war”, 9th of June 1998 Guardian, pg11; Xxxxxxxx Kuznechevskiy “Xxxxxxxx may have wider coverage suggested Kosovo Partition to Xxxxxxxxx”, Moscow Rossiyskaya Gazeta, 31st of product March 1999, and instruments than earlier agreementsalso Xxxxx X. Xxxxx “The War for Kosovo”, enhancing International Security, Vol 24, No.4 (Spring 2000) pg 45-46 Kosovo, hence some observers noted an apparent pattern of expulsion of Albanians concentrated in these same areas and inferred a partition motive.1 Authorities of Kosovo have shown capacity in building a society with multiethnic and multicultural elements in all parts of Kosovo and there is no doubt that that can be achieved in the degree of integrationnorthern part as well. They have also shown a great what one might call, generosity in providing additional rights for all minorities in Kosovo, although last census has shown that Kosovo is 92% Albanian populated country. On the other hand, we have certainly heard in Geneva comments from negotiators hand Serbian side has taken steps similar to the effect "If we do not get what we want policies of the 90s in the negotiating agendalast century by which Belgrade is the political, why should we worry? We have our own RTA. That is where the action is!" Was this a factor behind the failure intellectual, spiritual, capitol of all Serbs as well as protector of their rights in all of the WTO Ministerial meeting countries that Serbs live, but comprise no more than a national minority. Delay of implementing Brussels Agreement will prove a severe mistake for all sides. Having in Seattle in late 1999? On mind the wholerelations between Kosovo and Serbia, experience seems to confirm the equivocal view of Xxxxxxx (1998) who says that there is no reason to expect a simple answer to whether regionalism encourages or discourages the evolution towards globally xxxxx trade. Similarly, the jury remains out on whether the emerging mega-blocs of RTAs will facilitate or frustrate the making of multilateral agreements. It should be noted, however, that the emerging mega-blocks ignore, for the most part, the least-developed countries, particularly those in sub-Sahara Africa and South Asia. Are these new blocs then a sign of frustration with the multilateral system? While many countries have embraced trade liberalization as part of a wider package of economic reforms, the pace of change varies widely and has certainly slowed in recent years, even before the Asian financial crisis. For the faster moving countries, finding like-minded countries may well have been a factor behind regional agreements. Moreover, locking in reforms through RTAs has also been a consideration, Mexico in NAFTA is a key example, and this may also be the most important result of the Europe Agreements. Thus, the new regionalism lays down a challenge to be bettered at the multilateral level. Do RTAs harm third open issues between two countries and weaken the MFN principle? It nations; it is hard to find concrete evidence believe that RTAs have harmed third countriesprogress can be done without firm involvement of United States and EU headed by Germany to insure that all sides deliver on their promises. RTAs are by their nature discriminatory EU integration policy towards Kosovo and hence a derogation of the MFN principleSerbia must continue entailing clear conditions with regard to Kosovo-Serbia dialogue. It is, therefore, not surprising that trade within such blocs is generally growing faster than trade from non- members (except United States and EU should make Belgrade responsible for implementing Brussels Agreement in northern Kosovo as they did in the EC where the numbers are the same case of Erdut Agreement in Croatia in 1998. Kosovo’s authorities should make sure to fulfill all obligations and provide more favors to northern Kosovo Serbs than those that southern Kosovo Serbs already have. Any other scenario could bring out in the 1990s). On the other hand, trade with non-members is growing at about the same rate as world trade open ethnic divisions in general, and in some of the smaller, more dynamic RTAs, trade with non-members is growing faster than world trade. It is argued in the literature that more comprehensive coverage ("going all the way") inclines countries to take a more positive view of general liberalization. Similarly it is argued that deeper integration is beneficial to third countries as domestic regulations allow greater competition even from non-members. These issues obviously need more rigorous research. The maintenance of a dual system (of anti- dumping duties for third parties and competition or anti-trust policy among RTA parties) can create distortions where different criteria and conditions apply to the invocation of such measures and thus have the potential for discrimination against third countries. Differing XXXx among RTAs are likely to have negative effects on trade. Complex and varying methods of calculating regional content impose a significant burden on industry and this problem is magnified by the overlap of RTAs. Likewise, the network of diagonal cumulation schemes of preferential XXXx may have the effect of extending an RTA beyond its own membership, without any legal basis. This is discriminatory, since some of the RTA's trading partners – those participating in the diagonal cumulation scheme – benefit from preferential treatment, while other third parties – those outside the diagonal What about the examination of RTAs in the WTO Kosovo and the inconclusive debate on systemic issues? Does this matter? This certainly does the system little credit, but it Balkans which is also a consequence of the fundamental consensus process of the WTO. It is frustrating to all WTO Members, participants or not in an RTA, and has effectively given xxxxx xxxxxxx to participants to operate a range of discriminatory schemes. Given the divergences of view in the CRTA and the strength of entrenched positions, it is difficult to see any major breakthroughs in this area. It may be that the compatibility of individual RTAs with WTO rules is, in future, decided in the DSB of the WTO, in the absence of firm conclusions in the CRTA. WTO (1995) suggests the conversion of the examination process towards a transparency mechanism, which could be welfare-enhancing as suggested by the public choice literature. For example, the present legal examinations might be completed, reflecting the existing divergences of opinion (the current approach in the CRTA), and this might be followed with a periodic examination, looking at the implementation of each agreement and the evolution of trade among partners. A timetable for broad-based, economic review, keeping the RTAs under scrutiny, could go some way to satisfying the concern of third countries about the operation of RTAs. There can be little doubt that the main economic advantages to participants in regional trade agreements would be even greater if the liberalization were carried out on a wider, multilateral scale. RTAs are a second-best solution. Thus, on the basis of theory, Xxxx and Wan (1976) note "...there is a big incentive to form and enlarge a customs union until the world is one big customs union, that is, until free trade prevailsno one’s interest."