Conflict Cycle and Comparative Advantage of Different Kinds of Mediators According to Xxxxxxx, Hampson and Xxxx, at the ‘low end’ of the conflict curve, which indicates the period prior to the occurrence of belligerent activities, the combined interventions by non-official actors can be efficient in ‘defusing conflicts before they escalate’ (2001, 61). At that time, parties are still inclined to talk to each other, so they might re- ject efforts by outside states and international organizations perceiving them as interfering with internal issues. By creating informal settings for communication, mediators might help the parties avoid the pre- ssure from respective constituencies, and thus improve the likelihood of achieving a negotiated settlement. In the ‘middle range’ of the con- flict curve, parties are reluctant to accept outside intervention, as mutual relationships and perceptions between the parties have solidified due to escalation of violence (2003, 241). In this case the conflict is still not ripe for mutual acceptance that a settlement needs. Thus some low key mediators (i.e. NGOs) might be useful to establish communication between the parties without making them lose face since publicly they might be committed to pursue conflicting policies. Once the commu- nication has been established it is useful to introduce mediators that have coercive/reward power that can be used in a formal setting – a tactic described as “mediation with muscle” (Xxxxxxx et al.1999, 242; Xxxxxxx et al. 2001, 62). The use of coercive threats and side payments by third parties might induce conflicting sides to change their pre-co- ined options and convince them away from violence. Without these incentives, parties will have little reason to participate in talks and will be more inclined to continue with hostilities as a means to achieve an acceptable solution. Consequently the ‘upper end’ of the conflict curve requires even stronger presence of mediators with ‘muscle’ that will be able to develop the needed amount of pressure on parties and lead them away from conflicting deadlock. According to Xxxxxxx, Xxxxxxx and Aall, at this point it is expected from mediators to develop inventive and plausible solutions for ‘confidence-building measures, cease fire moni- toring, verification proposals’, to make sure that obligations are being executed and other types of ‘political guarantees’ that facilitate addre- ssing the most complex security issues pertinent to the parties (Crocker et al. 1999, 242). In the end, under t...
