Key Independence Clause Samples
The Key Independence clause establishes that each cryptographic key used within a system or agreement must remain independent from all others, ensuring that the compromise of one key does not affect the security of any other key. In practice, this means that keys are generated and managed separately, and no key is derived from or related to another, such as using unique random values for each encryption or authentication process. This clause is crucial for maintaining the overall security of cryptographic systems, as it prevents a single point of failure and limits the potential damage if a key is exposed.
Key Independence. We now give an informal proof that STR satisfies forward and backward secrecy, or equivalently key independence. In order to show that STR provides key independence, we only need to show that the former (prospective) member’s view of the current tree is exactly the same as the passive adversary’s view. This is because the advantage of the former (prospective) member is the same as the passive adversary, and the view of the passive adversary does not reveal any information about the group key by ▇▇▇▇▇▇▇ 3. We first consider backward secrecy, which states that a new member who knows the current group key cannot derive any previous group keys. Let Mn+1 be the new member. The sponsor for the join event changes its session random and, consequently, root key of the current key tree is changed. Therefore, the view of Mn+1 with respect to the prior key trees is exactly the same as the view of an outsider. Hence, the new member does not gain any advantage compared to a passive adversary. This argument can be easily extended to a merge of two or more groups. When a merge happens, the sponsor at the top leaf node of the largest tree changes its session random. Therefore, each member’s view on other member’s tree is exactly the same as the view of a passive adversary. This shows that the newly merged member has exactly the same advantage about any of the old key tree as a passive adversary. Now we consider forward secrecy, meaning that a passive adversary who knows a contiguous subset of old group keys cannot discover subsequent group keys. Here, we consider partition and leave at the same time. ▇▇▇▇▇▇▇ ▇▇ is a former group member who left the group. Whenever subtractive event happens, the sponsor located immediately below the deepest leaving leaf node refreshes its session random, and, therefore, all keys known to leaving members will be changed accordingly. Therefore, Md’s view is exactly the same as the view of the passive adversary. This proves that STR provides decisional version of key independence.
Key Independence. We now give an informal proof that TGDH satisfies forward and backward secrecy, or equivalently key independence. In order to show that TGDH provides key independence, we only need to show that the view of the former (prospective) member to the current tree is exactly same as the view of the passive adversary respectively, since this shows that the advantage of the former (prospective) member is same as the passive adversary and by ▇▇▇▇▇▇▇ 7.
Key Independence. Knowledge of any set of group keys does not lead to the knowledge of any other group key not in this set (see [5]).
Key Independence. Successive invocation of fA and fB produce indepen- dent random strings. Since each instance of key generation depends only on the outputs of fA, fB, the current key reveals no information about the past keys or future keys. Function: RetV al := fx(1n, s), x ∈ {A, B} RetV al := g(s, i) i := i + 1
Key Independence. We do not assume key authentication here. All communication channels are public but authentic. Order of Content • Introduction • Assumptions and Requirements • Cryptographic Properties • Notations • TGDH Protocols • Practical Aspects ( Issues and solutions ) • Performance Analysis • Related Work • Conclusion Notations • Use of binary trees • Key-path • Co-path • Key of node present at <l,v> - K<l,v> • Blind key - BK<l,v> = f ( K<l,v> ) • Where f ( k ) = aK mod p Notations… Order of Content • Introduction • Assumptions and Requirements • Cryptographic Properties • Notations • TGDH Protocols • Practical Aspects ( Issues and solutions ) • Performance Analysis • Related Work • Conclusion TGDH Protocols • Four basic protocol form the suite • Common framework:
1. Equal share
2. Secret shares 3. Membership changes taken into account 4. RSA for message signing • Minimum Requirement : • Knowledge of all Bkeys TGDH Protocols…. • SPONSOR :
1. Role
2. Additive Change
3. Subtractive Change • Assumption – Every member can unambiguously determine both the sponsors and the insertion location in the key tree (additive event) Join Protocol Join Protocol…. Leave Protocol Leave Protocol… Partition Protocol Partition Protocol…. Merge Protocol Merge Protocol…. Tree Management • Tree management has the following goals:
1. Balanced key tree
2. Minimum number of modular exponentials
3. Minimum number of protocol rounds Policy of Additive and Subtractive Events • Selection of insertion node • Tree balancing scheme for subtractive events Sponsor Selection Summary • Additive Events • Subtractive Events • Partition Events • This cover only initial protocol round. • Roles –
1. Refresh its key share
2. Compute all [key, bkey] pairs as far as the key path as possible
3. Broadcast updated key tree to all current group members Order of Content • Introduction • Assumptions and Requirements • Cryptographic Properties • Notations • TGDH Protocols • Practical Aspects ( Issues and solutions ) • Performance Analysis • Related Work • Conclusion Implementation Architecture • TREE_API • Contains the following function calls 1. tree_new_user
Key Independence. Knowledge of a subset of group keys in the life-cycle of a group (by a participant or outsider) should not enable knowledge of any key outside this subset.