Negotiation Strategies Sample Clauses

Negotiation Strategies. This subsection describes two classes of strategies, called concession and problem solving strategies. 1. starting high and conceding slowly – model an optimistic opening attitude and successive small concessions; 2. starting reasonable and conceding moderately – model a realistic opening attitude and successive moderate concessions; 3. starting low and conceding rapidly – model a pessimistic opening attitude and successive large concessions. The starting high and conceding slowly strategies are formalized by analogous functions. For instance, a strategy SH01 is formalized by a function: sh_strategy_01(state,TLi,F)= tactik⏐ if: state =“initial” then: tactik=“starting_optimistic” else: tactik=”const_factor_tact” ∧F=0.1 where state is the state of the negotiation, F∈[0,1] is the concession factor, tactik is the tactic specified by the strategy, starting_optimistic is an opening negotiation tactic, and const_factor_tact is a constant concession factor tactic (see subsection 3.5). The strategies in the other subclasses are formalized by similar functions. 1. low priority concession making – model a realistic opening attitude, large concessions on issues of low priority and small concessions on other issues; 2. low priority concession making with compensation – these strategies are similar to previous strategies; however, concessions are interleaved with compensations. Low priority concession making strategies partition the set Iik of issues into: (i) subset Iik+, corresponding to higher priority issues, and (ii) subset Iik–, corresponding to the remaining issues. Again, the strategies in this sub-class are formalized by analogous functions. For instance, a strategy LP01 is formalized by a function: lp_strategy_01(state,TLi,Iik,F1,F2)=(tactik, Iik+,tactik+1, Iik–)⏐ if: state =”initial” then: tactik=“starting_realistic” ∧tactik+1=”nil” else: Iik= Iik++ Iik– ∧∀itikj∈Iik+, tactik=”const_factor_tact” ∧F1=0.10 ∧ ∀itikj∈Iik–, tactik+1=”const_factor_tact” ∧F2=0.35 where state and const_factor_tact have the meaning just specified, F1 and F2 are constants, tactik and tactik+1 are the tactics defined by the strategy, and starting_realistic is an opening negotiation tactic (see subsection 3.5). The formalization of the strategies in the other sub-class is essentially identical to that.

Negotiation Strategies. Potential coal suppliers provided, however, that prior to any such study being conducted, the Participant(s) desiring that the study be performed shall have made suitable arrangements therefor, including payment arrangements with the provider of the study. Nothing in this Section 20.3 shall be construed to require the Operating Agent or any Participant which is a signatory to the Coal Sales Agreement to undertake any uncompensated or unfunded study which it would not otherwise perform.

Negotiation Strategies. ‌ In Faratin et al.’s approach [17], a proposal and counter-proposal are produced by a particular negotiation decision function, considering only one criterion at a time such as time, resource or behaviour of a negotiator’s opponent, and this function is called a tactic. However, a general course of actions is determined by a negotiation strategy. For example, if there is a risk of resource exhaustion, a client may decide to become more generous by changing its tactic (i.e. some coefficients of a respective function). Such a decision will be due to its strategy, as a client may choose other courses of action such as quitting a negotiation, waiting for the more favourable negotiation conditions, etc. In general, • a time-dependent tactic means that the amount that a negotiator concedes to- wards its opponent depends on time e.g., it may concede less at the beginning of negotiation, but more at the end of negotiation closer to its deadline; • a resource-dependent tactic is similar to a time-dependent tactic, but the conces- sion amount depends on resource availability e.g., a negotiator may concede more if there is a lack of resources; • a behaviour-dependent tactic tries to imitate the behaviour of the opponent e.g., if a buyer’s initial price was £10 then it proposes £15, a seller can reflect the difference in £5 between opponent’s proposals and suggests £20 if its initial price was £25. Here, the resource-dependent tactics might be impossible to apply if resource availabil- ity is unknown, but only its tendency of change can be guessed by a client. However, this criterion can be implicitly considered in the negotiator’s decision-making mecha- nism. For example, a client might become more generous if there is a risk of resource exhaustion according to the tendency in resource availability changes. As for behaviour- dependent tactics, imitating an opponent might be risky if the negotiator is not aware of the reasons behind these proposals. For example, if the opponent behaves selfishly, i.e. it tries to increase its own utility in costs of the negotiator, the negotiator might behave in the same way towards its opponent [188]. However, the decrease in the Grid scheduler’s proposed resource amount might be due to the resource scarcity, not its natural greediness, and selfish behaviour of the negotiator may lead to a negotiation failure. Although Xxxxxxxx et al. [188] consider modelling of the opponent’s preferences, they do not focus on how the environment ma...