The Epistemology of Disagreements. One major theoretical question that has dominated contemporary scholarship on disagreement explores the rational response of “epistemic peers” to disagreements.13 In general, scholars suggest that we can choose either “the conciliatory approach” or “the steadfast approach”. In simple terms, the former view advocates that if we come to disagree with our epistemic peers, we ought to become much less confident about our argument. 14 9 Popper 1962, 66-68. 10 Xxxxx 1932, vii. 11 Xxxx 2009, 44. 12 Contemporary debate on the question ‘what is philosophy?’ lies between two extreme positions: ‘philosophy-as-science’ and ‘philosophy-as-distinct-from- science’. See Xxxxxxxxx, Xxxxxxx & Burwood 2013, 23-44. For Xxxxx, however, there seems to be no distinction between science and philosophy. See Xxxxxxx 2000, Introduction. 13 Epistemic peers are described as follows: ‘[W]here one has good reason to believe that the other person is one’s (at least approximate) equal in terms of exposure to the evidence, intelligence, freedom from bias, etc.’ (Xxxxxxxxxxx 2009, 756). 14 The basic tenets of this approach are: ‘[1] that we may make mistakes in assessing evidence; [2] that the disagreement of others who have assessed the same evidence Thesteadfast approach, on the contrary, asserts that notwithstanding our disagreement with our epistemic peers, we should ‘maintain [our] confidence in [our] initial beliefs despite knowledge of disagreement by those who seem, independent of the disagreement, to be as well positioned as [ourselves] to arrive at accurate views on the disputed matter’.15 This approach can even result in thinking that our opponents are irrational because they have arrived at a different conclusion although we both look at the same evidence.16
