User Impersonation Attack Sample Clauses

User Impersonation Attack. As CIDi, C2, C3, C4, M1, M2 and M3 are all protected by secure one-way hash function, any modification to these parameters of the legitimate Ui’s authentication messages will be detected by S if the attacker cannot fabricate the valid CIDi∗. Because the attacker has no way of obtaining the values of IDi, PWi and h(x Y) corresponding to Ui, he (or she) cannot fabricate the valid CIDi*, M1, M2 and M3. Therefore, the proposed scheme is secure against user impersonation attack.

User Impersonation Attack. In such attack, an adversary may try to impersonate as a legitimate user in M0. However, our proposed scheme resists this attack. Because in the setup phase, the legal SE must send its IDi using hash function, which is considered as a collision- resistant one-way hash function. Therefore, it is hard for an attacker to extract the real ID of allowable user since each SE/Fog has previously registered its real ID in the CSA.

User Impersonation Attack k From Section 3.1, we know that a legal but malicious user U can obtain h(xǁy), h(ID ), C . Then he/she can forge the login request message {CIDi, V, M1} to disguise the user Ui.

User Impersonation Attack. { } If an adversary E wants to pretend Ui to communicate with Xx, he/she must forge the login request message CIDi, V, D, F1, F2, M1 . Then, he/she selects a random number v∗ and computes V ∗ = gv∗ mod n, U∗ = Y v∗ . Unfortunately, E couldn’t compute CIDi∗ without the Uijs smart card, he/she has to guess the user Xxxx