Registration Phase. The household smart meter needs to be registered at the NAN gateway before participating into the SEN and obtained security parameters, as follows. For each SM (say j), the NAN generates and assigns an unique identity (XXXX ) and a secret token STj with its identifier (idST ). It
Registration Phase. The registration phase for SMs and SPs are similar and follow the ECQV certificate scheme, refer to Section 2.3. As a result, each entity U is storing the public parameters {Ep(a,b), P, H0, H1, H2, H3, Ek(), Dk(), Ppub}, its public key Pu, certificate certU and identity IDU, together with its private key dU. Note that only the private key needs to be stored in the tamper resistant part of the memory. Similar as in the other papers in literature on key agreement schemes, we assume that the SM is also storing the public key of the SP. If not, it needs to request before the key agreement phase the identity and certificate of the SP in order to compute the corresponding public key and verify the certificate, cf. Equation (1).
Registration Phase. In this phase, the doctors and patients make a profile at the TTP, containing relevant attributes like expertise, linked hospital, etc. in case of the doctor, allergies, blood group, etc. in case of the patient. As a result, each user also possesses a user identity, private key, public key and corresponding certificate of the TTP, which is securely stored at the user side (e.g. on smartphone or smartcard) and at the TTP.
Registration Phase. A user U registers at the gateway node GWN in line with the requirement, while a regular sensor node S registers at GWN offline. A detailed process of registration process about U and S is highlighted as below.
Registration Phase. For the one-time, initial registration process of the proposed scheme, the UAV and USP need to execute the following steps:
Registration Phase. In this phase, the home agent (HA) must choose a public key cryptosystem based on the Chebyshev chaotic map; the corresponding public key is (x; Ts(x)), and his private key is s. When a mobile user (MU ) wants to register to the home agent HA, MU chooses her or his identity IDMU and password pw, selects a random number b, and submits IDMU and h(pw b) to HA for registration over a secure channel. HA computes V = EKS(IDMU h(pw b)), where KS is a secret key kept by HA, and issues a smart card to MU over a secure channel, which contains V , x, Ts(x), EK(·) and a one-way hash function h(·). When MU receives the smart card, he or she stores b into the smart card. Finally, the smart card contains b, V, x, Ts(x), EK( ), h( ) . This phase is outlined in Fig. 1.
Registration Phase. Let KGWN-U and PUGWN-U=gKGWN-U denote GWN’s private key and its corresponding public key, where s is kept secret by GWN and PUGWN-U is stored inside each user’s smart card. When a user, Xx wants to be registered to the GWN, Ui proceeds with the following steps through a secure channel.
Step 1: Ui selects a unique identity IDi and a password PWi, and generates a random number r. Then he (or she) computes RPWi=H(r||PWi) and submits the registration request {IDi, RPWi} to GWN.
Step 2: Upon receiving the message, XXX rejects the request if IDi is invalid. Otherwise, GWN computes TCi=H(KGWN-U||IDi) and PTCi=TCiRPWi, where KGWN-U is the long term secret key of GWN. Finally, GWN issues a smart card containing { H(·), g, PTCi, PUGWN-U } to Ui.
Step 3: After receiving the smart card, Ui computes R=rIDiPWi and stores R into the card. The registration phase for sensor nodes is described as follows.
Step 1: Sj submits it’s identifier SIDj to GWN through a secure channel. Step 2: Upon receiving the message, GWN computes TCj=H(KGWN-S||SIDj) and PUGWN-S=gKGWN-S, where KGWN-S is the GWN’s private key, PUGWN-S is another public key of the GWN for sensor nodes, and TCj is the temporal credential for Sj. Finally, GWN sends { TCj, g, PUGWN-S } to Sj. Step 3: After receiving the message, Sj stores { TCj, g, PUGWN-S } as its temporal credential.
Registration Phase. The SA generates a unique secret identity idN for node N . It then randomly chooses the temporary secret parameter kN and calculates aN = idN ⊕ h(kHN , kN ) and bN = kHN aN kN . A unique id′IN for the intermediary node (IN ) is chosen and the parameters ⟨idN , aN , bN ⟩ and ⟨id′IN , idN , aN , bN ⟩ are stored in N and IN respectively, while id′IN is stored by HN as the identity of IN when communicating in relay mode. aN = γ η and bN = γ µ. The shared session key kS is computed as h(idN , rN , fN , xN ) and the authentication parameters (aN , bN ) are replaced with (a+ , b+ ).
Registration Phase. This phase is important in the functioning of the proposed scheme. In fact, each sensor must be registered in order to be integrated to the network system. The registration phase between the sensor nodes, the gateway node, and the mobile remote user is divided into two parts (see Figure 2). Idi, Cipher suites PKg(UIdj, UPWDj) MSIdi , PKj(Idi, Cipher suites) Finished Finished Remote user j MSIdi = h(Idi || Xi) Gateway node Sensor node i First, registration part between the sensor node and the gateway node. We assume that the channel between the sensor node and the gateway node has been secured. Hence, the sensor node sends its identity Idi and a list of supported cipher suites to the gateway node through a secure channel. Second, the registration part between the gateway node and the remote user. The remote user connects to the gateway node using its identity UIdj and password UPWDj by an encrypted message (PKg(UIdj, UPWDj)) using the public key of the gateway node PKg. The gateway node selects the used cipher suites, and calculates the masked identity of the sensor MSIdi using the sensor identity Idi and its secret key Xi. Then, the gateway node sends to the remote user a message containing the masked identity of the sensor node MSIdi, an encryption of both of the identity of the sensor Idi and the selected cipher suites using the public key of the remote user PKj.
Registration Phase. User registers with GWN. A new user Ui proceeds with the following steps through a secure channel.
Step 1: Ui selects a unique identity IDi and a password PWi, and generates a random value r. Then he (or she) computes RPWi=H(r||PWi) and submits the registration request message R=(IDi, RPWi) to GWN.
Step 2: Upon receiving R, GWN verifies the validity of IDi and rejects the registration request if IDi is invalid. Then GWN continues to compute TCi=H(KGWN-U||IDi||TEi) and PTCi=TCiRPWi. GWN initializes the temporary identity TIDi and stores (TIDi, IDi, TEi) in the verification table. Finally, GWN issues the smart card containing { H(·), XXXx, TEi, PTCi } to Ui.
Step 3: After receiving the smart card, Ui stores r into the card. The registration phase for SNs is described as follows.
Step 1: Sj submits it’s identifier SIDj to GWN through a secure channel. Step 2: Upon receiving the message, GWN computes TCj=H(KGWN-S||SIDj), where KGWN-S is the GWN’s private key and TCj is the temporal credential for Sj. Finally, GWN sends TCj to Sj. Step 3: After receiving the message, Sj stores TCj as its temporal credential.
