Setup Phase Sample Clauses
Setup Phase. In this phase, the TTP selects the EC Ep(a,b) in Zp with generator point P of order q. It determines six hash functions H0 : {0, 1}∗ → Zq∗, H1 : Zq → Zq∗, H2 : {0, 1}∗ → Zq∗, H3 : Zq → Zq∗, H4 : {0, 1}∗ → Zq∗, and H5 : {0, 1}∗ → Zq∗. Also a symmetric key encryption algorithm is chosen to encrypt a message M into the ciphertext C using the secret shared key k, C = Ek(M), together with the corresponding decryption algorithm, M = Dk(C). A random value k is set as the private key of the TTP. The corresponding public key Ppub is computed by Ppub = kP. Now, the public parameters {Ep(a,b), Ppub, P, H0, H1, H2, H3, H4, H5, Ek(), Dk()} are published.
Setup Phase. Setup Phase is a special phase that occurs at the beginning of every scenario. During this time the battle is paused and you may arrange your forces around the setup zone instantly by using movement commands. The blue-tinged ground underneath your soldiers is called a Setup Zone, and is a special zone that exists only during the Setup Phase. There can be up to three different Setup Zones present per side. A unit placed within a Setup Zone must start the battle somewhere within that same setup zone. A unit that is not in any setup zone is locked in place until the battle begins. During Setup Phase, you can give all units starting orders for the first turn, which they will immediately begin to execute when the battle begins. For this mission you don't need to move your units in the Setup Zone, but you can rearrange them if you wish. In future missions, how you arrange your forces within the Setup Zone can be vitally important, especially if you are defending. ◼ Transporting Troops in Vehicles Currently almost all of your infantry are riding in vehicles, which are a very common way to move your troops in Black Sea. Any vehicle that can carry passengers will have grey dots in its info panel. Each grey dot represents an empty passenger seat, while a green dot is a seat occupied by a passenger. You can order troops into a vehicle by simply selecting any movement command and clicking on either the vehicle or its floating icon as the movement destination. The troops will then move to the vehicle and mount it. Dismounting is just as easy: select the passenger unit and give it a movement order anywhere. Once the vehicle has finished its own movement commands, if any, the passengers will dismount. You can also use the Dismount command in the Special command panel (F7). If the passenger unit is also the driver of the vehicle, as sometimes happens with light trucks such as Tigrs and Humvees, you'll have to use the Dismount command, found in the Special command panel (hotkey F7). Spend the first couple turns of the mission driving the Ukrainian BTR-4Es to the "Dismount" objective, and then have their passengers dismount there. Remember, you can either use the Dismount command, or simply give the passengers any movement command and they will automatically dismount while they carry out their orders. You should be careful about driving a vehicle laden with passengers in view of the enemy: one lucky shot from an ATGM or tank could destroy a whole rifle squad along with the ...
Setup Phase. In this phase, any user Ui has its identity IDi, and pub- lic key (x, TSi (x)) and a secret key Si based on Cheby- shev chaotic maps, a chaotic maps-based one-way hash function h(·) [35], and a pair of secure symmetric encryp- tion/decryption functions EK()/DK() with key K. The concrete notation used hereafter is shown in Table 1.
Setup Phase. In this phase, Key Generation Center (KGC) chooses below items: • Elliptic curve E over finite field Fq , where q is a power of a prime number, • Subgroup G1 with prime order n and generator P , of group E(Fq ) , • Multiplicative group G2 with prime order n , • Bilinear pairing, e : G1 × G1 → G2 , • Map-to-point, H : 0,1* → G1 . Then, KGC chooses a random number xKGC ∈R Ζ* as master-key and computes the public key PKGC = x
Setup Phase. Given the security parameter k and the maximal size N of all the MANETs members, the PKG chooses a group with order p, where |p|≤k.
1. Choose a collision resistant hash function H1:{0, 1}∗→ZP. H1 maps arbitrary identity into ZP.
2. Randomly choose generator g of and β, λ ∈Z∗ , compute U=gβ, V=gλ .
3. Output the public parameter PK=(g, U, V) while master secret key MK=(β, λ ) is kept secret by PKG.
Setup Phase. The protocol begins at time 0 with a one-time setup phase which is exe- cuted in parallel with a run of ΠKeyGrade. Recall that ΠKeyGrade begins with two rounds of exchanging (unpredictable) challenges among parties. At the end of the second round of exchanges, P creates a hash χ from these values. During the subsequent proof of computa- tion phase, it then computes ϕ0 = VDF11∆(Eval, χ pk , 1). When ϕ0 becomes available at time 13∆, P immediately starts computing ϕ1 as VDF13∆(Eval, HN(ϕ0), 1). At time 16∆, P outputs KeySet in ΠKeyGrade.
Setup Phase. At time 0: Participate in a run of ΠKeyGrade. In parallel, participate in a run of ΠLeader. – At time 16∆: Denote KeySetP the set of keys output in ΠKeyGrade. (Hereafter, it is assumed that parties share a graded PKI.) forever:
Setup Phase. In this phase, the executed steps are the same as in Xxx's scheme. H(SK2,3, Ts2Ts3(x), IDsession) by computing X2⊕B1, where X2 = B1⊕B2. After getting B2, U1 can further use it to get U3’s B3 = H(SK3,4, Ts3Ts4(x), IDsession) by computing X3⊕B2. Finally, after getting all Bj, all group participants can establish the common group session key GSKi by computing GSKi = H(B1||B2|| . . . ||Bn), where GSK1 = GSK2 = . . . = GSKn. TABLE II: THE VALUE OF BI Parameter Value B1 H(SK1,2, Ts1Ts2(x), IDsession)
Setup Phase. At time 0: In parallel, participate in a run of ΠKeyGrade. – At time 13∆: Denote ϕ0 = VDF11∆(Eval, χ, 1) the proof computed during the proof of computation phase of ΠKeyGrade. Call VDF13∆(Eval, HN(ϕ0), 1) to compute ϕ1. – At time 16∆: Denote KeySet the set of keys output in ΠKeyGrade.
Setup Phase. TS performs system setup for the proposed protocol. First of all, TS selects an elliptic curve E over Eq and a base point P of E, where q is a large order n. TS selects WA and V2 = H(WA) by using his (or her) identity XXX and password PWA. After that, A deletes VA from the memory of the SC and writes {V1, V2 } on it. A(Patient) TS(Hospital Server) Selects XXX Sends<XXX> Computes VA = H(IDTS || XXX || d) Store {E,P,F,H(),ê(),KA-TS,IDTS,IDB} in a SC Issues a SC Computes WA = XXX XOR PWA V1 = VA XOR WA V2 = H(WA) Stores { V1,V2 } Figure 2. Patient registration phase.