Setup Phase. In this phase, the TTP selects the EC Ep(a,b) in Zp with generator point P of order q. It determines six hash functions H0 : {0, 1}∗ → Zq∗, H1 : Zq → Zq∗, H2 : {0, 1}∗ → Zq∗, H3 : Zq → Zq∗, H4 : {0, 1}∗ → Zq∗, and H5 : {0, 1}∗ → Zq∗. Also a symmetric key encryption algorithm is chosen to encrypt a message M into the ciphertext C using the secret shared key k, C = Ek(M), together with the corresponding decryption algorithm, M = Dk(C). A random value k is set as the private key of the TTP. The corresponding public key Ppub is computed by Ppub = kP. Now, the public parameters {Ep(a,b), Ppub, P, H0, H1, H2, H3, H4, H5, Ek(), Dk()} are published.
Setup Phase. In this phase, any user Ui has its identity IDi, and pub- lic key (x, TSi (x)) and a secret key Si based on Cheby- shev chaotic maps, a chaotic maps-based one-way hash function h(·) [35], and a pair of secure symmetric encryp- tion/decryption functions EK()/DK() with key K. The concrete notation used hereafter is shown in Table 1.
Setup Phase. Setup Phase is a special phase that occurs at the beginning of every scenario. During this time the battle is paused and you may arrange your forces around the setup zone instantly by using movement commands. The blue-tinged ground underneath your soldiers is called a Setup Zone, and is a special zone that exists only during the Setup Phase. There can be up to three different Setup Zones present per side. A unit placed within a Setup Zone must start the battle somewhere within that same setup zone. A unit that is not in any setup zone is locked in place until the battle begins. During Setup Phase, you can give all units starting orders for the first turn, which they will immediately begin to execute when the battle begins. For this mission you don't need to move your units in the Setup Zone, but you can rearrange them if you wish. In future missions, how you arrange your forces within the Setup Zone can be vitally important, especially if you are defending. Transporting Troops in Vehicles Currently almost all of your infantry are riding in vehicles, which are a very common way to move your troops in Black Sea. Any vehicle that can carry passengers will have grey dots in its info panel. Each grey dot represents an empty passenger seat, while a green dot is a seat occupied by a passenger. You can order troops into a vehicle by simply selecting any movement command and clicking on either the vehicle or its floating icon as the movement destination. The troops will then move to the vehicle and mount it. Dismounting is just as easy: select the passenger unit and give it a movement order anywhere. Once the vehicle has finished its own movement commands, if any, the passengers will dismount. You can also use the Dismount command in the Special command panel (F7). If the passenger unit is also the driver of the vehicle, as sometimes happens with light trucks such as Tigrs and Humvees, you'll have to use the Dismount command, found in the Special command panel (hotkey F7). Spend the first couple turns of the mission driving the Ukrainian BTR-4Es to the "Dismount" objective, and then have their passengers dismount there. Remember, you can either use the Dismount command, or simply give the passengers any movement command and they will automatically dismount while they carry out their orders. You should be careful about driving a vehicle laden with passengers in view of the enemy: one lucky shot from an ATGM or tank could destroy a whole rifle squad along with the ...
Setup Phase. Given the security parameter k and the maximal size N of all the MANETs members, the PKG chooses a group with order p, where |p|≤k.
1. Choose a collision resistant hash function H1:{0, 1}∗→ZP. H1 maps arbitrary identity into ZP.
2. Randomly choose generator g of and β, λ ∈Z∗ , compute U=gβ, V=gλ .
3. Output the public parameter PK=(g, U, V) while master secret key MK=(β, λ ) is kept secret by PKG.
Setup Phase. Entities Xxxxx and Xxx who wish to agree a key first follow the User Setup Phase described in Section 3.2. We denote the two users’ partial private keys as SA = sQA and SB = sQB, in which their corresponding partial public key are QA = h(XXX) and QB = h(IDB), respectively. It is easy to verify the following equations: KAB = e(QB, PB)a · e(xASA, TB) = e(QB, xBsP )a · e(xASA, bP ) = e(xBsQB, aP ) · e(xAsQA, bP ) = e(xBSB, TA) · e(QA, PA)b = KBA. Hence, K = KAB = KBA is a key shared between Xxxxx and Xxx; To ensure forward security, the authors use the shared key H(K, abP ) as the final established session key between the two users, where H is a suitable hash function. The protocol uses two passes and is bandwidth- efficient. But each party needs to compute 2 expensive pairings. Notice that the pairing e(QID, PID) can be pre- computed, but the other one, i.e. e(xIDSID, TID' ) has to be computed on-line (where ID denotes UP and RP’s identity). 4 Our New CL-AK Protocol for Grid Computing In this section, we present our new CL-AK protocol for UP and RP to mutually authenticate each other and to share a common secret session key simultaneously for sub- sequent secure communications. Similar to the AP’s CL-AK [2], a grid trusted author- ity (GTA) is required to generate partial private keys for users, using their unique identity (ID) to derive the asso- ciate partial public keys. UP and RP both have their own chosen partial private/public key pairs. This initial regis- tration is what can be called a user single-sign-on (SSO) session [18]. In an SSO session, GTA conducts a thorough identity validation on UP and RP. We denote UP and RP’s own chosen partial pri- vate/public key pairs as (xU , PU ) and (xR, PR), respec- tively, in which PU = xU PPub = xU sP and PR = xRPPub = xRsP . They publish their partial public keys (PU and PR) via a public open directory. Note again that in CL-PKC, no public key certificate is needed to guar- xxxxx the authenticity of the user’s own chosen partial public keys. Our new protocol also consists of two stages: Setup Stage. his stage is identical as the Setup Phase of the AP’s protocol.
Setup Phase. In this phase, the executed steps are the same as in Xxx's scheme. H(SK2,3, Ts2Ts3(x), IDsession) by computing X2⊕B1, where X2 = B1⊕B2. After getting B2, U1 can further use it to get U3’s B3 = H(SK3,4, Ts3Ts4(x), IDsession) by computing X3⊕B2. Finally, after getting all Bj, all group participants can establish the common group session key GSKi by computing GSKi = H(B1||B2|| . . . ||Bn), where GSK1 = GSK2 = . . . = GSKn. TABLE II: THE VALUE OF BI Parameter Value B1 H(SK1,2, Ts1Ts2(x), IDsession)
Setup Phase. TS performs system setup for the proposed protocol. First of all, TS selects an elliptic curve E over Eq and a base point P of E, where q is a large order n. TS selects WA and V2 = H(WA) by using his (or her) identity XXX and password PWA. After that, A deletes VA from the memory of the SC and writes {V1, V2 } on it. A(Patient) TS(Hospital Server) Selects XXX Sends<XXX> Computes VA = H(IDTS || XXX || d) Store {E,P,F,H(),ê(),KA-TS,IDTS,IDB} in a SC Issues a SC Computes WA = XXX XOR PWA V1 = VA XOR WA V2 = H(WA) Stores { V1,V2 } Figure 2. Patient registration phase.
Setup Phase. In this phase, Key Generation Center (KGC) chooses below items: • Elliptic curve E over finite field Fq , where q is a power of a prime number, • Subgroup G1 with prime order n and generator P , of group E(Fq ) , • Multiplicative group G2 with prime order n , • Bilinear pairing, e : G1 × G1 → G2 , • Map-to-point, H : 0,1* → G1 . Then, KGC chooses a random number xKGC ∈R Ζ* as master-key and computes the public key PKGC = x
Setup Phase. At time 0: Participate in a run of ΠKeyGrade. In parallel, participate in a run of ΠLeader. – At time 16∆: Denote KeySetP the set of keys output in ΠKeyGrade. (Hereafter, it is assumed that parties share a graded PKI.) forever:
Setup Phase. At time 0: In parallel, participate in a run of ΠKeyGrade. – At time 13∆: Denote ϕ0 = VDF11∆(Eval, χ, 1) the proof computed during the proof of computation phase of ΠKeyGrade. Call VDF13∆(Eval, HN(ϕ0), 1) to compute ϕ1. – At time 16∆: Denote KeySet the set of keys output in ΠKeyGrade.
