Result 1 definition

Result 1. There is a coalition-proof equilibrium for the small economy in the non-cooperative Stackelberg game favorable to the preferential trade agreement if, and only if:

Result 1. From the 'local' version of the experiment (whose results are shown in (42) in the '1st gesture' and the '2nd gesture' panels) one can see that both second and third person gestures were found to be highly acceptable in the conditions in which no clash is expected (this includes the Gesture-Match condition for the 2nd gesture, as well as all the Gesture conditions for the judgments restricted to the 1st gesture). No difference was found across second and third person gestures (e.g., the difference in rating between 1st gesture and 2nd gesture judgments in the Gesture-Match condition is not significant: F(1,41)=.094, p=.76), and similarly the control helicopter/plane gestures are equally acceptable (still comparing the 1st and 2nd gesture judgments in the Gesture-Match condition, but now in the control condition, we obtain: F(1,41)=.032, p=.

Result 1. Continued implementation by Canada of commitments under the Canada-United States Great Lakes Water Quality Agreement Annex 5 –

Examples of Result 1 in a sentence

• Result 1 In an induced value second price auction, bidding behavior both with and without monetary incentives differs from perfect demand revelation.

• See Part IV.BACKGROUND This enforcement action arises out of an investment arbitration initiated by Petitioners and several other co-claimants against the Kingdom of Spain in November 2011, alleging various violations of the Energy Charter Treaty.

• Bids in T2 treatment are systematically increasing, which can be explained by risk aversion of the bidders who are more likely to fail the deal in the scrambled market.Our primary explanation for the difference across markets in Result 1 is risk attitudes.

• For each family of outcome variables, we examine indices as described in Section 4.5. Behavioral Responses Underlying Result 1: Large Incentives.

• Hence there exists a unique β¯ for which∫ Πe (min(β¯, v) − I ) f (v)dv = Π0.This bid wins the auction (in the sense that it defines the Nash equilibrium) and it is trivial to see that β¯ is equal to the threshold M that characterizes the optimal contract in Results 3 (note that M = I in the case of a project with avoidable expropriation, as in Result 1).

• Result 1 The mechanism fails to induce truth-telling in a substantial number of cases.

• Result 1 Participants hold high beliefs about their performance, which facilitate their efforts to be chosen as leaders.

• The Twinning project will build capacities and provide advisory assistance through activities structured under the following Components:Mandatory Result 1/ Component 1: Quality assurance mechanisms in VET strengthenedShort description:This component will focus on building the capacity of SAVE and vocational education institutions in development of a quality assurance framework in line with European policies and best practice.

• The CDA-Package mechanism achieves 8 percentage points more efficiency than the CDA-Broker mechanism.Support for Result 1 is given in Figure 8a and Table 2.

• The voter motivated by reciprocity plays a nonzero share of IC for a range of parameter values, whereas the voter unmotivated by reciprocity never plays IC, as in Result 1.

More Definitions of Result 1

Result 1. The participation decision of a firm does not directly depend on the effectiveness of the competition authority P or on firms' discount factor δ. In the Xxxx-equilibrium, condition (22) must apply for all firms. Therefore, the Xxxx- equilibrium is determined by the set of participation probabilities j that constitutes the global minimum of a function Ψ as defined in equation (23).  j =∑1− ⋅2 (23) In the Xxxx-equilibrium, i.e. the global minimum of Ψ, the condition  j =0 applies. To see this, consider that squaring ψi does not affect the root of function Ψ but prevents that positive values of ψi for firm i and negative values of ψ−i for some firm -i sum up to zero. Taking the sum of these squared terms ensures that a proposed solution j constitutes a Xxxx-equilibrium for all firms. If some firm considers participation in the cartel a dominant strategy (i.e. equation (18) applies) one can pre-assign this firm a probability of j i=1 . Firms of this type need not be considered in the calculation of other firms' optimal strategy. Therefore, an indicator-variable γi is defined that takes a value of 1 if some firm i considers cartel-participation a dominant strategy and a value of zero otherwise. Defining this objective function is one of the main contributions of this article. This is because previous literature defines functions of this type for Xxxx-Cournot equilibria in pure strategies only (see, e.g., Xxxx et al. (2007), Xxxxxxxxx et al. (2004), Xxxxxxxxxxx and Xxxxxxxx (2008) or Xxxxxxxxxx et al. (2010)). I argue that, from a computational point of view, determining a set of optimal participation probabilities is quite similar to the determination of a set of optimal output-quantities. Therefore, both problems can also be addressed by similar solution techniques as is shown in section 4.