ASSESSMENT exempelklausuler

ASSESSMENT. 1. The presence of state aid (22) Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement reads as follows: ‘Save as otherwise provided in this Agreement, any aid granted by EC Member States, EFTA States or through State resources in any form whatsoever which distorts or threatens to distort competition by favouring certain undertakings or the production of certain goods shall, in so far as it affects trade between Contracting Parties, be incompatible with the function­ ing of this Agreement.’
ASSESSMENT. 1. The presence of State aid (81) Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement reads as follows: ‘Save as otherwise provided in this Agreement, any aid granted by EC Member States, EFTA States or through State resources in any form whatsoever which distorts or threatens to distort competition by favouring certain undertakings or the production of certain goods shall, in so far as it affects trade between contracting parties, be incompatible with the functioning of this Agreement.’ (82) The Authority will in the following assess whether the four alleged measures referred to in the complaint constitute State aid within the meaning of Article 61 of the EEA Agreement. The Authority will assess (i) whether there are State resources involved, (ii) whether the alleged measures confer an economic advantage on the relevant entities of the Oslo Sporveier Group, and
ASSESSMENT. 1. The presence of State aid State aid within the meaning of Article 61(1) EEA Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement reads as follows: ‘Save as otherwise provided in this Agreement, any aid granted by EC Member States, EFTA States or through State resources in any form whatsoever which distorts or threatens to distort competition by favouring certain undertakings or the production of certain goods shall, in so far as it affects trade between Contracting Parties, be incompatible with the functioning of this Agreement.’ It follows from this provision that, for State aid within the meaning of the EEA to be present, the following conditions must be met: — the aid must be granted through State resources, — the aid must favour certain undertakings or the production of certain goods, i.e. the measure must confer an economic advantage upon the recipient(s), which must be selective, — the beneficiary must be an undertaking within the meaning of the EEA Agreement, — the aid must be capable of distorting competition and affect trade between contracting parties. The fulfilment of these conditions will be considered further below.
ASSESSMENT. 1. The presence of State aid State aid within the meaning of Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement reads as follows: ‘Save as otherwise provided in this Agreement, any aid granted by EC Member States, EFTA States or through State resources in any form whatsoever which distorts or threatens to distort competition by favouring certain undertakings or the production of certain goods shall, in so far as it affects trade between Contracting Parties, be incompatible with the functioning of this Agreement.’ The criteria will be assessed below, first in relation to the noti- fied amendments to the Harbour Act and second in relation to the 2003 Harbour Act, which was never notified to the Autho- rity.
ASSESSMENT. 1. The presence of State aid within the meaning of Article 61(1) EEA Agreement Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement reads as follows: ‘Save as otherwise provided in this Agreement, any aid granted by EC Member States, EFTA States or through State resources in any form whatsoever which distorts or threatens to distort competition by favouring certain undertakings or the production of certain goods shall, in so far as it affects trade between Contracting Parties, be incompatible with the functioning of this Agreement.’ The Authority will in the following give its preliminary assessment of whether the increased compensation for Hurtigruten represents State aid within the meaning of Article 61 of the EEA Agreement. The Authority will assess whether there are State resources involved, whether the compensation confers an economic advantage to Hurtigruten and whether the measures distort competition and have an effect on trade between the Contracting Parties.
ASSESSMENT. 1. The presence of State aid within the meaning of Article 61(1) EEA Agreement Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement reads as follows: ‘Save as otherwise provided in this Agreement, any aid granted by EC Member States, EFTA States or through State resources in any form whatsoever which distorts or threatens to distort competition by favouring certain undertakings or the production of certain goods shall, in so far as it affects trade between Contracting Parties, be incompatible with the functioning of this Agreement’. In the following, the Authority will assess whether the municipality of Oppdal has granted State aid to SDO in connection with the sale of the plot of land gbnr 271/8. If the transaction was carried out in accordance with the market economy investor principle, i.e. if the municipality sold the land for its market value and the conditions of the transaction would have been acceptable for a private seller, the transaction would not have involved the grant of State aid. On the contrary, State aid could be involved if the sale was not carried out at market price.
ASSESSMENT. 3. State aid within the meaning of Article 61(1) EEA and the classification of such aid as new or existing 3.1. The aid elements of the Icelandic system of implicit State guarantees (1) The original Icelandic text is as follows: ‘Aðrar skuldbindingar Íbúðalánasjóðs eru hins vegar ekki undanþegnar gjaldskyldu þar sem ekki er lagt fé í varasjóð til að mæta útlánatöpum vegna lánveitinga á grundvelli þeirra.’. (2) Opinion of the Economic and Commerce Committee of Alþingi, the Authority's unofficial translation. (3) Case E-1/00 State Debt Management Agency [2000-2001] EFTA Court Report, p. 8. For a measure to be classified as State aid within the meaning of Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement, it must be granted by the State or through State resources, confer an advantage on the recipient undertaking, be selective and thereby distort or threaten to distort competition and be liable to affect trade between the Contracting Parties. Before examining each of these conditions in turn, the Authority makes the following remarks concerning the scope of the present decision to open the formal investigation procedure: As any other undertaking organised as a public institution, the HFF enjoys an implicit State guarantee in the same manner as did the predecessors of the HFF from the start of their operations in the 1950's, cf. Act No 42/1957. The HFF pays neither a market based premium for the guarantee, nor the premium laid down in Act No 121/1997 on State Guarantees. The implicit State guarantee for this type of public undertaking was at the outset granted without any obli- gation to pay a premium. However, Icelandic system for implicit State guarantees was changed in 1987. From this point in time, a guarantee premium was to be paid for foreign commitments, but not for domestic ones. The original State guarantee scheme, with the changes introduced in 1987, thus predates the EEA Agreement. The Icelandic system relating to implicit guarantees was changed again as of 1 January 1998 when a general obligation to pay a guarantee premium was also introduced as regards domestic commitments. Considering the size of the premium the Authority finds it unlikely that the guarantee premium removed aid contained in the original guarantee scheme. Therefore, in the Authority's preliminary opinion, the original guarantee scheme still contains State aid. The State aid element will generally be the difference between the appropriate market price for the guarantee provided and the price paid ...
ASSESSMENT 

Related to ASSESSMENT

  • Uppföljning Kammarkollegiet har rätt att kontrollera att Xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx fullgör alla sina åtaganden från och med att Ramavtalet har trätt i kraft till och med att samtliga Kontrakt har upphört. Det innebär bland annat att Kammarkollegiet har rätt att kontrollera att Xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx uppfyller krav, tilldelningskriterier och villkor som Ramavtalsleverantören uppfyllde vid anbudsutvärderingen och att Ramavtalsleverantören fullgör sina åtaganden. Vid uppföljning har Kammarkollegiet rätt att anlita extern part för genomförandet. Xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx ska på begäran tillhandahålla, för egen del samt för Underleverantörer, uppgifter och handlingar som Kammarkollegiet skäligen behöver för att genomföra uppföljning i den utsträckning som krävs och som inte står i strid med gällande rätt eller tillämpliga börsregler. Ramavtalsleverantören ska ge Kammarkollegiet tillträde och insyn i Ramavtalsleverantörens och dess Underleverantörers verksamhet i den utsträckning som krävs. Vid uppföljning svarar respektive Part för sina egna kostnader under förutsättning att uppföljningen inte visar att Xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx gjort sig skyldig till vitesgrundande avtalsbrott. I det fallet står Xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx för Kammarkollegiets kostnader för uppföljningen. Om Xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx inte uppfyller ovanstående krav, tilldelningskriterier och villkor kan det resultera i vite och andra påföljder enligt avsnitt Avtalsbrott och påföljder.

  • Hävning Den upphandlande enheten har rätt att häva avtalet och få ersättning för skada om leverantören: ● väsentligt misskött uppdraget ● misskött uppdraget och inte utan dröjsmål efter skriftlig anmodan (varning) vidtagit rättelse ● i väsentligt hänseende brutit mot avtalet och inte utan dröjsmål efter skriftlig anmodan vidtagit rättelse ● kommer på obestånd och inte ofördröjligen efter begäran ställer betryggande säkerhet för sitt åtagande ● inte fullgör eller på annat sätt missköter redovisning och betalning av skatter och avgifter ● utan medgivande från den upphandlande enheten överlåter avtalet på annan ● utan medgivande från den upphandlande enheten genomför ägarskifte av väsentlig betydelse för den upphandlande enheten ● utan medgivande från den upphandlande enheten anlitar underleverantör ● saknar föreskriven försäkring ● lämnat oriktiga uppgifter i anbudet och dessa uppgifter har varit av väsentlig betydelse vid bedömningen av tilldelning av avtal Om påtagliga brister förekommer med regelbundenhet oavsett om de var för sig åtgärdas inom rimlig tid kan en sådan regelbundenhet utgöra grund för såväl skadestånd som hävning av avtal. Om leverantören missköter uppdraget har den upphandlande enheten rätt att låta avhjälpa felet eller bristen på leverantörens risk och bekostnad eller begära sådant prisavdrag som motsvarar felet eller bristen. Hävning ska ske skriftligen. Den upphandlande enheten äger rätt att erhålla ersättning för uppkomna kostnader i samband med hävning. Leverantören har rätt att häva avtalet och få ersättning för skada om den upphandlande enheten väsentligt misskött uppdraget. Leverantören är i dessa fall berättigad till ersättning för utförd del av uppdraget, skälig kostnad för avveckling samt utebliven skälig vinst på den del av uppdraget som inte blivit utförd. Hävning ska ske skriftligen.

  • Parter Ramavtal med avtalsnummer [X], har träffats för Avropsberättigades räkning, mellan Statens inköpscentral vid Kammarkollegiet, organisationsnummer 202100‑0829, nedan Kammarkollegiet, och [Ramavtalsleverantören], organisationsnummer [XXXXXX‑XXXX], nedan Ramavtalsleverantören.