Alternative Explanations for Xxxx Success Sample Clauses

Alternative Explanations for Xxxx Success. While my primary research hypotheses focus on the relationship between Congress and the Supreme Court, it is important to review and control for other explanations for xxxx success. Legislative scholars have suggested that sponsor and xxxx characteristics may systematically influence the probability that a xxxx passes. I, accordingly, include variables to control for these factors. The literature on xxxx success has consistently found that majority party members have more success at turning their bills into law than members in the chamber minority (Franzitch 1979, Xxxxx & Xxxxxx 1990, Xxxxxxxx, Box-Xxxxxxxxxxxxx & Xxxxxxx 2003, Xxxxx 2005, Cox & Xxxxx 2008). I accordingly expect the dummy variable measuring membership of xxxx sponsors in the majority party to be positively associated with the probability of passage. There is less consensus on the role of other xxxx and sponsor characteristics on legislative success. The literature suggests that members with certain institutional pre- rogatives may have increased success. In Chapter 3, I follow Xxxxx & Xxxxxxxxx (2005) and hypothesize that bills sponsored by a member of the committee or the chair of the committee to which the xxxx is initially referred are more likely to be successful than those sponsored by non–members of that committee.5 I also include two measures that char- 5This hypothesis is not considered in Chapter 4 because a number of responses to Court decisions are proposed as amendments to underlying legislation and do not go through the standard committee referral process. acterize the relationship between the preferences of the xxxx sponsor and his chamber. I expect that bills sponsored by “mainstream” legislators are more likely to be enacted than bills sponsored by more ideologically extreme legislators. Xxxxx & Xxxxxxxxx (2005) sug- gest that sponsorship by a mainstream legislator may signal that a proposal is more likely to reflect the preferences of the median legislator (or party median) or that such pro- posals may actually better reflect median preferences than proposals advanced by more ideologically extreme members of Congress. Another measure that may capture the level of support for a proposal is its number of cosponsors. I expect that as the number of cosponsors increases, so should the probability of success. The preferences of external actors may also be influential. Because the president has the power to veto any legislation, his preferences are especially likely to affect con...