Authentication Protocol for Vehicle Communication Sample Clauses

Authentication Protocol for Vehicle Communication. Authentication is considered a basic security service that allows subjects to mutually authenticate with other subjects [5–9]. In 2007, Xxx et al. [10] suggested an authentication protocol while using a group signature based on bilinear pairing. In their protocol, the verifier can verify multiple signatures simultaneously, which improves authentication efficiency. However, Xxxxx et al. [11] pointed out a significant flaw in Xxx et al.’s protocol, that validation required at least two pairing operations that could not be extended. In addition, their protocol uses many exponential operations that require complex computing. Therefore, they suggested an authentication protocol based on bilinear pairing and used addition operation, which is simpler than exponential operation. In 2013, Xxx and Xxx [12] found that Xxxxx et al.’s proposed scheme also has security weaknesses. They demonstrated that Xxxxx et al.’s protocol cannot achieve the signature non-repudiation and is insecure against replay attack. Moreover, Xxxxx et al.’s scheme cannot provide security to masquerade and tracking attacks. However, Xxxxxxxx et al. [13] proved that Xxx and Xxx’x protocol is insecure to the impersonation and tracing attacks and violates the non-repudiation. Further, Xxxxx et al. [14] also found an impersonation attack in Xxx and Xxx’x protocol. After that, Xxxxx et al. [14] proposed a secure authentication scheme for VANETS with batch verification to overcome [12]’s security weaknesses. Unfortunately, He et al. [15] pointed out that [14]’s protocol cannot defeat against modification, replay, and impersonation attacks. Then, He et al. [15] designed a novel secure protocol using Elliptic Curve Cryptographic (ECC) for vehicle communication. Xxxxx et al. [16] analyzed the protocol in [15] and concluded that using complex cryptographic functions can result in enormous operational costs and, consequently, the system faces network disruption problems. Therefore, they proposed a system to distribute pseudonymized signatures to verify user identities. In 2014, Xxxxxx et al. [17] proposed a trust-extended authentication scheme in VANETs. Under their protocol, vehicles are divided into three types and they only used hash and exclusive-or functions to create lightweight communication. However, Xxxx et al. [18] found out that Xxxxxx et al.’s protocol cannot guarantee privacy-preserving and is vulnerable to impersonation and insider attacks. They also argued that the assumption of TPD is stro...