For Xxxx. 0 and for all equipment and facilities directly related to Unit 3 only, in accordance with the following percentages:
A. Participants
1. New Mexico - 50 percent
2. Tucson - 0 percent
B. Unit Participants
1. M-S-R - 0 percent
2. City of Farmington - 0 percent
3. Tri-State - 8.2 percent
4. Los Alamos County - 0 percent
5. SCPPA - 41.8 percent
6. City of Anaheim - 0 percent 7. UAMPS - 0 percent
For Xxxx. After it is determined that the EL no longer qualifies as an ELL, the district/school shall continue to monitor the student for at least two years for academic progress, just as it would an EL who has received ESL programs and services.
For Xxxx. The cost for Xxxx of her peacekeeping is 1 per player (Xxx and Bob) that engages in the Arms Race. However, if only one player engages in the arms race and the other remains Peaceful, Xxxx can extract 2 utils from the latter in exchange for the protection. Engaging in the arms race transfers 1 util to Xxxx with Xxxx's intervention and 2 without. Without Xxxx's intervention, if a player engages in the arms race and the other does not, the former can take 4 utils from the latter. The game has only one SPE, where Xxxx instigates, Xxxx does not inter- vene, and Xxx and Bob engage in the arms race.27 However, Xxx, Bob, and Xxxx would like to find an agreement that induces Xxxx not to instigate. To do so, they need Xxxx to threaten Xxxx to intervene, while Xxx and Bob stay silent.28 I show that the reduced agreement with eO = {AR, P }×{AR, P }×{Int}× {Out}, inducing outcome (Out), is a SES. All actions are rationalizable; then, since the game has depth 2, by Xxxxxxx 1, it suffices to show Realization- strictness and Self-Justifiability. Realization-strictness: for every i = A, B, C — — and µi that strongly believes eO i, (ρ∞(µD)×eO i) = {(Out)}; for every µD that — strongly believes eO D, ρ∞(µD) = {Out}, which also yields Self-Justifiability for Xxxx. Self-Justifiability: for Xxxx, Int is justified by any µC that strongly believes (eO)i C such that µA((P, AR, Inst)|(Inst)) = 1; for Xxx, AR and P are justified by any µA that strongly believes (eO)i A with, respectively, µA((AR, Int, Inst)|(Inst)) = 1 and µA((P, Int, Inst)|(Inst)) = 1; likewise for Bob. Note that no specific randomization over Xxx and Bob's actions can sub- stitute agreement incompleteness: any randomization that induces Xxxx to 27 The subgame has no mixed equilibrium. If Xxx or Bob has the strict incentive to play Peaceful, the other will have the strict incentive to play Peacef ul as well. For Xxx and Bob to both randomize, given a mixed action of Xxxx, they need to play Peaceful with the same probability. But then, the probability that they play different actions cannot exceed 1/2, and thus Xxxx will have the strict incentive not to intervene. 28 This is a situation where, if secret agreements within subsets of players were possible, Xxx and Bob would want to agree on being peaceful in case Xxxx instigates, trusting that Xxxx would intervene. However, we can think that Xxxx's intelligence would discover such an agreement, and thus they refrain from reaching it, so to leave Xxxx's intervention c...
For Xxxx xxx Apartment Finder Xxxxxxxxxx.xxx
For Xxxx. 0 and for all equipment and facilities directly related to Unit 4 only, in accordance with the following percentages:
6.2.3.1 PNM: 38.457 percent 6.2.3.2 TEP: 0 percent 6.2.3.3 M-S-R: 28.8 percent 6.
