MORAL HAZARD. No contribution notice or financial support direction under the Pensions Act 2004 has been issued to the Seller in relation to the Business or to any other person in respect of the Pension Scheme and there is no fact or circumstances likely to give rise to any such notice or direction.
MORAL HAZARD. The presence of moral hazard is largely responsible for inducing the two-part structure of health insurance. This makes it important to show that moral hazard does not change the implications we have developed. Absent any other market failures, moral hazard leads to a second-best equilibrium. Monopoly with two-part health insurance also achieves this competitive outcome. Studying the moral hazard problem requires incorporating some additional consumer heterogeneity. We continue to assume that consumers are indexed by h ∈[0,1] , and distributed uniformly over this interval. We also keep the assumption that the fraction fall sick, or all consumers for whom h ≤ σ . Sick consumers place value on the medical care good, while healthy consumers do not. Therefore, insurers can easily distinguish healthy from sick patients. However, information on the severity of illness is incomplete. Patients with lower values of h are sicker, but the insurer cannot observe this. Therefore, even though they may benefit from more insurance than the less ill patients, there is no way for the insurer to make payments contingent on actual underlying health state. Payments can only be contingent on the consumer’s observed decision to purchase the medical good or not. It is impossible to insure all consumers fully. The result is a second-best solution, where the insurer charges co-payments below marginal cost. This results in “over-utilization” relative to the first-best, but this is a welfare-enhancing means of delivering some additional insurance in the face of informational incompleteness.
MORAL HAZARD. No person with which the Company is connected or of which the Company is an associate participates, or has participated, as an employer in an occupational pension scheme other than a money purchase scheme (as defined in section 181 of the Pensions Scheme Act 1993). For the purposes of this paragraph, “connected” and “associate” are to be interpreted in accordance with sections 249 and 435 of the Insolvency Xxx 0000. Part 11: Information Technology Part 10: Intellectual Property
MORAL HAZARD. The Sellers covenant to pay to the Purchaser an amount equal to any liability of the Group Companies arising out of the exercise, or proposed exercise by the Pensions Regulator of any of its powers under sections 38-51 of the Pensions Xxx 0000 to issue a contribution notice or a financial support direction to any of them requiring the recipient to contribute or provide financial support to the E.ON UK Group Pension Scheme. For the avoidance of doubt, any investigation, determination, proceedings, decisions or regulatory action taken or threatened to be taken by the Pensions Regulator shall be a “Third Party Claim” for the purposes of Clause 11.5 (Conduct of Third Party Claims) of this Agreement.
MORAL HAZARD. 39.1 Unless otherwise prohibited under Compulsory Rules and in accordance with the provisions of Recital (94) of the AIFM Regulation, the Depositary may be relieved of the liability resulting from this Agreement in relation to any investment knowingly made or maintained by the AIFM without sufficient and reasonable consideration of the (custody) risks attached to such investments and more generally without sufficient and reasonable consideration of the liability borne in relation to such investments by the Depositary pursuant to Compulsory Rules.
