Server Impersonation Attack Sample Clauses

Server Impersonation Attack. In this attack, an adversary can masquerade as a cloud server and try to respond to the node by sending (E, P and Kpub ). Our scheme can resist this attack. In fact, in the setup phase, SEi must send the h(IDi ∥ T1) to the server before getting Kpub which will be used to generate the shared key Ku. Then, the server must reply with M1∶ (E, P,Xxxx, h(IDi ∥ Kpub ∥ T2), T2 ). So, even if an attacker eavesdrops the public key, he/she cannot get the IDi which is secretly pre-shared between the trust server and a legitimate SE.

Server Impersonation Attack message {CIDi, V, M1} which was sent to S by Ui. A legal but malicious user Uk acquires {C2∗, C3∗, C4∗, A legal but malicious user Uk acquires h(xǁy),h(IDi), C1 i i h(·), n, g, B∗} from his/her own smart card and computes b∗ = B∗ ⊕ IDk ⊕ PWk, h(xǁy) = C4∗ ⊕ h(b∗ǁPWk). And the value of h(xǁy) is not changed for every user. Then Uk can obtain h(IDi) and C1 by computing h(IDi) = CID ⊕ h(V ǁh(xǁy)), C = C ⊕ h(bǁPW ) ⊕ h(ID ) = by the method mentioned in Section 3.1, then Uk can impersonate server Si to communicate with Xx.

Server Impersonation Attack. If an adversary E eavesdrops the login request message ǁ ǁ ǁ ǁ {CIDi, V, F3, F4, M1} from user Ui, he/she performs the following steps to act as the legal server Si. E must com- pute M2 = h(SK W C1 RPWi d) to respond the login request message. Even If Uk selects a random number w∗ and computes W∗ = gw∗ , SK∗ = V w∗ mod n, he/she cannot forge M2 without RPWi, C1, d. From the above analysis, our proposed scheme could resist server imper- sonation attack.