Thoughts on Reconciliation Sample Clauses

Thoughts on Reconciliation. While I find the reconciliation arguments convincing, I do not necessarily want to argue for reconciliation as the best option for the panpsychist. Rather, I would like to make a dialectical argument: whatever option one picks in terms of the ontology of properties, there will still be space for panpsychism to make its case. If one is a Russellian monist, the standard argument can be defended. If one is a dispositionalist, then Xxxxx'x argument stands, and we can make a case for panpsychism. If one accepts Xxxxx'x attempt at reconciliation between the categorical and the dispositional argument, then there is a way to clarify that view, as suggested by Xxxxxxx (2022), and arrive at a unitary and convincing defence of panpsychism. Also, even if Xxxxx’x reconciliation attempt collapses into dispositionalism, one can still argue for panpsychist from a purely dispositionalist standpoint, without seeking reconciliation. So, no matter which popular ontology of properties one chooses, one could make an argument for panpsychism. That being said, out of all these options, I found Xxxxxxx’s (2022) proposal to be the most complete and robust. However, a problem that might undermine all of the reasoning behind the standard Russellian argument is the fact that dispositional essentialists introduce an alternative to consciousness as the only positively conceivable notion of an ‘inner nature’. Dispositional essences might be sufficient as a ‘basis’ for reality, without the need for fundamental consciousness, so the dispositionalist objection to Russellian monism is still forceful. Interestingly, in the case of dispositional panpsychists who follow Xxxxx'x line of thinking, there is no danger because there is no obvious positive conception of causation which is not experienced as a mental phenomenon – at least provisionally. However, with regard to the standard Russellian argument, there seems to be an alternative to consciousness and it is thus no longer the only candidate that can play the grounding role. As mentioned previously, the dimensions discussed by Xxxxx (2013) and Xxxxxx (2003), which orient, locate, and identify a property, are an example of such an alternative. The problem is that those alternatives will not help us in explaining consciousness or filling out our ontology in order to make it more coherent. There is still a disconnect between theoretical entities like dimensions and spatiotemporal orientedness, and the first-hand experience of being conscious a...