Common use of Union Position Clause in Contracts

Union Position. The Union requested that all matters, with the exception of a wage adjustment for the Terminal Access Control, Backflow, Access Control (TAC) classification, be accepted as agreed upon in the Memorandum of Settlement that was rejected on February 17, 2017. The Union also asked that the interest arbitrator remain seized to adjudicate any matters that might arise from the implementation of this instant award, prior to the conclusion of the renewal collective agreement by the parties. The Union revisited the established consensus from interest arbitrators that the primary objective of interest arbitration was to replicate, as closely as possible, the result that might have occurred through collective bargaining, had the parties been free to enact the ultimate industrial sanction of either strike or lockout. That process, the Union urged, relied on the consideration of objective factors only, and not ad hoc or subjective speculation about what the outcome of bargaining might have entailed. Therefore, the Union continued, while the role of the interest arbitrator was to ultimately establish the terms of a renewed collective agreement, it nevertheless remained a pursuit that must be adjudicative in principle. In Re Building Service Employees, Local 204 and Welland County General Hospital (1965) 16 L.A.C. 1, Xxxxxxxxx Xxxxxxx considered the subject, and explained that the process of interest arbitration should address “adjudication” and not “adjustment.” Such an objective approach would, it was reasoned, measure the aspirations of the parties with regard to wages and working conditions based on relevant comparisons, and not abstract notions of social justice or fairness: A central issue which we faced at the outset was whether this board was to adjust or to adjudicate the differences between the parties. If we were to attempt adjustment, we would seek to reach a result agreeable to both parties. This we might do by proposing a series of compromises to them directly, or by their “proxies”, the two board members nominated by them. By a process of negotiation within the board or between the board and the parties, we would reach an acceptable mid-point. Failing of success, the board would compel “consensus” on the basis of a reasonable compromise between the negotiating positions of the two parties. Adjudication is a different kind of process. Here, the board applies evidence to pre- determined and rational standards, as does a Court of law or a board of arbitration in a grievance dispute. The negotiating positions of the parties, and the acceptability of the award to them, is at best a marginal factor in the award. Rather, the board attempts to be “objective” in measuring the entitlement of the parties to wages and working conditions. Of course, it would be naïve to assert that our deliberations were pure adjudication, wholly divorced from considerations of adjustment. Obviously, the hospital’s offer and the union’s demand established, respectively, lower and upper limits within which our award was bound to fall. Most importantly, although the absence of truly objective criteria and the nature of the “evidence” before us made adjudication a highly creative task, we were constantly aware of the need to produce a result consistent with the labour relations realities of the situation. With these reservations, however, we did attempt to adjudicate the dispute – to decide it by applying the evidence before us to rational and objective criteria. The union in this respect submitted that its wage adjustment proposal for the top rate of pay for TAC employees was comparable with security personnel working for Securiguard at Vancouver International Airport. The Union argued that wages for workers performing similar tasks and responsibilities at the Vancouver Airport were substantially higher than those of ASP employees at Xxxxxxx. It was asserted that, with the exception of training (new hires), the top rate for every classification at Vancouver Airport far exceeded the $15 per hour threshold. The lowest top rate in effect from April 1, 2016 – March 31, 2017 was $17.43, or $3.19 (22%) higher than the top rate for the classification in question in this current interest arbitration. The union further submitted that current wage rates for the TAC classification were far below the living wage calculations for much of the Xxxxxxx Xxxxxxx and Xxxxxxxx Areas. The Canadian Centre for Policy Alternatives defines the living wage as the income a full-time worker must earn in order to meet basic needs, pay for work related expenses such as commute and clothing, and have some money left over for one’s family expenses and broader community activities. The Union contended that living wage calculations across the GTA have far exceeded the minimum wage set in every province and territory, and that even full-time low- wage workers do not earn enough money to adequately make ends meet. In that regard the Union provided the following comparison: Table 2: Top Rate and Local Living Wage Comparison Terminal Access Control, Backflow, Access Control Top Rate Region Living Wage % of living wage Gap between Living Wage and Top Rate $14.42 Xxxxxxxx $15.85 91% 9% Toronto $18.52 78% 22% Durham $17.00 85% 15% Guelph $16.50 87% 13% Source: Ontario Living Wage Network, Living Wage by Region, xxx.xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx.xx The Union then cited the perceived Employer response that ever increasing wages were a major detriment to profitability. However, recent research from economists and management experts alike, the Union alleged, highlighted a positive correlation between higher wages and improved training opportunities with increased productivity and ability to focus on the job. For example, the Union continued, in her book The Good Jobs Strategy, Xxxxxx Xxx found that employees with low earnings and insufficient training can have a negative effect on an employer’s operational goals, and indeed drag down productivity and profit. While her research focussed on the retail sector, the Union believed that it provided important insight for all employers, including those in aviation safety and security. The request for $15 an hour for the top rate TAC employee, the Union contended, would not elevate those workers even close to a full-living wage. However, it would begin to decrease the wage gap that they experience, as they attempt to make ends meet. Additionally, the Union submitted that the public safety and security of the aviation industry, while a fundamental goal of Security Services for all concerned, was effectively being undermined by low-wage employees at Xxxxxxx Airport, including TAC workers, who are increasingly dealing with challenges of the most precarious nature. The Union voiced the overarching concern that such under compensated employment generally exerted a downward influence on service quality, one that could potentially lead to security and safety breaches. The Union submitted that an increase to $15 per hour for the top wage rate of TAC employees would improve worker well-being, have the simultaneous effect of improving job performance, and by extension increase public safety and aviation security at Xxxxxxx Airport. The Union requested that the interest arbitrator so award.

Union Position. The Union requested that all matters, with the exception of a wage adjustment for the Terminal Access Control, Backflow, Access Control (TAC) classification, be accepted as agreed upon in the Memorandum of Settlement that was rejected on February 17, 2017. The Union also asked that the interest arbitrator remain seized to adjudicate any matters that might arise from the implementation of this instant award, prior to the conclusion of the renewal collective agreement by the parties. The Union revisited the established consensus from interest arbitrators that the primary objective of interest arbitration was to replicate, as closely as possible, the result that might have occurred through collective bargaining, had the parties been free to enact the ultimate industrial sanction of either strike or lockout. That process, the Union urged, relied on the consideration of objective factors only, and not ad hoc or subjective speculation about what the outcome of bargaining might have entailed. Therefore, the Union continued, while the role of the interest arbitrator was to ultimately establish the terms of a renewed collective agreement, it nevertheless remained a pursuit that must be adjudicative in principle. In Re Building Service Employees, Local 204 and Welland County General Hospital (1965) 16 L.A.C. 1, Xxxxxxxxx Xxxxxxx considered the subject, and explained that the process of interest arbitration should address “adjudication” and not “adjustment.” Such an objective approach would, it was reasoned, measure the aspirations of the parties with regard to wages and working conditions based on relevant comparisons, and not abstract notions of social justice or fairness: A central issue which we faced at the outset was whether this board was to adjust or to adjudicate the differences between the parties. If we were to attempt adjustment, we would seek to reach a result agreeable to both parties. This we might do by proposing a series of compromises to them directly, or by their “proxies”, the two board members nominated by them. By a process of negotiation within the board or between the board and the parties, we would reach an acceptable mid-point. Failing of success, the board would compel “consensus” on the basis of a reasonable compromise between the negotiating positions of the two parties. Adjudication is a different kind of process. Here, the board applies evidence to pre- determined and rational standards, as does a Court of law or a board of arbitration in a grievance dispute. The negotiating positions of the parties, and the acceptability of the award to them, is at best a marginal factor in the award. Rather, the board attempts to be “objective” in measuring the entitlement of the parties to wages and working conditions. Of course, it would be naïve to assert that our deliberations were pure adjudication, wholly divorced from considerations of adjustment. Obviously, the hospital’s offer and the union’s demand established, respectively, lower and upper limits within which our award was bound to fall. Most importantly, although the absence of truly objective criteria and the nature of the “evidence” before us made adjudication a highly creative task, we were constantly aware of the need to produce a result consistent with the labour relations realities of the situation. With these reservations, however, we did attempt to adjudicate the dispute – to decide it by applying the evidence before us to rational and objective criteria. The union in this respect submitted that its wage adjustment proposal for the top rate of pay for TAC employees was comparable with security personnel working for Securiguard at Vancouver International Airport. The Union argued that wages for workers performing similar tasks and responsibilities at the Vancouver Airport were substantially higher than those of ASP employees at XxxxxxxPearson. It was asserted that, with the exception of training (new hires), the top rate for every classification at Vancouver Airport far exceeded the $15 per hour threshold. The lowest top rate in effect from April 1, 2016 – March 31, 2017 was $17.43, or $3.19 (22%) higher than the top rate for the classification in question in this current interest arbitration. The union further submitted that current wage rates for the TAC classification were far below the living wage calculations for much of the Xxxxxxx Xxxxxxx and Xxxxxxxx Areas. The Canadian Centre for Policy Alternatives defines the living wage as the income a full-time worker must earn in order to meet basic needs, pay for work related expenses such as commute and clothing, and have some money left over for one’s family expenses and broader community activities. The Union contended that living wage calculations across the GTA have far exceeded the minimum wage set in every province and territory, and that even full-time low- wage workers do not earn enough money to adequately make ends meet. In that regard the Union provided the following comparison: Table 2: Top Rate and Local Living Wage Comparison Terminal Access Control, Backflow, Access Control Top Rate Region Living Wage % of living wage Gap between Living Wage and Top Rate $14.42 Xxxxxxxx Hamilton $15.85 91% 9% Toronto $18.52 78% 22% Durham $17.00 85% 15% Guelph $16.50 87% 13% Source: Ontario Living Wage Network, Living Wage by Region, xxx.xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx.xx The Union then cited the perceived Employer response that ever increasing wages were a major detriment to profitability. However, recent research from economists and management experts alike, the Union alleged, highlighted a positive correlation between higher wages and improved training opportunities with increased productivity and ability to focus on the job. For example, the Union continued, in her book The Good Jobs Strategy, Xxxxxx Xxx found that employees with low earnings and insufficient training can have a negative effect on an employer’s operational goals, and indeed drag down productivity and profit. While her research focussed on the retail sector, the Union believed that it provided important insight for all employers, including those in aviation safety and security. The request for $15 an hour for the top rate TAC employee, the Union contended, would not elevate those workers even close to a full-living wage. However, it would begin to decrease the wage gap that they experience, as they attempt to make ends meet. Additionally, the Union submitted that the public safety and security of the aviation industry, while a fundamental goal of Security Services for all concerned, was effectively being undermined by low-wage employees at Xxxxxxx Airport, including TAC workers, who are increasingly dealing with challenges of the most precarious nature. The Union voiced the overarching concern that such under compensated employment generally exerted a downward influence on service quality, one that could potentially lead to security and safety breaches. The Union submitted that an increase to $15 per hour for the top wage rate of TAC employees would improve worker well-being, have the simultaneous effect of improving job performance, and by extension increase public safety and aviation security at Xxxxxxx Airport. The Union requested that the interest arbitrator so award.

Union Position. The Union requested that all matters, with the exception of a wage adjustment for the Terminal Access Control, Backflow, Access Control (TAC) classification, be accepted as agreed upon in the Memorandum of Settlement that was rejected on February 17, 2017. The Union also asked that the interest arbitrator remain seized to adjudicate any matters that might arise from the implementation of this instant award, prior to the conclusion of the renewal collective agreement by the parties. The Union revisited the established consensus from interest arbitrators that the primary objective of interest arbitration was to replicate, as closely as possible, the result that might have occurred through collective bargaining, had the parties been free to enact the ultimate industrial sanction of either strike or lockout. That process, the Union urged, relied on the consideration of objective factors only, and not ad hoc or subjective speculation about what the outcome of bargaining might have entailed. Therefore, the Union continued, while the role of the interest arbitrator was to ultimately establish the terms of a renewed collective agreement, it nevertheless remained a pursuit that must be adjudicative in principle. In Re Building Service Employees, Local 204 and Welland County General Hospital (1965) 16 L.A.C. 1, Xxxxxxxxx Xxxxxxx considered the subject, and explained that the process of interest arbitration should address “adjudication” and not “adjustment.” Such an objective approach would, it was reasoned, measure the aspirations of the parties with regard to wages and working conditions based on relevant comparisons, and not abstract notions of social justice or fairness: A central issue which we faced at the outset was whether this board was to adjust or to adjudicate the differences between the parties. If we were to attempt adjustment, we would seek to reach a result agreeable to both parties. This we might do by proposing a series of compromises to them directly, or by their “proxies”, the two board members nominated by them. By a process of negotiation within the board or between the board and the parties, we would reach an acceptable mid-point. Failing of success, the board would compel “consensus” on the basis of a reasonable compromise between the negotiating positions of the two parties. Adjudication is a different kind of process. Here, the board applies evidence to pre- determined and rational standards, as does a Court of law or a board of arbitration in a grievance dispute. The negotiating positions of the parties, and the acceptability of the award to them, is at best a marginal factor in the award. Rather, the board attempts to be “objective” in measuring the entitlement of the parties to wages and working conditions. Of course, it would be naïve to assert that our deliberations were pure adjudication, wholly divorced from considerations of adjustment. Obviously, the hospital’s offer and the union’s demand established, respectively, lower and upper limits within which our award was bound to fall. Most importantly, although the absence of truly objective criteria and the nature of the “evidence” before us made adjudication a highly creative task, we were constantly aware of the need to produce a result consistent with the labour relations realities of the situation. With these reservations, however, we did attempt to adjudicate the dispute – to decide it by applying the evidence before us to rational and objective criteria. The union in this respect submitted that its wage adjustment proposal for the top rate of pay for TAC employees was comparable with security personnel working for Securiguard at Vancouver International Airport. The Union argued that wages for workers performing similar tasks and responsibilities at the Vancouver Airport were substantially higher than those of ASP employees at Xxxxxxx. It was asserted that, with the exception of training (new hires), the top rate for every classification at Vancouver Airport far exceeded the $15 per hour threshold. The lowest top rate in effect from April 1, 2016 – March 31, 2017 was $17.43, or $3.19 (22%) higher than the top rate for the classification in question in this current interest arbitration. The union further submitted that current wage rates for the TAC classification were far below the living wage calculations for much of the Xxxxxxx Xxxxxxx and Xxxxxxxx Areas. The Canadian Centre for Policy Alternatives defines the living wage as the income a full-time worker must earn in order to meet basic needs, pay for work related expenses such as commute and clothing, and have some money left over for one’s family expenses and broader community activities. The Union contended that living wage calculations across the GTA have far exceeded the minimum wage set in every province and territory, and that even full-time low- wage workers do not earn enough money to adequately make ends meet. In that regard the Union provided the following comparison: Table 2: Top Rate and Local Living Wage Comparison Terminal Access Control, Backflow, Access Control Top Rate Region Living Wage % of living wage Gap between Living Wage and Top Rate $14.42 Xxxxxxxx Hamilton $15.85 91% 9% Toronto $18.52 78% 22% Durham $17.00 85% 15% Guelph $16.50 87% 13% Source: Ontario Living Wage Network, Living Wage by Region, xxx.xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx.xx The Union then cited the perceived Employer response that ever increasing wages were a major detriment to profitability. However, recent research from economists and management experts alike, the Union alleged, highlighted a positive correlation between higher wages and improved training opportunities with increased productivity and ability to focus on the job. For example, the Union continued, in her book The Good Jobs Strategy, Xxxxxx Xxx found that employees with low earnings and insufficient training can have a negative effect on an employer’s operational goals, and indeed drag down productivity and profit. While her research focussed on the retail sector, the Union believed that it provided important insight for all employers, including those in aviation safety and security. The request for $15 an hour for the top rate TAC employee, the Union contended, would not elevate those workers even close to a full-living wage. However, it would begin to decrease the wage gap that they experience, as they attempt to make ends meet. Additionally, the Union submitted that the public safety and security of the aviation industry, while a fundamental goal of Security Services for all concerned, was effectively being undermined by low-wage employees at Xxxxxxx Airport, including TAC workers, who are increasingly dealing with challenges of the most precarious nature. The Union voiced the overarching concern that such under compensated employment generally exerted a downward influence on service quality, one that could potentially lead to security and safety breaches. The Union submitted that an increase to $15 per hour for the top wage rate of TAC employees would improve worker well-being, have the simultaneous effect of improving job performance, and by extension increase public safety and aviation security at Xxxxxxx Airport. The Union requested that the interest arbitrator so award.