Accession Negotiations Sample Clauses
The Accession Negotiations clause outlines the process and requirements for a new party to join an existing agreement or organization. Typically, it specifies the steps a prospective member must follow, such as submitting an application, meeting certain criteria, and obtaining approval from current members or a governing body. This clause ensures a clear and orderly procedure for expanding participation, helping to maintain consistency and fairness when integrating new parties.
Accession Negotiations. Any WTO member may accede to the GPA on terms agreed between that member and all GPA parties. Since the GPA entered into force in 1996, its membership has grown from 23 to 48 parties
Accession Negotiations. Any WTO member may accede to the GPA on terms agreed between that member
Accession Negotiations. Any WTO member may
Accession Negotiations. We begin the analysis by considering the stage 2 accession game, given the tariffs negotiated by countries 1 and 2 in stage 1. In light of the symmetry in endowments across the three countries, we can restrict attention to the case in which the initial trade agreement specifies ¯t 12 = ¯t 21 . We denote this tariff imposed on trade between member countries in goods 1 and 2 as tm. The MFN principle will ensure that if an agreement is reached, t13 = t23 = tm. Similarly, country 3 must apply the same tariffs to imports from countries 1 and 2 if it becomes a member, so the tariff negotiated between 3 and the members can be denoted ta = t31 = t32. The negotiations in this accession will involve offers of tariff reductions by the acceding country in return for receiving MFN access to the member markets. The payoff to a member country under an agreement can thus be expressed as W m(t m,t a) = W 1(t m,t m,t m,t m,t a,t a) , and the payoff to the acceding country is W a(t m,t a) = W 3(t m,t m,t m,t m,t a,t a) . Utilizing (1), (3), and (4) yields the following results:
Lemma 1: For values of tm and ta that are not prohibitive,
(a) The payoff to the representative member country, Wm(tm, ta),
(i) is concave in tm and attains a maximum at t˜m = (x + (6 -7)y - c)/7, where tN > t˜m
(ii) is convex and decreasing in ta
(b) The payoff to the acceding country, Wa(tm, ta),
(i) is concave in ta and achieves a maximum at ta = tN > tC
(ii) is convex and decreasing in tm for tariffs that are not prohibitive Note that for the existing members of the agreement, the tariff that maximizes member welfare is less 1j than the ▇▇▇▇ value. Specifically, for country 1 the ▇▇▇▇ tariff satisfies 6S 1(t N,t N)/6t = 0 for j = 2,3. In contrast, 6W m/6t m = Σ j'2,3 6S 1(t m,t m)/6t 1j + Σ j0{1,3} 6S 1(t m,t m)/6t 2j , where the second term reflects the effect on country 1 of an increased tariff on its exports to the partner country’s market and must be negative. Therefore, the optimal value of tm will be less than the ▇▇▇▇ tariff. Reductions in tm reflect reciprocal tariff reductions by members, so each of the original members benefits from reductions in the other’s tariffs. Note however that the optimal tariff for the members will exceed the cooperative level defined in (4) because members do not internalize the benefits of tariff reductions on the non- member. In the event that 3 does not become a member, country 3 will impose its optimal tariff on imports from both 1 and 2, which yields t3i =...