Bank of Am. Nat’l Trust & Sav. Ass’n, 310 F.3d 1188 (9th Cir. 2002) establish Maryland law governing whether interest paid by a nursing care facility pursuant to a swap agreement that secures the facility’s real property is mortgage interest under the Maryland Medicaid regulation making mortgage interest an allowable, reimbursed cost?
Bank of Am. Corp., 639 F.3d 572, 579 (2d Cir. 2011)). “While related to jurisdiction is not limitless, it is fairly capacious, and includes suits between third parties which have an effect on the bankruptcy estate.” Id. (cleaned up); see Celotex Corp. x. Xxxxxxx, 514 U.S. 300, 308 (1995) (“Congress intended to grant comprehensive jurisdiction to the bankruptcy courts so that they might deal efficiently and expeditiously with all matters connected with the bankruptcy estate.”).
Bank of Am. Corp., 700 X. Xxxx. 2d 832, 847 (E.D. Mich. 2010) (“An accounting is not available where the action is for [a] specific amount due under the contract.”); West x.
Bank of Am. N.A., 910 F.3d 1096, 1101 (9th Cir. 2018)). 138 AT&T cites the Verizon Xxxxxxxx x. Dominion Virginia Power decision as supporting the application of a breach of contract statute of limitations, but this is not what Verizon Virginia says. See AT&T’s Pole Attachment Complaint at ¶ 32 n.93. Importantly, the Commission made no finding regarding the “applicable statute of limitations” in that case. The Commission merely noted that Verizon contended that the applicable statute of limitations was a 5-year breach of contract limitations period and that the defendant in that case did not dispute that contention. See Verizon Virginia, LLC and Verizon South, Inc., v. Virginia Electric and Power Company d/b/a Dominion Virginia Power, Order, Proceeding No. 15-190, 32 FCC Rcd 3750, 3764 (2017). Furthermore, in the AT&T v. FPL Decision (and despite significant briefing in which AT&T took the same position it takes here), the Commission specifically “ma[de] no findings as to the appropriate statute of limitations.” AT&T v. FPL Decision, 35 FCC Rcd at 5323, ¶ 6 n.19. A more analogous state cause of action would be an action to rescind a contract, given that AT&T’s claims seek to disavow or rewrite—rather than enforce—the contract at issue. The limitations period for such an action under Florida law is four years and begins to run at the time the cause of action accrued.139 Here, AT&T bases its claim to “rescind” the contract on the premise that the cost-sharing methodology in the joint use agreement is not “just and reasonable” under Section 224. This right accrued no later than July 12, 2011 (the effective date of the Commission’s 2011 order asserting jurisdiction over the rates, terms and conditions for ILEC attachments on electric utility poles).140 This means that, if a Florida state law statute of limitations applies, then AT&T’s entire claim is this case—both backward looking and forward looking—is time barred. Notwithstanding the foregoing, application of Florida’s limitations periods for a breach of contract action or an action to rescind a contract would not be consistent with Commission policy or recent Commission precedent. First, the Commission has a “longstanding policy of refusing to adjudicate private contract law questions for which a forum exists in the state courts.”141 Therefore, it would be inconsistent for the Commission to borrow a state limitations period that applies to actions over which the Commission has consistently refused to exercise jurisdict...
Bank of Am. Corp., 2014 WL 4273358 at *10 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 29, 2014) (discussing range of acceptable TCPA settlements and approving
Bank of Am. N.A., 2023 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26261, at *5 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 16, 2023) (internal quotation omitted).
Bank of Am. Corp. (“AIG”), 712 F.3d 775, 780 (2d Cir. 2013). All three prongs of the test must be satisfied for jurisdiction to lie.
Bank of Am. Corp. v. Lemgruber, 385 X. Xxxx. 2d 200, 215 n. 13 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (concluding that purchase of the stock of a Brazilian defendant and several of its affiliates constituted a financial operation); Xxxxxx x. Nat’l City Bank of N.Y., 23 F. Supp. 363, 365-66 (E.D.N.Y. 1938) (operations were those inherent in and arising out of trust indenture relating to sale of German corporation’s bonds); see also Bin-Jiang Tao v. Citibank, N.A., 445 F. App’x 951, 954 (9th Cir. 2011) (unpublished), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 1561, 182 L. Ed. 2d 168 (2012) (“‘[I]nternational or foreign financial operations,’ . . . are defined to include operations by banks or corporations to raise capital, including through the sale of securities.” (emphasis added)). But see Warter v. Boston Secs., S.A., No. 03-81026-Civ./Xxxxxxx, 2004 WL 691787, at *8 (S.D. Fla. Mar. 22, 2004) (finding that the “purpose of the securities transactions is not legally relevant to determining whether the transactions were financial in nature”). A sale of goods would not constitute a “financial operation.” Sale of a security as a good, without a connection to raising capital, is not normally considered a “financial operation.” See Black’s Law Dictionary (9th ed. 2009) (defining the verb finance as “[t]o raise or provide funds”).
