Dispute Resolution and Sanctions. The GBT deal brings basic telecommunications---and hence, most of the global market---under an internationally legitimate enforcement mechanism. For any country that wishes to fend off bilateral pressure tactics, this is an important break with the past. The institutional mechanisms and multilateral consultations involved may be especially important for small and developing countries that would otherwise find themselves on their own and at a substantial disadvantage in dealing more powerful countries. The process begins with bilateral consultations, in which the Director General of the WTO may offer his or her "good offices" in an effort to mediate. If these efforts fail, the Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) establishes a panel with clear terms of reference and an agreed composition; an expert review group may also be consulted. The panel then examines the issues in meetings with the parties and any relevant third parties over a period not to exceed six months, three months in urgent cases. The panel then submits its report to the parties and then to the DSB for an interim review. The DSB must decide on the report within sixty days unless it is appealed, and an appellate review not to exceed ninety days may be launched. The DSB monitors the implementation of the adopted panel report or appellate body recommendation, and parties may then negotiate compensation pending full implementation. If all else fails, the DSB can authorize retaliatory measures against the infringing party that in principle would have full legitimacy under the rules. This could provide parties, especially smaller ones, with a degree of safety from undue pressure tactics and unilateral bullying. In fact, trade policy makers hope, the threat of such legitimate sanctioning may often preclude conflicts by giving members strong incentives to settle their differences before they reach the boiling point. Never before have telecommunications services been subject to such a clear and forceful multilateral framework for preventing and resolving bilateral conflicts; the instruments of the ITU, for example, lack provisions for resolving disputes over competition. There are, however, some potentially significant problems with this mechanism. One is whether in practice the composition and conduct of the DSB and its panels will be sufficiently open and democratic to enjoy the necessary legitimacy in the first place. Another is whether the involvement of the DSB, and indeed of the telecommunications grou...
