Domestic-level factors. None of the above-mentioned perspectives deals explicitly with national-level factors, which prompted scholars in recent years to issue a call to ‘bring domestic politics back in’ (e.g. Xxxx 2004; Xxxxxxx et al. 2005). Particularly per- tinent in this respect are the works of EU scholars who stress the role of domestic institutions, norms and culture (e.g. Green Xxxxxx et al. 2001; Xxxxxx 2005; Xxxxxxxxxxxxxx and Xxxxxxxxxx 2005). Studying compliance on the part of Spain and Germany to EU environmental directives, Börzel (2000), for example, finds that the degree of fit, or misfit, between EU and national policy regimes determines whether a country will adhere to its supranational commit- ments, while Xxxxx and Xxxxxxxx (2001) observe that new EU regulatory instru- ments that do not conform to existing institutional agreements at the national level are more likely to meet resistance than those that do (see Mastenbroek 2005 for a critical discussion of the ‘fit’ hypothesis). Others, by contrast, suggest that interest groups or other societal actors are pertinent factors affecting the implementation of international agreements. Whether or not a state may take national-level action depends on the power of the groups that would be positively or negatively affected by the international agreement in question (Young 1979; Xxxxxxxxx 1991). For example, the more power a group has that would suffer adverse effects from implementation, the more reluctant a state might be to take steps in accordance with the agreement due to fear of potential political ramifications, such as being voted out of office during the next elections. Foot dragging regarding the implementation of inter- national agreements can also occur if governmental authorities, rather than soci- etal groups, are affected by the adjustments needed. In this case, rules that require changes in well-established administrative structures, procedures or practices at the national level may be met with resistance by bureaucracies with vested interests in existing arrangements (Tallberg 2002: 628). By the same token, polarization among political parties may hamper implementation since no agreement can be reached on whether particular laws should be passed or insti- tutions established. Finally, scholars working in the liberal tradition have emphasized that the type of government is a good indicator for how it may behave (e.g. Xxxxxxxxx 1995). According to this line of thinking, mature democratic countries are mor...
