Full Coverage. The same medical and life insurance coverage the employee has at the time the leave is granted.
Full Coverage. During the term of this Warranty, upon prompt written notice by the Building Owner as hereinafter provided, Simon Roofing will take appropriate action to repair leaks which may occur. Xxxxx will inspect the roof and, if a leak is within the coverage of this Warranty, will at its own expense make or cause to be made all necessary repairs to the Simon Roof Assembly to put it into watertight condition. Should investigation reveal that a leak is caused by something other than causes covered by this warranty, investigation and repair cost shall be assumed and paid by the Building Owner, who shall affect prompt and adequate repairs in a manner compatible with the Simon System. The Building Owner will be responsible for the removal or replacement of any traffic surfaces or other appurtenances built over the roof required in order to put the Roof Assembly in watertight condition.
Full Coverage i. If the Insured chooses Coverage based on no deductible, AFSC will only pay an Indemnity when the percentage of loss on an Insured Crop is equal to or exceeds ten percent. When the percentage of loss on an Insured Crop is equal to or exceeds ten percent, AFSC will pay the full percentage of loss. If the percentage of loss on an Insured Crop is calculated by AFSC to be equal to or in excess of 90 percent, the percentage of loss shall be deemed to be 100 percent.
Full Coverage. One immediate solution of (4.18) is yi = Li − xi = x0, for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, which yields full coverage for the participating agent types. The lowest participating type θ0 in the full-coverage scenario is determined by setting that agent’s insurance premium equal to his “certainty equivalent.” The latter corresponds to the agent’s compensating variation for the insurance contract, so necessarily x0 = C(L1 − x0, . . . , Ln − x0, θ0), which in turn implies that 0 0 L¯, if θ = 0, x = g(θ ) ≡ { ln(−r(θ0))/θ0, if θ0 ∈ (0, 1], i=1 where L¯ = ∑n piLi denotes the agent’s expected loss.20 The principal’s expected payoff under full coverage is V¯ (x; θ0) = (x0 − L¯)(1 − F (θ0)), so that the optimal participation threshold becomes the global solution of a scalar maximization problem on an interval (for details, see [18]): ∈ θ θ0∗ arg max 0∈[0,1] {(g(θ0) − L¯)(1 − F (θ0))} . As a result, the optimal (constant) schedule is x∗ = (x∗0, L1 − x∗1, . . . , Ln − x∗n), where x0∗ = g(θ0∗) and x = Li − x0∗ for i ∈ {1, . . . , n}. The full-coverage solution leads to no information revelation at all, as all the agent types are offered the same contract. This is also referred to as “bunching” [4]. Partial Coverage. Based on the available optimality conditions it may be possible to construct another solution to the optimal insurance problem, which involves at least partial information revelation. Indeed, for a given θ ∈ (0, 1], provided that µ = 0 and ϕ(θ) ≡ p0f (θ)/ψ0(θ) > 1/θ, there is a negative solution to (4.18), i.e., there exists a ζ = ζ(θ) < 0 such that ζ = (eθζ − 1) ϕ. (4.19) In this case, the solution ζ = x0 − yi = x0 + xi − Li < 0 is independent of i ∈ {1, . . . , n}. For ϕ(θ) ∈ [0, 1/θ], the only solution to (4.19) is ζ = 0, reverting back to the full-insurance regime (for that agent type θ). Because by the transversality condition (C1) it is ψ0(1) = 0 , this implies that for large enough agent types θ the principal may find it optimal to use partial coverage. We now continue to follow the solution algorithm outlined in Remark 3, via (3.1) and (3.9). Indeed, the law of motion in (3.1), together with x˙i = ζ˙ − x˙0 for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, implies that ζ˙ − x˙0 φi(x, θ) = − p0 = p0 . (4.20) i=1 ( ) ∑n x˙0 = φ(x, θ) · (x˙1, . . . , x˙n) = 1−p0 v(ζ, θ) ζ˙ p0 1−p0 ζ˙ eθζ + 1−p0 p 1 − 1−p0 v(ζ, θ) 19By the adjoint equation (C1), it is ψ0 = (1 − F )p0 and ψi = −(1 − F )pi on [θ0∗, 1] for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n}. (Thus, nontriviality (C5) holds.) Theorem 3 yields µ(θ) ...
Full Coverage. If the Insured chooses coverage based on no deductible, AFSC will only pay an Indemnity when the percentage of loss is equal to or exceeds ten percent. When the percentage of loss is equal to or exceeds ten percent, AFSC will pay the full percentage of loss. If the percentage of loss is calculated by AFSC to be equal to or in excess of 90 percent, the percentage of loss shall be deemed to be 100 percent.
