INDEPENDENT OFFER ANALYSES Sample Clauses

INDEPENDENT OFFER ANALYSES. ▇▇▇▇▇▇ conducted its own rather simplified valuation process. The two sets of valuations generally correlated well, with a fair amount of noise in the comparison, as shown in Figure 3 that compares the two sets of valuations. LCBF valuation, $/MWh ▇▇▇▇▇▇ did not use its simplified model to construct a separate short list. Instead, the simplified model was useful in quality control to identify errors in PG&E’s or the IE’s inputs, parameters, or assumptions for specific Offers. Also, the comparison helped identify what specific factors caused specific Offers to be ranked high or low in PG&E’s short-listing process, such as the impact of the discount rate assumption, the on-line date, the choice of which transmission cluster to assign to an Offer, and the size of TRCR or transmission wheeling adders. ▇▇▇▇▇▇ also scored each Offer for viability independently of PG&E’s analysis, using the original Energy Division version of the Project Viability Calculator. This was useful to get an estimate of what the standard error of the Calculator is, and a sense of whether differences in score reflect significant differences in the viability of projects or are within the noise of the method for assessing viability. ▇▇▇▇▇▇ emerged from the comparison (shown in Figure 4) with a view that differences of a dozen or fewer points in viability score may not reflect true differences in the likelihood that one project is significantly likelier than another to achieve successful completion, given the roughness of the tool and the subjectivity of its use. PG&E viability score The correlation of the IE and PG&E team’s scores using the Project Viability Calculator is poorer than that between valuation models. ▇▇▇▇▇▇ ascribes this to the gray areas in the scoring guidelines, to differences in the subjective judgments of individual scorers, and to PG&E’s use of an additional evaluation criterion in its modified Calculator. The comparison between the sets of scores helped reveal specific errors that ▇▇▇▇▇▇ acknowledged in its draft scores and corrected, but no doubt there are other errors in ▇▇▇▇▇▇’▇ viability scoring that have not yet been identified.
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INDEPENDENT OFFER ANALYSES. ▇▇▇▇▇▇ conducted its own rather simplified valuation analysis. PG&E’s and ▇▇▇▇▇▇’▇ valuations generally correlated well for many Offers, but with a fair amount of noise in the comparison, as shown in Figure 3 that compares the two sets of valuations. Some of the differences between valuations include: • Less value assigned to Resource Adequacy in the independent assessment, which tends to lower the value ranking of projects with the most estimated Net Qualifying Capacity such as solar generation; • Less value assigned to projects interconnecting in non-CAISO balancing authority areas; • Less of a premium assigned to projects with later CODs or longer delivery terms. This comparison was useful in quality control to identify errors in PG&E’s or the IE’s input parameters. Also, the comparison helped identify what factors caused specific Offers to be ranked high or low in PG&E’s short-listing process, such as the impact of the discount rate assumption, the on-line date, and the size of transmission adder. ▇▇▇▇▇▇ also scored each Offer for viability independently of PG&E’s analysis. This was useful to get an estimate of what the standard error of the Calculator is, and a sense of whether differences in score reflect significant differences in viability or are within the noise of the method. ▇▇▇▇▇▇ emerged from the comparison (shown in Figure 4) with a view that differences of a dozen or fewer points in viability score may not reflect significant differences in the likelihood that project will succeed in attaining commercial operation on schedule, given the modest precision of the tool and the subjectivity of its use. PG&E valuations, $/MWh • Lower IE scores for projects proposing very large solar photovoltaic facilities; • Lower IE scores for projects from developers with experience only in distributed generation (e.g. beyond the meter) projects rather than wholesale generation; • Lower IE scores for projects for which specific network upgrades are as yet poorly characterized.
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INDEPENDENT OFFER ANALYSES. ▇▇▇▇▇▇ conducted its own rather simplified valuation analysis. ▇▇▇▇▇▇’▇ valuations generally correlated well with PG&E’s Net Market Value analysis for many Offers, but with a fair amount of noise in the comparison, as shown in Figure 9 that compares the two sets of valuations. The mediocre quality of the correlation is less interesting than the outliers and the underlying reasons for some of the divergences:
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INDEPENDENT OFFER ANALYSES. ▇▇▇▇▇▇ conducted its own rather simplified valuation analysis. ▇▇▇▇▇▇’▇ valuations generally correlated well with PG&E’s Net Market Value analysis for many Offers, but with a fair amount of noise in the comparison, as shown in Figure 9 that compares the two sets of valuations. The mediocre quality of the correlation is less interesting than the outliers and the underlying reasons for some of the divergences: PG&E LCBF valuation of Net Market Value • PG&E assigned a higher value to new projects interconnecting in non-CAISO balancing authority areas because no transmission adders are applied; ▇▇▇▇▇▇ estimates an adder for network upgrades for these projects. This is most clearly seen in the two shortlisted projects interconnecting into IID’s grid. • PG&E assigned network upgrade costs to projects for an interconnection even if the developer reports that the costs will be borne by another project using a share of the interconnection capacity, on the logic that the costs should still be allocated to the project making an Offer. • Some scatter is due to the difference in discount rates applied to future years’ cash flows; PG&E uses its own authorized weighted cost of capital as a regulated utility, ▇▇▇▇▇▇ uses a higher estimate of merchant generators’ cost of capital. The adjustments have a considerable impact on the value rankings of Offers. Figure 10 shows a plot of Offers’ NMV vs. PAV, showing visually how for some Offers the ' adjustments can reduce the PAV by as much as ranking. , substantially altering their Overall, if ▇▇▇▇▇▇ had used its valuation and viability scores to identify high-value candidates for selection, more Offers in SP-15 would have been chosen, including more existing geothermal and wind projects. Fewer Offers in NP-15 would have been chosen'' , and projects that ▇▇▇▇▇▇ scored below median for project viability would have been rejected, . This simply reflects the strength of PG&E’s preference for projects in its own service territory, its disinterest in counting IID network upgrade costs that do not directly affect PG&E’s rates, and its greater willingness to select lower-viability proposals. ▇▇▇▇▇▇ also scored each Offer for viability independently of PG&E’s analysis, using the final version of the 2011 Project Viability Calculator, anticipating a later need to rank projects that obtain executed PPAs against a peer group made up of all RFO proposals.
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Related to INDEPENDENT OFFER ANALYSES

  • Independent Analyses of each Holder Each Holder acknowledges that, except for the representations made in Section 7, it has, independently and without reliance upon any other Holders and based on such documents and information as such Holder has deemed appropriate, made its own credit analysis and decision to purchase its respective Note. Each Holder hereby acknowledges that the other Holders shall have no responsibility for (i) the collectability of the Mortgage Loan, (ii) the validity, enforceability or legal effect of any of the Mortgage Loan Documents or the title insurance policy or policies or any survey furnished or to be furnished in connection with the origination of the Mortgage Loan, (iii) the validity, sufficiency or effectiveness of the lien created or to be created by the Mortgage Loan Documents, or (iv) the financial condition of the Borrower. Each Holder assumes all risk of loss in connection with its respective Note for reasons other than gross negligence, willful misconduct or breach of this Agreement by any other Holder or gross negligence, willful misconduct or bad faith by any Servicer.

  • Independent Analysis Each Party hereby confirms that its decision to execute this Agreement has been based upon its independent assessment of documents and information available to it, as it has deemed appropriate.

  • Independent Development Receiving Party may currently or in the future be developing information internally, or receiving information internally, or receiving information from other parties that may be similar to the Disclosing Party's Confidential Information. Accordingly, nothing in this Agreement will be construed as a representation or inference that Receiving Party will not develop or have developed products or services, that, without violation of this Agreement, might compete with the products or systems contemplated by the Disclosing Party's Confidential Information.

  • Response/Compliance with Audit or Inspection Findings A. Grantee must act to ensure its and its Subcontractors’ compliance with all corrections necessary to address any finding of noncompliance with any law, regulation, audit requirement, or generally accepted accounting principle, or any other deficiency identified in any audit, review, inspection or investigation of the Grant Agreement and the services and Deliverables provided. Any such correction will be at Grantee’s or its Subcontractor's sole expense. Whether ▇▇▇▇▇▇▇'s action corrects the noncompliance shall be solely the decision of the System Agency. B. As part of the services, Grantee must provide to HHS upon request a copy of those portions of Grantee's and its Subcontractors' internal audit reports relating to the services and Deliverables provided to the State under the Grant Agreement. C. Grantee shall include the requirement to provide to System Agency (and any of its duly authorized federal, state, or local authorities) internal audit reports related to this Grant Agreement in any Subcontract it awards. Upon request by System Agency, Grantee shall enforce this requirement against its Subcontractor. Further, Grantee shall include in any Subcontract it awards a requirement that all Subcontractor Subcontracts must also include these provisions.

  • DEVELOPMENT OR ASSISTANCE IN DEVELOPMENT OF SPECIFICATIONS REQUIREMENTS/ STATEMENTS OF WORK