Interface Specification. Rambus-1 Interface -------------------------------- Specification' means, at any time, the then most current version of the Rambus-1 Technology interface specification finalized and released by Rambus."
Interface Specification. The functional specification prepared by Seller that defines the radio frequency interface, logical and physical protocols necessary for Mobile Exchange Unit (MXU) interoperability with the Space System. It does not include the Voice Encoding Algorithm necessary for complete interoperability with the IRIDIUM Communications System.
Interface Specification. The functional specification prepared by Seller that defines the radio frequency interface, logical, and physical protocols necessary for subscriber unit (voice, data, facsimile) interoperability with the Space System. It does not include the Voice Encoding Algorithm necessary for complete interoperability with the IRIDIUM Communication System.
Interface Specification. Seller agrees to develop and sell MXUs to third parties and to license to responsible and competent suppliers acceptable to Seller the rights to use the information in the MXU Interface Specification and the Voice Encoding Algorithm to the extent essential to manufacture and sell IRIDIUM MXU's, all pursuant to reasonable terms and conditions mutually acceptable to Seller and such third parties.
Interface Specification. Unless otherwise agreed by the parties in ----------------------- writing, ACS shall not knowingly make any changes to the Products which obsoletes the interface specification applicable to the then current version of the Products and the then current version of the Xerox 4890 and 4635 Printers, the Docutech, or any other Xerox product which Xerox has notified ACS in writing are being used by end-user customers in connection with the Products.
Interface Specification. The external RA server interfaces are shown in the Table 6 and in Figure 17. We distinguish two classes of APIs: APIs enabling operations related to targets (e.g., adding a target to the list of targets that can be attested by the RA server, returning the list of available targets, etc) and APIs enabling operations about the attestations (e.g., running an attestation, returning computed attestations about a designated target, etc). Internal interfaces, between RA server and RA agents will be over TLS protocol. Internal interfaces, between RA agents and the underlining hardware will be based on TPM standards [45]. Table 8 Remote Attestation API Method URL Required Data Objects Returned Data Object Operations related to targets GET /api/targets/ --- JSON list GET /api/targets/{id} —- JSON list / error 404 DELETE /api/targets/{id} —- Ok (204) / Error (404) PUT api/targets/{id} {id, name, host, port} Ok (204) / Error (404) Operation related to attestations GET api/attestations/ —- JSON list POST /api/attestations/ {id, name, target_id} OK (201) GET /api/attestations/ targets/{id} —- JSON list GET /api/attestations/ {id} —- JSON list / ERROR (404) DELETE /api/attestations/ {id} —- OK (204) / ERROR (404) PUT /api/attestations/ {id} {id, name, target_id} OK (204) / ERROR (404) Figure 17 [RA enabler] REST API overview
Interface Specification. Currently the RCA module has not been integrated into the MMT framework. We define the API of MMT-Operator to get root causes in csv or json format sent from the RCA module. The detailed message is yet to be completely specified. It is possible to support all types of communications means, such as through the use of MongoDb, Redis or Xxxxx servers. The RCA-M is part of the Decision Engine, as shown in Figure 18. It receives information from the Security Analytics Engine or the SSLA assessment module; historical root cause-related information from the Data Services and stores new information; and finally it notifies the Security Orchestrator so that corrective actions can be taken. Figure 18 Location of RCA-M in the INSPIRE-5Gplus HLA The initial version of the API is shown in the following Table 9. The API allows providing the RCA module with all the information extracted and the analysis obtained by monitoring the system, retrieving the all the possible root causes, and interrogating the RCA to determine the most probable cause of a detected security breach. Optionally, the RCA module can store and retrieve historical information in the Data Store (not included in the API described here). Table 9 Root Cause Analysis API Method URL Required Data Objects Returned Data Object POST /api/causes Request Body: An array of causes in json (to be defined) 200: OK 400: Invalid input GET /rca/ None Return all alerts and the potential root-causes suggested by RCA 200: OK 404: Not found GET /rca?property=propertyId Params propertyId (type: string): the security alert Id requested by Security Orchestrator root-cause (type: json) (to be defined) Return the root- cause related to the threat in the alert identified by ‘alertId’ 200: OK 404: Not found
Interface Specification. The LASM Referencing Service and the LASM Analysis Service allow MANIFEST elements to be exchanged data. Their interfaces are shown in Table 11. They will be designed to enable API based communication from the MANIFEST Class and Instance in the INSPIRE-5Gplus architecture. Table 11 APIs of the LASM Referencing Service and the LASM Analysis Service REST endpoint Method URL Required Data Objects Returned Data Object Referencin g Service GET /referencingpolicy -- Text file with SWRL rules POST /referencingpolicy Text file with SWRL rules -- POST /manifestclass Multipart(zip) JSON(string :manifestclass_ID, string: manifestclass_status) PUT /manifestclass/{ID} -- JSON(string: manifestclass_ID, string: manifestclass_status) GET /manifestclass/{ID}/status -- Status in plaintext GET /manifestclass/{ID}/file -- Manifestclass_JSON /manifestclass/findby JSON(map: key/criteria) Array(string: manifestclass_ID) Analysis Service POST /manifestinstance/ JSON(string: manifestclass_ID, string: instance_ID, JSON: instanciation) -- PUT /manifestinstance/{instance_ID} JSON(map: metrics/action) -- GET /manifestinstance/{instance_ID} JSON(map: metrics/value) GET /manifestinstance/{instance_ID}/file --
Interface Specification. The preliminary interface specification for GRALAF is shown in Table 12. The purpose of the API is to ingest data, mainly network model, and generate the graph model for further analysis via GRALAF algorithms. Moreover, the results will be provided to the end user(s) or other elements in the architecture. Table 12 GRALAF API Method URL Required Data Objects Returned Data Object GET liability/gralaf/graph/networkmodel —- JSON object GET liability/gralaf/graph /probabilisticgraph --- JSON object GET liability/gralaf/graph /probability/node/<nodeID> nodeID Probability value GET liability/gralaf/graph /probability/link/<sourceNodeID>/<targetN odeID> sourceNodeID targetNodeID JSON object GET liability/gralaf/graph/liabilityList --- JSON object References [1] Xxxx X. Xxxxxxxx, “Liability and computer security: Nine principles.” In European Symposium on Research in Computer Security, pp. 231-245. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg, 1994. [2] 5GPPP, “5G Infrastructure Public Private Partnership (5GPPP) the next generation of communication networks and services,” xxxx://xxxxxxxxxxxxx.xx/wp-content/uploads/5GPPP- brochure-draft02.pdf. [3] Xxxxxx Xxxxxxxxx, Xxxxxx Xxx, Xxxxx Xxxxxx Xxxx Xxxxxx, Xxxxxxxxxx Xxxxxxxx, Xxxxxx Xxxxxx, Xxxx Xxxxxxxxxx, “The roadmap to 6G security and privacy", IEEE Open Journal of the Communications Society, 2021. [4] X. Xxxxxxxx, X. Xxx, and X. Xxx, “6G and beyond: The future of wireless communications systems,” IEEE Access, vol. 8, pp. 133 995–134 030, 2020. [5] ITU-T FG-NET-2030. “Network 2030 A blueprint of technology, applications and market drivers towards the year 2030 and beyond”, May 2019, online: xxxxx://xxx.xxx.xxx/en/ITU- T/focusgroups/net2030/Documents/White_Paper.pdf. [6] SMA, “Network slicing use cases requirements,” xxxxx://xxx.xxxx.xxx/futurenetworks/wp- content/uploads/2020/01/2.1Network-Slicing-Use-Case-Requirements-Booklet-1.pdf, 2020. [7] X. Xxxxxx, “The legal and political battles of Y2K,” IEEE Annals of the History of Computing, 2020. [8] EC Report with recommendations to the Commission on a civil liability regime for artificial intelligence, xxxxx://xxx.xxxxxxxx.xxxxxx.xx/doceo/document/A-9-2020-0178_EN.html [9] EC Report on the safety and liability implications of Artificial Intelligence, the Internet of Things and robotics, xxxxx://xx.xxxxxx.xx/info/sites/info/files/report-safety-liability-artificial- intelligence-feb2020_en_1.pdf [10]ETSI NFV Release 4 Security; Security Management Specification, xxxxx://xxxxxx.xxxx.x...
Interface Specification. Network Device Class Power Management Reference Specification, Version 1.0a xxxx://xxx.xxxxxxxxx.xxx/hwdev/specs/PMref/ OpenHCI: Open Host Controller Interface Specification for USB, Release 1.0a xxxx://xxx.xxxxxxxxx.xxx/hwdev/respec/busspecs.htm OnNow and Power Management Web page xxxx://xxx.xxxxxxxxx.xxx/hwdev/onnow/ PC Card and CardBus Guidelines, Version 1.1 xxxx://xxx.xxxxxxxxxx.xxx/library/pccard.htm PCI Bus Power Management Interface Specification, Revision 1.1 PCI Bus Power Management Interface Specification, Revision 1.0 PCI SIG Phone: (000) 000-0000 xxxx://xxx.xxxxxx.xxx/developers/specification/ PCI Hot-Plug Specification, Revision 1.0 xxxx://xxx.xxxxxx.xxx/developers/specification/ PCI IDE Controller Specification, Revision 1.0 xxxx://xxx.xxxxxx.xxx/developers/docs/ PCI Local Bus Specification, Revision 2.2 (PCI 2.2) xxxx://xxx.xxxxxx.xxx/developers/specification/
