Threat any circumstance or event with the potential to adversely impact County operations (including mission, functions, image, or reputation), organizational assets, individuals, or other organizations through an Information System via unauthorized access, destruction, disclosure, modification of Information, and/or denial of service.
Threat. A known or suspected malicious behaviour executing on an Asset. This includes threat intelligence events.
Threat. If CRED iQ or CRED iQ’s third party data suppliers, acting reasonably in the circumstances then known to CRED iQ, determines that Customer’s or any of its Authorized Users’ use of the CRED iQ Services poses an imminent threat to the security or integrity of
Threat. (The plan should contain the threat information provided by the government and any other pertinent information known to the program or activity officials specifying known threat to their location, personnel, information, or operations. Threat should be tailored to both the information and locations identified as critical to the sponsor and the program or activity. An essential part of this section should be a thorough analysis of the available open-source information concerning both the program/activity's and sponsor's operations in similar efforts and technologies. The threat to U.S. Government activities continues. The political changes that took place in eastern Europe have certainly changed the focus of U.S. concerns from a nuclear-centered threat to an economic-centered threat, but the potential for grave harm to the U.S. continues. Although it is a less cataclysmic climate, the ultimate result is the same. Information about specific adversary capabilities is available from the NAWCAD OPSEC Officer. This includes, but not limited to, information on organizations such as the Russian Foreign Intelligence Service (SVRR); People's Republic of China (PRC); Intelligence services of countries friendly to U.S. interests; competitors in the economic world; or efforts by narcotraffickers or terrorist groups.)
Threat. The threat is documented in the JART ICD and JRATS CDD and is on file at DAU/IN. The JTAMS will operate in high threat conditions. The system is intended for employment in nuclear, chemical, and biological warfare contaminated environments.
Threat. A potential cause of an unwanted incident, which may result in harm to a system or the organization. Roles and Responsibilities Note to organizations – These role descriptions here are an example. Organizations should adjust these descriptions as necessary to best meet their business environment and include any additional roles that have been identified in the organization that apply such as Security Officer, Privacy Officer, etc. Organizations need to identify roles, responsibilities and identify who is responsible for incident response preparation and planning, discovery, reporting, response, investigation, recovery, follow-up and lessons learned. Staffing will be dependent on organization’s capabilities. The same person may fulfill one or more of these roles provided there is sufficient backup coverage. The following are suggested roles and responsibilities organizations should consider: incident response team members, incident commander, and point of contact to interface with external organizations.
Threat. “Unit costs for production on the NCS represent a threat to the level of activity,” says Mr Xxxxxxx. “Something must be done, and quickly. We must succeed in revers- ing this picture over the next three-five years if we’re going to derive full benefit from our infrastructure and installations. “That’s particularly important at a time when we’re find- ing smaller and more complex fields, while facing major challenges in maximising oil recovery from existing developments. Margins in both case are smaller, and we’ve got to get much more cost-effective than before.” “Smart” or intelligent operation is one of the most important concepts for shifting Norway’s oil sector onto the offensive. This involves changing work processes, particularly to take advantage of the opportunities offered by information technology advances. Today’s fibreoptic solutions allow large volumes of data to be transferred in real time between offshore installa- tions and land. In practice, a number of work operations can thereby be controlled and monitored remotely – with all the savings and opportunities for increased value creation which that offers. The potential for cutting costs and to some extent for improving earnings through more intelligent operation is substantial in every area, from licence administration, procurement and logistics to operation, maintenance, production optimisation, reservoir management and drilling. Calculations show that an investment of roughly NOK 1 billion in more efficient operation of six selected fields could cut their costs by up to 40 per cent in 2004-08 while boosting output by as much as five per cent. Complex One area where intelligent operation could be applied is drilling, a complex activity which requires the application of broad expertise. By integrating the land organisation more closely with offshore operations, knowledge of geology, production and other disciplines can be utilised faster, more effectively and probably with better results during the actual process. Monitoring important phases in drilling, production and maintenance can be done just as well from land as from an offshore control room. The aim is to take better decisions in order to achieve improved results at a lower cost. “Unit costs for production on the NCS represent a threat to the level of activity. Something must be done, and quickly.” “Smart operation is one of the most important issues we’re pursuing at Petoro,” comments Mr Xxxxxxx. “We know that the potential for bette...
Threat. Livestock, humans and vehicles can physically disturb and cause birds to leave leks or abandon nests. CM: Avoid new surface disturbing activities (e.g., roads, pipelines, corrals for branding) within 0.6 mile of the perimeter of occupied leks; avoid dis- ruptive activities between 6 pm and 8 am from March 1 through May 15 within 0.6 mile of the perimeter of occupied leks; avoid concentrating live- stock in nesting habitat from March 15 through June 30; Avoid off-trail ve- hicular travel in nesting habitat from march 15 through June 30 unless es- sential for routine ranch management (fencing, doctoring livestock).
Threat. Livestock watering tanks and troughs can cause sage-grouse mor- tality by entrapment and drowning. CM: Fit existing and new water troughs with escape ramps.
Threat. Some farm and ranch operations can increase opportunities for predation of sage-grouse and sage-grouse nests.
