Xxxxxxx Corp. GL and MB collectively own all of the issued and outstanding membership interests of the General Partner.
Xxxxxxx Corp. Of course, reference to old English cases had received criticism. Xxxxx Xxxxxx XXX, in the Court of Appeal case of Government of Malaysia v. Syarikat Xxxxxx Xxxxxxx Sdn Bhd & Ors5, says:
Xxxxxxx Corp. Of course, reference to old English cases had received criticism. Xxxxx Xxxxxx XXX in the Court of Appeal case of
Xxxxxxx Corp and each Stockholder represents and warrants that the number of shares of Xxxxxxx Corp. common stock, par value $.01 per share ("Xxxxxxx Corp. Common Stock"), set forth opposite such Stockholder's name on Schedule I hereto is the total number of shares of Xxxxxxx Corp. Common Stock over which such person has "beneficial ownership" within the meaning of Rule 13d-3 under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended, except that the provisions of Rule 13d-3(d)(1)(i) shall be considered without any limit as to time.
Xxxxxxx Corp. Counsel Senior Vice President ------------------------------------ ----------------------------------- Printed Name and Title Printed Name and Title -------------- * Text omitted pursuant to a request for confidential treatment and filed separately with the Securities and Exchange Commission.
Xxxxxxx Corp. ANNEX III DESCRIPTION OF EXISTING INDEBTEDNESS Senior Notes $ 100,000,000 (1) Senior Subordinated Notes $ 27,188,000 (2) Hutcxxxxxx xxxuisition notes $ 500,000 Other $ 3,987,000 (3) --------------------------
Xxxxxxx Corp. No. 06-5566 (N.D. Cal.); Xxxxxxx v. Int’l Paper Co., No. 06-703 (S.D.Ill.); Will v.
Xxxxxxx Corp. 737 F.2d 982, 986 (11th Cir. 1984). Rather, the approval of a class action settlement is within the sound discretion of the trial court. In re Vitamins Antitrust Litig., Misc. No. 99-197 (TFH), 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8931, at *17 (D.D.C. Mar. 20, 2000); United States v. District of Columbia, 933 X. Xxxx. 42, 47 (D.D.C. 1996). Prior to giving approval, the Court must provide adequate notice to the class, conduct a “fairness hearing,” and then find that the “settlement is fair, adequate and reasonable and is not the product of collusion between the parties.” Xxxxxxx x. Xxxxxxxx, 185 F.R.D. 82, 98 (D.D.C. 1999); (quoting Xxxxxx x. Xxxxxxxx, 139 F.3d 227, 231 (D.C. Cir. 1998); Xxxxxxx x. Xxxxx, 948 X. Xxxx. 1077, 1086 (D.D.C. 1996). In making this determination, the trial court must protect the interests of the absent Class Members. Xxxxxxx, 185 F.R.D. at 98. In exercising its discretion, the Court “should always review the proposed settlement in light of the strong judicial policy that favors settlements.” Xxxxxxx v. Wometco Enterprises, Inc., 000 X.X.X. 000, 538 (S.D. Fla. 1988); Xxxxxxx, 948 X. Xxxx. at 1086; Cotton x. Xxxxxx, 559 F.2d 1326, 1331 (5th Cir. 1977) (“Litigants should be encouraged to determine their respective rights between themselves.”). This is especially true in the case of class actions given their inherent uncertainty, difficulties in proof and length. Xxxxxx, 559 F.2d at 1331; Xxxxxxx, 118 F.R.D. at 538. Furthermore, the settlement of complex cases conserves scarce judicial resources and resolves disputes more quickly. Xxxxxx, 559 F.2d at 1331; see also In re United States Oil and Gas Litigation, 967 F.2d 489, 493 (11th Cir. 1992) (“Complex litigation . . . can occupy a court’s docket for years on end, depleting the resources of the parties and the taxpayers while rendering meaningful relief increasingly elusive.”). In assessing the fairness and adequacy of a proposed class settlement, “there is a strong initial presumption that the compromise is fair and reasonable,” especially for cases brought under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Xxxxxxx, 948 X. Xxxx. at 1086; see Xxxxxxx x. Xxxxxxxx, 93 F.R.D. 68, 85 (D.D.C. 1981) (“decisions emphasizing the preferred role of settlements under Title VII are legion”). As the Supreme Court has recognized, Congress enacted Title VII with a “strong preference” for “encouraging voluntary settlement of employment discrimination claims” to ensure compliance. See Xxxxxxx, 948 X. Xxxx. at 1086; se...
Xxxxxxx Corp. 2006 SCC 43. The determination of this issue may also affect the ability to invoke the s. 29.4 educational institutional exemption as well. ent media, different copyrights, and different copyright holders. In addition, there are other organizations and companies that do not style themselves as copyright collectives but may fall within the definition of “collective socie- ties” in the Copyright Act (for example, book publishers, record companies, motion picture studios). Users may often have to deal with multiple collec- tives and other organizations in order to fulfill their requirements and obtain the requisite licenses. This is particularly the case in the increasingly digital context — playing a song over the internet may arguably involve both the communication right of each of the composer and sound recording owner (for transmission over the internet) and reproduction rights (for download- ing). Industry Canada has recognized such new technology issues as a part of the medium-term reform agenda of the Copyright Act. While dealing with collectives vastly reduces the complications of dealing with multiple owners or licensees of copyrights, dealing with multiple collective societies also in- creases complexity and transaction costs, running contrary to some of the key benefits of collectives.60 As publishers respond to consumer preferences and shifting business models in the digital age and provide content subscriptions and pay per use/user agree- ments, the more legally certain approach would be to deal with copyright owners directly. Complex administrative matters persist, moreover, pertaining to the redis- tribution of collected funds, as noted by Xxxxxxxxx Xxxxx: Board decisions can be contentious . . . Issuing a licence where none was needed would be outside the Board’s power. The Board’s practice on grant- ing a licence is to fix an appropriate royalty for the user to pay to a collect- ing society. The Board then authorizes the society to apply the sum to its general revenue if the copyright owner does not collect the royalty within five years. This practice seems questionable. The Board cannot require ap- plicants to make charitable donations as a condition of obtaining licences. A power to authorize copyright collectives to confiscate money is even less plausible. The royalty might better be deposited with the Board, which could then return it to the user if the owner does not claim it within five years of the expiry of the licence.61 Since the Su...
Xxxxxxx Corp. 1994 WL 162613, *2 (Del. Ch. Apr. 21, 1994) (finding reasonable doubt existed as to whether directors who served as officers of controller's affiliates could consider a litigation demand). The Court now turns to whether Plaintiffs alleged sufficient facts showing that Defendants T. Xxxx, Xxxxx, and Xxxx, DPW's CEO, CFO, and President, respectively, are independent and uninterested. If so, Defendants did not need to raise a demand with the Board prior to bringing the instant lawsuit.
